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Abstract
This thesis investigates the turn to a neo-revivalist Muslim identity in the West as a form of self-
othering. The binary dichotomy of self and other is used as a framework for the apparent 
divide between Muslims and the West. Second and third-generation disapora neo-revivalists 
personalise religion and through their hermeneutics seek an expression of religion that 
transcends cultural practice. They self-other in a way reactionary to society, and also react to the 
religion of their parents’ generation, which for them is not spiritual enough and instead is too 
steeped in cultural practices. Secularism and the post-secular turn is considered in Western 
society to provide context to the West that these neo-revivalists are located within. The diversity 
of Muslims is investigated to contextualise the neo-revivalist shift, which rather than being 
tolerant of diversity amongst Muslims seeks a separation of culture from religion. As second-
and third-generation diaspora Muslims are the children of Muslim migrants to the West, the 
inter-generational divide is investigated. First-generation migrants have a continuity to their 
religious expression based on their experiences within the country of origin, whereas second-
and third-generation migrants engage in a re-negotiation process to enable their religiosity to be 
relevant to Western societies. Qualitative case studies relating to the performance of religious 
identity, that is necessarily public, are utilised from Britain and the United States to further 
contextualise neo-revivalism. Literary mediation and mediatisation are examined in the context 
and globalisation. Contemporary literature is utilised to consider the self-critique of issues 
relating to integration and assimilation of Muslims in Western society by Muslims in Western 
societies. These cosmopolitan voices provide an internal understanding of the issues involved. 
Media-technologies have enabled a wide range of discourses to circulate about the current 
geopolitic following ‘9/11’ and Muslims themselves have utilised these mediated-technologies, 
and as such, neo-revivalism is necessarily a product of time, place and circumstance. Finally, a 
conclusion is reached and in seeking to understand the neo-revivalist turn and the place of 
Muslims in the West, a cosmopolitan ethic of integration is proposed that seeks to turn away 
from essentialisations and binary oppositions, but instead, through an engagement in 
respectful and reflexive critical dialogue, it is hoped that our shared universal humanity may be 
realised. 
1Introduction
The term ‘neo-revivalist’1 Muslim identity is utilised to describe the ‘new’ turn to the 
privileging of a Muslim identity over national and ethnic affiliations amongst second- and 
third-generation diaspora Muslims2 in the West3. This is not a universal ‘phenomenon’, 
contrary to media suggestions, and is not applicable to all young Muslims, however it is 
significant as some Muslim youth have become increasingly visible actors on the public stage. 
The notion of ‘self-othering’ is employed to conceptualise this neo-revivalist shift in terms of 
the polarised notions of ‘self’ and ‘other’. A binary construction of self-othering refers to 
Muslims being considered the ‘other’ in societal terms. This occurs in a variety of ways, with 
regard, firstly, to the profession of a religious identity in Western secular societies; secondly due 
to the salience of Muslims and Islam especially following the events on the 11th of September, 
2001 or ‘9/11’; and thirdly through their status as ‘visible minorities’. In response, it is argued 
that second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims engage in a re-negotiation process with 
regard to their religious affiliations, and more significantly their expression of Islam, that is 
necessarily public. The conception of ‘self-othering’ will thus be considered to denote the active 
construction of a (reactionary) religious identity in the multiple contexts of Western societies 
and with regard to the global politic following ‘9/11’. Self-othering may also take place by 
young Muslims distinguishing their distinctive (religious) identities from that of their parents’ 
generation, through which their understanding of Islam seeks out ‘real’4, ‘true’ and ‘authentic’ 
Islam. In this way neo-revivalists may self-other to the local Muslim community and other 
Muslims, and instead, locate themselves supranationally, through their consideration of the 
Islamic ummah.
  
1 This term has been derived from Nazli Kibria’s qualitative research study on: ‘The ‘new Islam’ and Bangladeshi 
youth in Britain and the US’. Ethnic and Racial Studies. Vol. 31, No. 2. February 2008. pp. 243-66. Kibria refers to 
the ‘new Islam’ as revivalist Islam. 
2 Diaspora Muslims refers to Muslims living outside Muslim-majority countries. 
3 The ‘West’ refers to Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand. However, Europe and the United 
States will mainly be focussed on. 
4 This relates to the preoccupation in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries with the search or passion for the 
‘real’. See Zizek, S. Welcome to the Desert of the Real!: Five Essays on September 11 and related dates. London; New 
York: Verso. 2002.
2In this thesis a cultural approach to religion is followed, focussing on how a religious and more 
specifically a Muslim identity is enacted by second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims. The 
term ‘Islamic’ identity is not used, but instead reference is made to the hermeneutics of Islam 
by Muslims. Identity is considered a dynamic, ongoing process and construction that 
necessarily locates itself in accordance to societal context and is a product of time, place and 
circumstance. Both identity politics and the reflexive self5 are significant as the turn to neo-
revivalism is an individualised marker of identity and a choice rather than simply ascribed.  
This thesis approaches the issue holistically taking into account such socially ascribed variables 
as political, economic, educational, religious and cultural issues, as well as identity formation 
with regard to ethnicity and cultural heritage. All of these factors are significant in 
understanding the individual’s relationship to society. Following this, I argue that the 
geopolitical context that includes what Devji has termed the ‘landscapes of the jihad’6 is 
significant in influencing some who may be considered to be ‘other’ in Western society. For 
the neo-revivalist turn to an individualised religious identity is combined with a shift towards a 
global community-oriented religious identity as well, that of the supranational Islamic ummah.
Therefore, it is argued second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims may engage in a re-
negotiation process with regard to their religious affiliations and more significantly, their 
religious expression.
A wide range of discourses relating to Muslims, Islam and the West will be engaged with in this 
thesis including study of hermeneutics relating to religion in general, Islam, and Muslims in 
particular. Societal secularism, diaspora Muslims, identity politics, community organisation, 
media discourses and literary fiction will all be taken into account in order to attempt to 
comprehend the prevalence and privileging of the religious identity over other forms of identity 
construction by second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims, such as ethno-national identity 
markers. Religious ‘extremism’ will also be considered in terms of ‘neofundamentalism’ and 
global jihadis. However as the neo-revivalist Muslim identity does not necessarily indicate 
religious extremism or religious militancy, what is explored is the social landscape that this may 
take place in. 
  
5 Giddens, A. Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Cambridge: Polity Press. 1991.
6 Devji, F. Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity. London: Hurst & Company. 2005.
3Chapter one examines the background of Western secularism. It begins with an overview of 
Western secularism and the secularisation thesis proposed by social theorists stemming from 
Enlightenment ideals of science and rationality which discounted the individual and societal 
requirements for religion in terms of both human meaning and societal organisation. The 
framework of contemporary Western society with regard to postmodernity is considered with 
regard to identity politics and the re-emergence of religion in the private sector of social life. 
1.2 considers the ‘post-secular’ turn taking place in the West through which religion has 
increased in visibility in the public sector of society. This visible shift of religion returning to 
the public sector of societal organisation is considered, for the purpose of this thesis, in terms 
of Muslim identity and Islam. 
Chapter two provides an overview of the discourse relating to moderate Muslims, and the 
variety of positions that Muslims may take with regard to being Muslim in society. Issues of 
religious extremism will be taken up in 2.2, and reference made to neofundamentalism and 
global jihadis. 
Chapter three focuses on issues pertaining to diaspora Muslims in the West. The 
‘essentialisation’ and ‘racialization’ of Muslims and Islam will be considered in 3.1. Reference 
will also be made to the notion of the ‘diaspora’ for Muslims in the West, and conceptions of 
Islam and Western discourse are examined. 3.2 takes into account issues of belonging and 
notions of home for first-generation diaspora Muslims. The views of Tariq Ramadan, a notable 
scholar of Islam concerning the place of Muslims in Western society are taken up in 3.3 with 
regard to the societal of participation first- and second- and third-generation migrants. Second-
and third-generation conceptions of cultural dislocation and religious re-location are 
investigated in 3.4. 3.5 will contextualise this discussion through qualitative research case 
studies carried out in Britain and America.
Chapter four examines mediated and mediatised discourses. Contemporary literary fiction 
written by Muslims about Muslims in the West is considered in 4.1. These works are  
significant in reflecting an internal critique of issues of integration and religion. The 
significance of globalisation and the media is explored in 4.2. Through techno-mediation, a 
4global and virtual (inter)connectedness has taken place whereby the primary affiliation to 
localised contexts have been overshadowed by the global stage. Reference is also made to 
mediatised discourse.
5Chapter 1. Secularisation, the post-secular turn and religion
To examine the place of religion in contemporary Western society, this chapter will present an 
overview of both the secularisation thesis prevalent in the West and the simultaneous (and 
paradoxical) continued religiosity found there. Bosetti and Eder7 assert that the United States 
(perhaps due to denominational and sectarian factions that have always been present in its 
history8) has not gone through the same period of secularisation whereby religion has been 
privatised. Therefore, ‘the West’ referred to in this section will mainly refer to Western Europe. 
However, the information presented will be relevant to all contemporary Western countries9 in 
providing a context and background through which global issues such as multiculturalism can 
be viewed10. Such issues as the ‘invisibility’ of religion in the public sphere of society, its 
reappearance, and the continued and continuing significance of religion relating to 
individuation and identity, which is reflected both in contemporary individuals and in society, 
will also be discussed. I will be using the term ‘neo-revivalist’ Muslim identity rather than Islamic
identity as my concern is not with the religion of Islam in general, but of how Muslims enact 
their Muslim identities in Western society, through their hermeneutics of Islam.  
This chapter is specifically more concerned with religion in general, rather than Muslims and 
Islam in particular, which will be dealt with more fully in Chapter two. I will begin this chapter 
by establishing the institutionally secular context of the West, in particular Europe and 
contemporary analyses pertaining to the place of religion in society. The purpose of this 
chapter is to provide a theoretical background of the place of religion within contemporary 
Western society11. This background is important in order to provide a context through which 
the place of religion in general and Islam in particular can be considered in the West. 
  
7 Bosetti, G. and Eder. K. ‘Post-secularism: A return to the public sphere’. Eurozine, 17th August, 2006. 
http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2006-08-17-eder-en.html See also Anderson, B.C. ‘Secular Europe, religious 
America’. Public Interest Spring 2004. 155. pp. 143-158. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Including New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the United States. 
10 Diaspora Muslims in the West will be considered in more detail in Chapter 3, regarding identity, the assertion 
of religious identity and immigrant communities. It should be noted here that I will discuss a particular context 
(the West) rather than the universal and global perspective of the continued significance and presence of religion. 
11 This will be a general discussion, however, which will mainly refer to Islam and Muslims in the West.
61.1 Religion, secularism, the secularisation thesis 
There are two etymological roots of the term ‘religion’. The first is relegere, ‘to bring together’,
and the second is religare, ‘to tie or bind together’12. Both these etymologies relate to the notion 
of membership and religare relates also to regulations created and maintained through some 
communal form. ‘Religion’, however, is a contested term13, and as well as being a self-definition 
by adherents, may also be defined externally by those outside of the religious parameters. Smith 
refers to religion as an anthropological rather than a theological category that describes 
“...human thought and action, most frequently in terms of belief and norms of behaviour”14. 
During the course of this thesis, religion is defined as a set of beliefs, symbols and practices 
binding a group of individuals together in what may often be a common community. I will 
consider religion in cultural terms, that is, how it is experienced, practiced and lived. ‘Culture’ 
is defined by social science as, “all that in human society which is socially rather than 
biologically transmitted…thus a general term for the symbolic and learned aspects of human 
society”15. Thus, there is an inextricable link between culture and society and I would add, 
between culture and religion. Religion is lived through the cultural collective of the sacred16 as a 
way of life in terms of attitudes, beliefs, language, dress, diet, custom and convention17, I would 
also suggest that a shared experience of history and collective memory adds to the cultural 
experience of religion. Religion may be considered as the overarching collective and also as the 
‘authentic’18 locations of belief, ritual and practice19. Religiosity can be considered as the 
individuated response and expression of religion. Traditionally classified in terms of belief, the term 
'religiosity', as used in this thesis, will be expanded to include contemporary forms of 
individuated religious expression, such as spiritual and individualised interpretations of particular 
religions that may be transcendent of sectarian differences. Religiosity will refer also to religion 
  
12 See Turner, B.S. ‘Religion’. Theory, Culture & Society. Vol. 23, Nos. 2-3. 2006. pp. 437-455.
13 See McCutcheon, R.T. ‘The Category “Religion” in Recent Publications: A Critical Survey’. Numen. Vol. 43, 
No. 3. October 1995. pp. 284-309.
14 Smith, J.Z. ‘Religion, Religions, Religious’. In M.C. Taylor (ed.) Critical Terms for Religious Studies. Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press. 1998. p. 269. 
15 Scott, J. and Marshall, G. (eds.). ‘Culture’. Oxford Dictionary of Sociology. Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press. (1994) 2005. pp. 132-3.
16 Scott, J. and Marshall, G. (eds.). ‘Religion’. Oxford Dictionary of Sociology. Ibid. p. 560.
17 Abercrombie, N., Hill, S. and Turner, B.S. (eds.). ‘Religion’. Penguin Dictionary of Sociology. London; New York: 
Penguin Books. 2000. p. 83.  
18 As perceived by some adherents and also those outside of the religion. 
19 Defined in collective terms, practices and beliefs that fall outside of the collectively-located orthodoxy and 
authentic perception of religion, may be defined by the collective majority in dissent terms. 
7being practiced so that it is an individualised identity marker. Whilst the scope of this thesis is 
concerned with a neo-revivalist Muslim identity in the West, it is vital to consider secularism in 
the West although of course due to the Judeo-Christian heritage of the West, Islam not 
specifically dealt with. However, it is important to contextualise the neo-revivalist Muslim 
identity with Western secularism as this is the physical location for second and third 
generation Western diaspora Muslims.    
The term 'secularism' is often considered to be the antithesis of religion and implies non-
religiosity. It can apply to individuals or to the state of society. Being secular or non-religious 
does not necessarily mean being anti-religious. It refers to the fact that individuals in a society 
(or a society itself) do not necessarily ascribe to religious faith either for ontological security or 
to provide the epistemological underpinning of reality and existence. Moreover, religious faith 
in a secular society is not practiced in terms of phenomenology as taken-for-granted meaning 
within society. The notion of secularism implies freedom of religion and impartiality of the 
State towards any particular religious tradition. Ideally, however, secularism would be inclusive 
and aware of religious plurality within a given society. Rather than trying to be impartial to any 
particular religion by not accepting any type of public religious display, what needs to be 
considered is whether the break with religious institutions and religious authority in secular 
societies needs to necessarily include individual religious expression. For example, a secular 
society is not necessarily synonymous with an anti-religious society, but instead, ideally would 
be a society that respects religious plurality, religious conscience and religious traditions 
without using religion and religious institutions as a necessary basis to morally instruct 
governance in terms of liberties and freedoms. (The French notion of laicite20 is a secular 
notion that in practice may be considered anti-religious if the recent headscarf debates 
surrounding the public display of religious symbols are taken into consideration. Religious 
symbols and religious expression is to be limited to the private sector of society, and whilst this 
would include all religious symbology, the hijab or headscarf, can be considered a highly 
symbolic expression of profession to a religious faith, and more significantly perhaps, to a 
contested set of cultural values, interpreted by some as the subjugation of women.) 
  
20 French secularism that is based on the principle of the separation of Church and State that emerged specifically 
out of the French context. The roots of laicite are based in the French Revolution in 1789 when social and 
political systems were restructured. The involvement of the Roman Catholic Church was confined to religious 
matters only in 1801, and Judaism, Lutherans and the Reformed Churches were formally recognised. Religion 
became and individual matter and separate to the state. See  http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A2903663
8A theoretical overview of societal secularism and religiosity will be given below to provide a 
context to the continuation and transformation of religious practice within Western society. 
This background will inform the turn to a neo-revivalist Muslim identity amongst some second-
and third-generation diaspora Muslims in the West. It will also provide a framework for the 
repositioning of this individuated Muslim identity, for a small minority, to the supranational 
and communal focus of the global jihad. My main focus in doing so is to show that although 
institutional secularisation in the public sector was historically proposed and accepted as part 
of the ‘modern’ condition, the behaviour and practices of individuals have not necessarily 
reflected this, and religious identity is still relevant to many people of all faiths in contemporary 
society. The public face of religion is also changing, as social theorists21 have now proposed, 
with the move towards post-secularism within the larger context of post-modernism. Yet 
secularisation always allowed to some degree a split between the public and private faces of 
religion. This can be seen historically in the case of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. 
The movement towards the Western Christian notion of secular society emerged in 1648 
following the Thirty Years War, with the Treaty or Peace of Westphalia. Political boundaries 
were re-shaped and more autonomy granted for religious freedoms to Protestants and 
Catholics, who were now seen as equal before the law in Europe. Religious denominations that 
were not considered part of established religious institutions were given freedom to publicly 
practice their religion. Although there are variations in political citizenship in the West, most 
Western governments have assumed the Westphalian model of government22. The Treaty of 
Westphalia enabled a clear separation of Church and State and gave sovereigns the right to 
“confessionalize” their states and “to determine the religious affiliation of their kingdoms”23. 
Religion was relegated to a matter of private conscience and individuals were granted the 
choice to “leave a state from whose established religion one dissented”24. Thus, religion was 
  
21 See for example, Halman, L. and Draulans, V. 'How Secular is Europe?' The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 57, 
No. 2, 2006. pp. 263-88; Bosetti, G. and Eder. K. ‘Post-secularism: A return to the public sphere’. Eurozine, 17th
August, 2006. http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2006-08-17-eder-en.html; Hervieu-Leger, D. ‘In search of 
certainties: the paradoxes of religiosity in societies of high modernity’. The Hedgehog Review. Vol. 8, Nos. 1-2. 
Spring-Summer 2006. pp. 59-69.
22 Turner, B. S. ‘Islam, Religious Revival and the Sovereign State’. The Muslim World. Vol. 97, No. 3. July 2007. p. 
408. 
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
9removed from the public sphere of society and its authority replaced by the political over the 
religious.  
The origin of modern-day secularism however, is associated with the Age of Enlightenment in 
Europe from the eighteenth century onwards. The Enlightenment was associated with science, 
reason, rationality and the notion of progress25. Whilst religion was considered to play a central 
role in social life of pre-modern societies in which religious ideology dominated daily life, 
scientific and rationalist thought re-evaluated previously taken-for-granted religious ‘truths’. 
Thus, religious revelation and scientific rationalism were viewed in opposition to one another. 
Religion was no longer considered necessary in providing a moral order for society as morality 
could be reasoned and considered without the need for revealed texts. Enlightenment 
philosophers such as Hume, Voltaire, Rousseau and Diderot, considered religion (namely, 
Christianity due to the Western context) to be “…a form of irrational or mistaken knowledge 
of the world”26 that stifled individual liberties. Monotheism, and especially Catholicism, was 
regarded as politically intolerant due to the authoritarian nature of Christian institutions. 
The Age of Enlightenment may be historically connected to the Christian Reformation of the 
sixteenth century and Renaissance humanism of the fifteenth Century27. This historical context 
informs the anti-authoritarian views of the eighteenth century philosophers with regard to the 
place of religion in society and individual liberties. Rationalism and reason were considered far 
superior and “…important in the liberation of human beings from the false consciousness of 
revealed religion”28. During the period of modernity (from the end of the nineteenth century 
onwards, characterised by the rapidly accelerating industrial and democratic revolutions), 
religiosity declined and many nineteenth-century Positivist social theorists29 predicted that 
religion would eventually lose its significance in society due to the rise of scientific rationalism 
and urbanisation. These theorists had an evolutionary view of human behaviour and 
considered individualised religious beliefs to be erroneous which would necessarily be replaced 
epistemologically by scientific theories of knowledge, such as Darwinism. The evolution of 
  
25 See Fitzpatrick, M., Jones, P., Knellwolf, C. and McCalman, I. (eds.). The Enlightenment World. New York: 
Routledge. 2004.  
26 Turner, B.S. ‘Religion’. Theory, Culture & Society. Vol. 23, Nos. 2-3. 2006. p. 438. 
27Ibid. p. 439. 
28 Ibid. p. 438.  
29 Such as Comte and Durkheim who were proponents of the scientific and empirical study of society.
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rational thought was considered as progressing through a series of stages from theology to 
metaphysics to positivist or scientific thinking30. Institutional secularism came about out of 
Enlightenment ideals of reason and rationality and religion was essentially juxtaposed to 
science as a legitimate worldview. There was a move towards a separation of Church and State 
and the gradual replacement of religious institutions by State organisations. It was this 
separation that led to the decrease of the religious in contemporary institutions that organise 
daily life. Examples of such institutions in contemporary society are medicine, science, 
education, the economy, government and education31.
In 1887, Nietzsche claimed that God was dead and that God had been killed by peoples’ 
indifference32. This statement reflected the nineteenth century positivist worldview at the 
time33, that the belief in a transcendental figure was no longer necessary to the lives of 
contemporary people. There was no longer a consensus on a singular location of truth, as life 
could be lived without reference to religion, the world could be explained through multiple 
alternative claims of truth such as science, a secular history and psychology. These ideas 
reflected Enlightenment ideals, of knowledge, reason, rationality and self-reflexivity, which led 
to a move away from a worldview shaped and supported by the community towards a more 
individualistic understanding of the world. Secularisation was an assumed part of 
modernisation of society, and was considered to be in part, a result of societal differentiation. 
Through societal differentiation, the authority of religious institutions declines and “…religion 
becomes simply one institution to provide various services to its followers or to the 
community”34. Thus, Nietzsche’s proclamation of God being dead reflected the reorganisation 
of individual and social life from arguably being God-centred to becoming free from being 
rooted in the religious institution and also from being constrained and influenced by it. 
  
30 See Marshall, G. and Scott, J. (eds.). ‘religion, sociology of’. Oxford Dictionary of Sociology. Oxford/New York: 
Oxford University Press. 2005. pp. 560-1. Sociologists of religion developed their theories' response to this 
Positivist view. Whilst Positivists focused on belief and knowledge, sociologists of religion focused instead on the 
collective, symbolic and non-rational aspects of religion such as the human need for meaning. 
31 Victor, J.S. ‘Forecasting the future of religion: the next 50 years’. The Humanist. May-June 1, Vol. 56, No. 3, May-
June 1996. pp. 20-3. 
32 Nietzsche, F. [1887]. The Gay Science. Random House: New York. 1974. 
33 Although Nietzsche was not a Positivist.
34 See Turner, B. S. ‘Religion’. Theory, Culture & Society. Vol. 23, Nos. 2-3. 2006. p. 439. 
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The result of this reorganisation meant that God and religion were no longer necessary for the 
organisation and experience of modern social life. The secularisation thesis35 proposed by 
Weber in the early twentieth century was related to Enlightenment ideals of rationality. It 
posited that as societies became more industrialised and ‘modernised’, the need for religion as 
an institutional force would subside as people would become more rational. Although there 
has been a decline in the public display of religion in the West36, as seen through declining 
Church attendance,  religion still remains a powerful force (albeit a privatised one) both to the 
general public and to politics37. Moreso, there has been the return of public religion, even as 
private belief has continued to decline, especially in Christianity.    
The continuing force of religion highlights the fact that it is not a static phenomenon mired in 
the past, but instead is extremely fluid and adaptive because its presence is reflective of societal 
conditions. This rise in “transcendental metaphysics”38 was commented on by Sidney Hook in 
1943. Writing from America, but addressing Western society during World War II, at a time of 
economic, political, and social crisis in society, Hook proposed a “new failure of nerve” 
reflected by a rise in mysticism. He relates that scientific method was questioned, distrusted39
and regarded as only “information” needed by individuals rather than “knowledge” and 
“truth”40. In this way, the rise in mystical beliefs was a “desperate quest for a quick and all-
inclusive faith”41 to respond to societal disorder and dissatisfaction with the status quo. These 
observations reflect the adaptability of religion and spirituality and of those drawn to them. In 
a sense, the contemporary revivalist neo-Islamic identity can be considered in this context of 'a 
failure of nerve'. Revivalist communal identities of second-generation diaspora Muslims in this 
context may be seen to be reflective of societal change. Considering this in the post ‘9/11’ 
situation, the ‘othering’ of Muslims, negative associations espoused by the media, 
counterterrorism strategies and racial profiling of Muslims42 can create conditions that lead to a 
  
35 This was generally agreed upon by social theorists through the twentieth century such as P. Berger, B. Wilson, T. 
Luckmann.
36 Such as with the decline of Church attendance in Western Europe, New Zealand and Canada
37 Religion has been allowed back in to society through postmodern ideals of plurality, relativity and diversity that 
has been shown through the post-secular turn that will be discussed in 1.2
38 Hook, S. ‘The New Failure of Nerve’. The Partisan Review. Vol. X, No. 1. January-February 1943. pp. 2-23. 
39 Ibid. p. 4. Along with related fields such as: positivism, naturalism, empiricism and scientific philosophy. 
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid. p. 23. 
42 Or the ‘racialization’ or ‘ethnoisation’ of this identity.
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contemporary failure of nerve reflected not by mysticism, but through the formation of a 
universalised neo-revivalist communal Muslim identity. 
Later in the twentieth century, social theorists43 in the 1950s and 1960s reflected the rationalist 
view concerning religion that emerged out of the Enlightenment period, and Berger’s 1969 
secularisation thesis is an example of this44. Berger predicted that as religion was not a rational 
social force, as individuals developed a more rationalistic mind-frame, religion would simply be 
rejected by individuals and this would be reflected in societal organisation. Berger asserted that 
it was due to structural changes in society, that included industrialisation, rationalisation and 
modernisation, that the “crisis of credibility in religion” had taken place45. Thirty years later, 
however, Berger recanted his secularisation thesis and instead stated that the “world today … is 
as furiously religious as it ever was”46. Instead of simply fading away, he now views religious 
institutions as incorporating strategies of rejection and adaption to a secularised world. These are 
significant strategies that reflect the significance of variables such as time, place, history and 
contemporary geo-political and national contexts.  
What has changed in the West with regard to religion is what Heelas, Lash and Morris have 
termed the de-traditionalisation47 of religious authority and institutionalised religion. As there 
is no institutionalised religiosity in Islam, it is fitting that the visible reflection of religious 
change would not necessarily happen in institutional terms, but would be reflective in how 
people express their religious identities in the context of (and perhaps also, in opposition to) the 
contemporary national collective consciousness and geo-politic contexts. Thus, the 
development of a neo-revivalist Muslim communal identity amongst diaspora youth is reflective 
of this. According to Saint-Blancat, there are two forms of distancing that occur in a diaspora 
context. The first is “…the refusal to be assigned to an ‘essentialized’, inherited, unavoidable, 
  
43 Such as Thomas Luckmann and later, Bryan Wilson. 
44 See Berger, P.L. The Social Reality of Religion. London: Faber & Faber 1969, published in 1967 in the USA as The 
Sacred Canopy. See also Luckmann, T. The Invisible Religion, London: Macmillan. 1967.
45 Berger, P.L. Ibid. p. 126.
46Berger, P.L. ‘The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview’. In P.L. Berger (ed.) The Desecularization of 
the World. Washington: Ethics Public Policy Centre; Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans.  1999. p.2.
47 Heelas, P, Lash, S. and Morris, P. (eds.) Detradtionalization: critical reflections on authority and identity. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers. 1996.
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fixed religious culture”48. This suggests that ‘essentialising’ or ‘othering’ in religious terms may 
also in fact lead to ‘self-othering’ that is also expressed in religious terms, and perhaps in a 
reactionary form to the society that the diaspora is physically located in. The second form of 
distancing is the internal debate between Muslims. This is reflective through “…challenges to a 
normative, univocal definition of religious belonging.”49 It can be argued that this distancing 
and internal debate also takes place between and across diaspora generations as cultural aspects 
of religious belonging, such as the distancing of religion from an ethno-located-culture, take on 
new forms and relocate according to the new socio-cultural context. Religion has been adapted 
in accordance with social changes and has become a response (from within) to contemporary 
Western society. Whilst the neo-religious response may be to society in general, it may also be 
to the local Muslim community in particular as well. Thus this is reflective of the social 
expression of religion in terms of conceptions such as the authentic response and 
interpretation of religion, in particular to the context of how to be an authentic Muslim in the 
West. This notion is significant as it reflects the lack of a singular Islamic hegemonic 
authority50 that has the answers to questions on social issues pertaining to religion. Individual 
Muslims instead are able to choose from a variety of religious interpretations dependent on the 
type of Mullahs, Mosques and text that the individual chooses from or is directed toward.    
Whilst there has been a visible decline of religiosity in the West with the advent of modernity, 
many non-Western countries, and specifically Muslim ones, have not followed suit by 
separating religion from the state. However, just because countries with Muslim majorities have 
not necessarily defined themselves in terms of Western secularism, (or as some positivists may 
say ‘have progressed’), does not mean that these societies, and the way in which the religion is 
practiced, is static and unchanging51. Religion and religious practice has historically been fluid 
and adaptive to societal and political forces and structures. It is important to question whether 
  
48 Saint-Blancat, C. ‘Islam in Diaspora: Between Reterritorialization and Extraterritoriality’. International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research. Vol. 26, No. 1. March 2002. p. 142. 
49 Ibid.
50 There is no singular hegemonic authority within Islam although it may be (internally and externally) perceived 
that there is due to competing claims by multiple authorities. The two main schisms in Islam are Shi’a Islam and 
Sunni Islam. They each have different authorities and whilst Muslims all share the Five Pillars of Islam, it can be 
said that there are many other theological and legal issues that continue to be debated.  
51 Of course many non-Western and Muslim majority countries are also secular, or have had a historical past 
relating to secularism. Such countries include Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey. It should also be noted that although 
Muslim majority countries often define themselves as Islamic, there is generally some type of a separation of power
and a degree of co-existence that takes place between the rulers and government, and between the religious leaders 
or Mullahs. 
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there has really been an increase in religion, or whether what has changed is the visibility of 
religion in the ways that people practice, display, identify and profess their faith. In an 
analogous way, it is important to consider whether crime per se has increased, or whether 
increased visibility is shown through the reporting of it. Is it that religion has also become a 
visible societal force by attention being given to the importance of it, in informing politics, 
immigration and even freedom of speech and expression? For religion may inform these areas 
and issues through the discourse of multiculturalism, migrants, integration, assimilation and 
what may be regarded, to a certain extent, as the suspicion of loyalties. 
A further significant change is that of religiosity and individualised response. These changes 
may be reflective of what has been termed ‘post-secular’ society. Roy52 relates this to Islam in 
terms of deterritorialisation of the religion. Due to globalisation and migration, Roy asserts 
that the religiosity of contemporary Muslims has also adapted (like the Christian experience in 
the West) to incorporate a move towards “…individualisation, the quest for self-realisation, the 
rethinking of Islam out of a given culture, and the recasting of the Muslim ummah in non-
territorial terms”53. 
However it is not entirely accurate to say that the Muslim ummah has been recast in non-
territorial terms, as the Islamic ideal has never ever been territorial (due to the very notion of 
the transnational ummah) and the concept of the ummah has always been a powerful extra-
territorial concept. The ‘change’ that has taken place is that this ideal has been allowed to be 
realised in modern times due to mass migrations of Muslims to all parts of the world54. The 
concept of the ummah necessarily reflects a ready-made global community that the individual 
may have links to and with all over the world. This ideal allows Muslims a sense of being self-
contained in a communal setting and therefore may have implications for assimilation or 
integration into the adopted country. The notion of the ummah in this sense is not simply an 
expansionist notion, but an extra-territorial force through which Muslims located 
transnationally can position themselves. However, through the forces of globalisation55, the 
notion of the ummah may also be viewed to some extent as a push for global hegemony and in a
  
52 Roy, O. Globalized Islam: The search for a New Ummah. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004.
53 Ibid. p. 232. 
54 Hence the desire to break with ethno-cultural aspects of Islam.
55 Such as the information flow of techno-mediation such as the internet, cassettes, DVDs, videos, audiotapes.   
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sense a monolithic and univocal version of Islam enacted in communal terms. In this way, 
particular and peripheralised notions of Islam56 may be enacted on the global arena. 
Paradoxically however, these patterns of individualisation, personalisation and the realisation 
of the ummah in extra-territorial terms could relate either to a liberal and inclusive 
interpretation of the religion on the one hand, or to the spread of a neofundamentalism on the 
other. This neofundamentalism is also spread across global networks in the context of, what 
Devji has termed, the ‘landscapes of the jihad’57. 
The landscapes of the jihad is a conceptual term used to refer to the ways in which Islam has 
become a powerful force of globalisation (and utilised by militant groups such as Al Qa’eda) 
due to mass Muslim migration, the use of mediated technologies and through the unintended 
global consequences of major militant acts such as ‘9/11’ that have taken the jihad, and in a 
sense the perception of Islam, “…well beyond the politics of control.”58
 
Islam and Muslims have become more visible following the attacks of September 11, 2001 in 
New York, the October 12, 2002 Bali bombings, the May 16, 2003 Casablanca bombings, the 
November 15 and November 20, 2003 attacks in Istanbul, the March 11, 2004 train bombings 
in Madrid, and the July 7, 2005 London bombings, and fear of both ‘home-grown terror’ and 
global networks instigating violence professed in the name of religion, has led to much debate 
surrounding the nature and place of religion in the modern world59. This has raised questions 
regarding the true extent of secularisation. Whilst the West has gone through a period of 
secularisation in institutional terms, other continents and nations have not gone through the 
same type of secularisation. However, even in Europe, one of two continents to have 
experienced secularism60 (the apparent ‘disappearance’ of religion from the public sphere of 
society) besides Australia, many social theorists61 have predicted a wave of post-secularism, that 
  
56 Such as those that may be considered to hold views in opposition to local and national religious orthodoxy.
57 Devji, F.  Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity. London; New York: Hurst & Company. 2005.
58 Ibid. p. 2
59 This can be considered paradoxical as the vast majority of violence that occurred in the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries were not religious, but political in nature.
60 Bosetti, G. and Eder. K. ‘Post-secularism: A return to the public sphere’. Eurozine. 17th August, 2006. 
http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2006-08-17-eder-en.html
61 See for example, Halman, L. and Draulans, V. 'How Secular is Europe?' The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 57, 
No. 2, 2006. pp. 263-88.; Bosetti, G. and Eder. K. ‘Post-secularism: A return to the public sphere’. Eurozine, 17th
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is, the return of religion to the public sector of society through discourse and even its return in 
political terms. The post-secular turn signifies the ‘return’ of religion to the public sector. 
However, is it a return, when the religion that appears to be the most publicly discussed is Islam 
rather than Christianity62? The post-secular turn can be considered through the return of 
Christianity in the West and through the emergence of Islam. Another way this post-secular 
turn can be read is through the visibility of religion and religious plurality in the public sector. It 
seems perhaps short-sighted to have dismissed the significance of religion, because 
demographically and geographically, the majority of the world still professes a variety of 
religious faiths and religion has appears to have retained its importance in the non-West.  
One important view that has been put forward is that religion itself has not declined, but 
rather that secularisation prompted the decline of religious authority63. This seems valid, as it 
appears that the world is not becoming less religious, but that religion has less of an 
authoritative hold in society due to competing and multiple truths that exist64. This is also due 
to the earlier-mentioned declining authority of religious institutions within the social structure 
of society. However, as will be discussed towards the end of this subsection, this view may also 
be changing, as the place of religion is increasingly discussed in the public sphere, in social and 
public policy, in the political arena and through the mass media. An example of this from the 
United States is the increased involvement of the government in matters of religious 
organisation. Exemptions are given by federal law to many religious organisations in areas as 
diverse as pensions, immigration and land use65. As analysed by The New York Times, since 
1989, there have been over two hundred cases of “special arrangements, protections or 
exemptions for religious groups or their adherents”66. This relates to the fact that whilst 
historically, Europe has become increasingly secular with regard to Church attendance and to 
    
August, 2006. http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2006-08-17-eder-en.html; Hervieu-Leger, D. ‘In search of 
certainties: the paradoxes of religiosity in societies of high modernity’. The Hedgehog Review. Vol. 8, Nos. 1-2. 
Spring-Summer 2006. pp. 59-69; Asad, T. 2003. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, modernity. Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press.
62 Although of course there has also been a visible turn to Pentecostal Christianity. See Turner, B.S. ‘Islam, 
Religious Revival and the Sovereign State’. The Muslim World. Vol. 97, No. 3. pp. 405-418.
63 Chaves, M. 1994. ‘Secularization as declining religious authority’. Social Forces. Vol. 72, No. 3, March 1994. pp. 
749-775.
64 Such as science and a reflexive morality framed by human rights discourse.
65 Henriques, D.B. ‘As Exemptions Grow, Religion Outweighs Regulation’. New York Times. October 8, 2006. 
http://www.New 
Yorktimes.com/2006/10/08/business/08religious.html?ei=5070&en=35229a7c11bac47a&ex=1175227200&adx
nnl=1&adxnnlx=1175054686-mlA1sMoOIVGdWnfRn4YXQQ
66 Ibid.
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the importance of religion in people’s lives, the United States has not followed suit. In Europe, 
only twenty-one percent of people consider religion to be a very important part of their lives 
whilst over sixty percent of Americans consider religion to be an integral part of their lives67. It 
is apparent that religion remains a powerful force in the United States. 
However, in comparison to many non-Western countries, religion is no longer necessarily the 
primary way of understanding the world in Western countries. In a sense, the religious 
framework has been disconnected from holding an ‘official’ place within society (although even 
in secular countries, religious holidays such as Christmas and Easter are still official holidays). 
However, the degrees of secularisation within Western countries are diverse. The same is the 
case with many countries in the non-western world which still identify themselves on religious 
grounds. In countries such as these, there may not be such a change in the official place of 
religiosity in terms of individuals’ religious practices and religion through inheritance. As the 
world becomes more globalised, religion is ‘deterritorialised’68and countries are linked to each 
other especially through the global mass media, perhaps the way in which people are religious 
(and more significantly, how people identify themselves as religious and assert their religion) has 
changed.
Although in the Western world as a rule there has been institutional secularisation, due to 
alternative competing claims of truth and authority, and in general because of the official 
separation of religion from State or Government, peoples’ beliefs and practices do not 
necessarily reflect this secular direction. Therefore a decline in traditional Church services for 
example, does not necessarily represent a decline in religiosity, as religiosity may also imply 
personal belief rather than the outward expression of that belief in the form of ritual 
observance69.  
  
67 See Anderson, B.C. ‘Secular Europe, religious America’. Public Interest. Spring 2004. Vol. 155. pp. 143-158 for a 
discussion of post-Christian Europe and religious America.
68 See Roy, O. Globalized Islam: The search for a New Ummah. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004.
69 And also traditional service attendance may be replaced by variances in sectarian diversity, religious plurality and 
religious hybridisation. See Davie, G. Religion in Modern Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2000.
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Religious institutions are still important in peoples’ lives as markers for rites of passage, such as 
births, weddings and funerals70. As Brill71 asserts however, religion has become more privatised, 
indicating that it is more of a personal choice in the contemporary world than an inherited 
one72. It is important to note that Brill is American in focus and that the European experience 
may be quite different. It is clear that religiosity can and does mean different things in different 
locations and for different theorists. 
One way through which people can interact with religion in society today is one of ‘religious 
consumerism’, or as Hervieu-Leger73 refers to it, a do-it-yourself attitude towards religion. 
Although there have always been religiously pluralistic societies, the way in which secular, 
Western societies reflect plurality and diversity of religion has changed. In the Western context, 
people are no longer necessarily born into a specific religion, and if they are, there are 
possibilities to reject one faith for another, or to reject religion altogether. Religious identity in 
contemporary society has become a choice of association (or rejection) and affiliation, an active 
construction in which individuals have become “choosers”74. Perhaps the reason why some do 
remain affiliated with traditional denominations is due to the ‘adaption’ of the religious that 
Berger75 referred to. Any religious authority may be considered to be open to (often textual) 
interpretation, and increased reflexivity and selectiveness of accepted teachings may appeal to 
churchgoers in the context of the postmodern76 and secular world. Within the Muslim context, 
the rise of individual textual interpretation has also become more widespread. Perhaps more 
accurately, it is not that traditional religious authority has necessarily broken down, but that 
  
70 Brill, E.J. ‘Religion and identity: the Canadian, American, and Brazilian cases’. International Journal of 
Comparative Sociology. Vol. 39, No. 2. June 1998. P. 240.
71 Ibid.
72 Voye, L. ‘Secularization in a Context of Advanced Modernity’. Sociology of Religion, Vol. 60, No. 3. Fall 1999. p 
275. 
73Hervieu-Leger, D. ‘In search of certainties: the paradoxes of religiosity in societies of high modernity’. The 
Hedgehog Review. Vol. 8, Nos. 1-2. Spring-Summer 2006. pp. 59-69.
74 Bauman, Z. ‘Postmodern religion?’ In P. Heelas, D. Martin and P. Morris (eds.) Religion, Modernity and 
Postmodernity. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 1998. p.68.
75 Berger, P.L. ‘The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview’. In P. Berger (ed.) The Desecularization of 
the World. Washington: Ethics Public Policy Centre; Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans. 1999.
76 The term ‘late modern’ may be substituted for ‘postmodern’ (see Giddens, A. Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and 
Society in the Late Modern Age. Cambridge: Polity Press. 1991.), as the term postmodern signifies the end of 
modernity. Postmodernity and late modernity may also be contested as this type of theorising can be regarded as 
Eurocentric in that these theories may be more applicable to the Western cultural experience rather than those of 
the non-West.   
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there are individualised responses and interpretations of the religious teachings77. This diversity 
and plurality of religious authority is apparent in the 'visibility' of global jihadi networks that 
spread their worldview via audiovisual mediums such as mosque sermons, the internet, 
television, audio- and video-tapes and DVDs. Technology has enabled the visibility of 
multivocal Muslim authorities. These ‘new’ authorities may be, and often are, in opposition to 
more established authorities and also often come from opposing Muslim factions78. In this 
sense, the type of Islam being spread across the internet can be considered to be ‘progressive’79
through their engagement with technology in the late-modern world. Thus the internet, as a 
force of globalisation, has enabled the spread of religious discourse in all religions. Increasingly, 
the religious has become a way through which political discontent can be vocalised and 
expressed80.   
The contemporary late-modern Western world is framed by religious plurality and individuals 
live in a secularised world where, in general, the religious context is peripheralised and 
privatised. There is an established view in social science81 that the breakdown of traditional 
kinship systems, and the rise of the citizen, has led to a fragmented state where society may be 
characterised as no longer claiming a singular ultimate truth in religious terms as it did before 
the advent of modernity. In contemporary society, there are not only ‘alternative’ claims to 
religious knowledge but also a plethora of truth claims and worldviews that do not necessarily 
have to refer to religious claims at all. As the traditional hold of communities and societies 
have broken down, people lead more individualised lives and have the choice to pick their 
worldviews, be they religious affinities and associations or non-religious ones. 
However, the viewpoint of the breakdown of traditional kinship systems is of course extremely 
Eurocentric and does not allow space for religious minority groups and immigrants who have 
settled in the West and who may not have experienced the same changes in traditional and 
  
77 See Hervieu-Leger, D. ‘In search of certainties: the paradoxes of religiosity in societies of high modernity’. The 
Hedgehog Review. Vol. 8, Nos. 1-2. Spring-Summer 2006. pp. 59-69; Gole, N. ‘Islam in European Publics: 
secularism and religious difference’. The Hedgehog Review. Vol. 8, Nos. 1-2. Spring-Summer 2006. pp. 140-6. Roy, 
O. Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004.
78 See Devji, F. Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity. London; New York: Hurst & Company. 2005.
79 But not in the Positivist sense.
80 This point will be later expanded in Chapter 4 through the discussion of the media.
81 See Marshall, G. and Scott, J. (eds.). ‘Postmodernism’. Oxford Dictionary of Sociology. Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press. 2005. pp. 508-10.
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community values. It does however provide some understanding of the type of societies that 
diasporic82 or religious minorities may feel ‘othered’ to or be reactionary towards. This 
apparent development of tensions can escalate if minorities feel their position as ‘other’ in the 
dominant organisation of social life in the countries they are residing in. Whilst some may be 
able to understand and accept these differences in community organisation83, others may feel 
as though their culture or religion is under threat. This may inadvertently lead to a need to 
‘defend’ and identify only with their (ethno-cultural or religious) heritage, and in a sense define 
themselves as what and who they are in opposition to the mainstream. This ‘self-othering’ is 
evidently problematic, as individuals can develop reactionary identities and a minority may 
look for allegiances elsewhere in arenas such as religious extremism and religious militancy. 
These allegiances may be found through transnational networks that transcend cultural 
differences within a minority group and may seek a global belonging such as that of neo-
fundamentalism.
Allegiances and belonging may be sought in many different ways by individuals within the 
community context. Morris84 is a proponent of examining communities in a multifaceted way, 
rather than viewing community organisation as singular and homogenous. Two important 
models of community organisation are communities of descent and communities of assent85. 
He rejects the modernist evolutionary approach to community organisation that suggests that 
communities of descent are necessarily replaced by assent communities and instead views them 
as not in opposition, but as different forms of community organisation. 
Descent communities, which Morris refers to as traditionally-linked to Jewish communities, 
may be associated with communities in which culture and religion are significant and are 
overlapping factors in the community’s organisation. Culture and religion in this model, are 
interlinked and cannot be separated from one another. This accounts for cultural continuity 
being tied to the religion. Identity, in descent communities is ascribed through birth and is 
  
82 The term diasporic or diaspora will be utilised to denote immigrant or religious groups in the West that have 
been re-negotiated outside of their traditional context.
83 And perhaps ‘self-other’ in terms extrinsic to cultural and religious heritage.
84 Ibid.
85 Morris, P. ‘Community Beyond Tradition’. In P. Heelas, S. Lash and P. Morris (eds.), Detradtionalization: critical 
reflections on authority and identity. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 1996.  
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“…(very nearly) unnegotiable”86. It is considered to be a given and “…something beyond 
personal construction”87. The descent community is a physical community that exists in a 
reified form, separate from the individual which  relates to myths of “…eternal descent”88. A 
descent community cannot be chosen by an individual, but chooses the individual. Choice 
therefore lies in a polarised way “…between acceptance or rejection, of the community’s 
recognition of us.”89 Thus, communities of descent are: “…unasked for, unquestionable, 
beyond construction.”90 Due to the detraditionalisation91 of communal authority92 however, 
one way in which the individual does have choice is by re-negotiating assent categories such as 
prioritising class or ethnicity, or, more significantly for this thesis, being “‘born again’”93. 
Whilst dissent is decided upon in communal terms, the notion of being ‘born again’ or 
(re)claiming one’s religious identity in a zealous manner is one area in which the individual has 
freedom within a religious structure to do this in a personalised and individualised way. One 
can hardly be accused of dissenting if one is overly-zealous about one’s relationship to the 
religion by descent. This is significant to the Muslim experience and arguably, a parallel in the 
Islamic context is that of dawa or religious conversion activities. As this model is mainly based 
on the Jewish experience of descent communities, Morris brings up issues relating to “…the 
detested categories of ‘biology’ and ‘race’”94 being prevalent in this narrative. These 
essentialised notions however, are taken to be part of the nineteenth century modernist grand 
narrative of European superiority. 
Communities of assent, however, (which Morris considers to be more closely related to 
Christian and Islamic models) are constructed through descent communities. They are non-
familial, voluntary and continually forming and re-forming95. Rather than religion being 
ascribed at birth, in this model, “purity of doctrine”96 is emphasised over purity of religion 
  
86 Ibid. pp. 238-40.
87 Ibid. p. 243.
88 Ibid. p. 244.
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. p. 245.
91 The breakdown of, in this case, the ultimate authority of a communal organisation 
92 Morris discusses the simultaneous processes of detraditionalisation and re-traditionalisation, indicating a 
reconceptualisation of traditionalisation, in this case in community terms.  
93 Morris, P. ‘Community Beyond Tradition’. In P. Heelas, S. Lash and P. Morris (eds.), Detradtionalization: critical 
reflections on authority and identity. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 1996.
94 Ibid. p. 241. 
95 Ibid. pp. 238-9.
96 Ibid. p. 239.
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through familial descent. Morris considers assent communities to be anti-pluralistic and 
intolerant of dogmatic variations in that “…hierarchies of assent have to decide on the 
orthodox form of assent, that is, who is in and who is out.”97 Thus, the focus is on shared 
truths, values and creeds and the familial community is replaced by the metaphorical 
community. This model is based on the Christian model and has universalistic tendencies, 
whilst the descent model is based on the local context. Whilst Morris considers these to be two 
distinctive community types, there may undoubtedly be some overlap between the two98. This 
overlap can be seen in the Muslim experience. Whilst the Jewish experience informs descent 
communities, Morris proposes that examples from other religions such as Christian dogmas, 
the Buddhist Eightfold Path and the Five Pillars of Islam are reflective of an assent approach to 
religious communalism.
Relating Morris’ community analysis to the Muslim experience, Muslim communities can be 
said to embody aspects both of descent and assent communities. Whilst Muslim communities 
can be considered to be communities of assent due the universality of creed and truths, they 
can also be considered to be very much communities of descent as well due to religion being 
ascribed at birth in patrilineal terms. Religion of the individual is assumed according to the 
religion of the father, and the child does not have to go through rites of passage to assert this 
religious identity in terms of assenting to the religious doctrines. 
As mentioned above, the notion of being ‘born-again’ is significant in the Muslim context99
with regard to identity construction and formation. Dissent is not tolerated within assent 
communities, and any action considered antithetical to Islam can be dealt with through 
instruments such as the issuing of fatwas or religious decrees. Turner100 notes that in a diaspora 
context, group solidarity is significant and thus individual rights of ‘opting out’ of the religious 
community could be considered a threat to the very idea of the community’s survival.
  
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid. pp. 238-9.
99 Although this is, of course, a Christian concept. As mentioned earlier, a parallel term in Islam could perhaps be 
the concept of dawa
100 Turner, B. S. ‘Islam, Religious Revival and the Sovereign State’. The Muslim World. Vol. 97, No. 3. July 2007. p. 
413.
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The very notion of diaspora communities implies that they could be both communities of 
descent and assent. Within the Muslim diaspora, whilst culture and religion may be ascribed at 
birth through heritage, there may also be wider affiliations and associations through the notion 
of the transnational Muslim ummah. This type of association may be considered to be in a 
continual state of flux and association with this vast community may or may not be viewed as 
voluntary, depending on the worldview of individuals within the community setting. 
By associating with an established or establishing diaspora community, it may be difficult for 
individuals to feel a freedom of religious association. However, diasporic religious communities 
may be established within a wider societal context, in which there is freedom of religious 
association and religious conscience. Traditional religious expectations, such as the ways of 
being a Muslim and acting as one in society, are necessarily fluid when taken out of the context 
of Muslim majority countries and transplanted within a Western context and society.    
The point relating to the choice of religious associations is reiterated by Bauman101, who states 
that societal and personal freedom of choice born of polytheistic reality, “does not mean 
believing in nothing”, but “believing in too many things – too many for the spiritual comfort of 
blind obedience; it means being aware that there are too many equally important or convincing 
beliefs” to choose responsibly from. Thus, that people may not hold a specific religious affinity 
does not necessarily mean that this reflects a secular worldview. It does show that types of 
religiosity in contemporary society are fluid and not static and exclusively associated with 
institutionalised forms of religion. Durkheim believed that religion would gradually die out, 
but stated that “the old gods are dying or are already dead. But this is not to say that society is 
incapable of creating new ones”102. This may refer to the way in which God and religion are re-
conceptualised in our contemporary context and also in terms of politics, culture and 
nationalism which may all act as new authorities. In opposition to the climate of secularisation, 
according to Brill103, secularisation in fact stimulates ‘religious innovation’. This can be seen 
through the rise of extremist and non-extremist sectarian groups, cults and New Age spirituality 
movements as conventional religious groups may begin to lose their significance.   
  
101 Bauman, Z.  Postmodernity and its Discontents. New York: New York University Press. 1997. p. 201.
102 Brill, E.J. ‘Religion and identity: the Canadian, American, and Brazilian cases’. International Journal of 
Comparative Sociology. Vol. 39, No. 2. June 1998. p. 237.
103 Ibid.
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This religious innovation has also allowed space for individuals to re-conceptualise traditional 
religion and religious authority. As mentioned above, examples of this are ‘born-again’ religious 
individuals who may break away from their respective religious ‘communities’ in order to seek 
alternative and individualised interpretations of their religion104. This point is especially 
significant to this thesis as it relates to the notion of revivalist identity formations that are 
expressed in religion, and more specifically to the neo-revivalist Muslim identity that is 
occurring amongst second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims. 
However, an important distinction needs to be made. It is apparent through this overview of 
secularisation and religiosity in the Western context that the individuals being discussed are 
those within the Judeo-Christian context. The majority of literature dealing with religion and 
secularisation in the West does not necessarily deal with the religions and religiosity of 
immigrants105, or immigrant communities that are now part of the West. As earlier mentioned, 
I will be discussing diaspora Muslims more fully in Chapter three. Thus, although religion is 
no longer embedded in social systems and social structures in the West, it does not necessarily 
follow that people are also increasingly secular or that religion is no longer significant in 
society. All this does indicate that people may have more choice to become secular. However, a 
secularised state does not necessarily lead to a secularised population on the whole. The 
Turkish experience is an example of this. Whilst in institutional terms, Turkey is a secular 
state, the expression of Islam, especially outside the major city centres, is still apparent, as in 
the case of women wearing the hijab which indicates the visual performance of religious faith. 
Turkey appears to be a divided country in terms of secular and religious ideals. Whilst an 
estimated fifty percent of the population are against religious symbols and political 
representation that stems from an Islamic party, the divisiveness in public opinion has been 
reflected by the recent government elections with more political power being reached by the 
AKP which is considered to have ‘Islamist’ roots106. The wearing of the headscarf has been 
symbolic and representative of much debate surrounding Turkey’s commitment to Ataturk’s 
secularisation of Turkey. The fact that the AKP was re-elected in July 2007, indicates much 
  
104 To be further discussed in the final subsection of this chapter. 
105 However, for a discussion of Islam, see Asad, T. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, modernity. Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press. 2003.
106 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6910444.stm
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popular support also for a party rooted in political Islam107. Thus, whilst a nation may be 
institutionally secular and be committed to these secular ideals, public opinion may not 
necessarily reflect this. However, a secular society has the theoretical freedom of religion, and 
in a sense also, the freedom from religion, due to the separation of religion from the 
institutional State.    
Thus, due to the legacy of institutionalised secularism that has arisen from Enlightenment 
ideals of the separation of Church and State, there is declining religious authority within 
Western society. Multiple truths and authorities are reflected in contemporary society and that 
has led to a choice in the construction of a religious (or lack of religious) identity. Religion has 
become more of a personal and privatised issue. Identity politics and the identity project that 
has arisen through postmodern relativism has enabled religion to be privatised. Religion 
however, in contemporary times appears to have gone beyond the private, and during the last 
few years, there has been a move in thinking towards post-secular society, that is, the return of 
religion to the public sector. Thus, whilst there may be an appearance of secularism in Western 
societies, religion is still significant to the public sector of society with regard to cultural 
memory. This may be transferred across generations with regard to religious ritual and 
traditions108. An example of this is through rites of passage. Another significant area is that of 
personal and public crises109, such as through problems of health, death, war, natural disasters. 
During these times religious ideas may be relevant in providing meaning and security. The 
prevalence of religion in secular societies will now be briefly discussed.    
1.2 Religion and the Post-secular turn
Although many Western societies have gone through a period of secularisation, there has 
recently been much discourse around the notion of post-secular society110. Halman and 
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Draulans111 discuss secularisation in contemporary Europe in their 2006 article ‘How Secular is 
Europe’. They provide data and analysis taken from a 1999/2000 European Values Study112, 
which includes the majority of European countries but not some of Scandinavia and Eastern 
Europe. 
Their findings indicated that secularisation in Europe has been uneven and varied, and that a 
lack of Church participation113 did not necessarily indicate secularisation in terms of individual 
belief or religiosity. Religious pluralism in Europe was found to produce lower levels of 
religiosity. Where religiosity did remain significant, it was found that cultural heritage and 
socioeconomic factors were relevant to explaining religiosity and religious participation. 
Through the breakdown of the hegemony of community, the individual has become the 
primary point of reference in contemporary Western society, regarding such areas as “values, 
attitudes and beliefs”114. As a result, religion has also become personalised (in terms of a sense of 
ownership towards religion) and individualised (the atomisation of this ownership). Davie115
characterised this societal change as ‘believing without belonging’, where a lack of religious 
participation does not necessarily indicate a lack of belief. This indicates a shift in emphasis in 
(historically Christian) society, (and perhaps also social analysis), from religion, defined in 
terms of practice, to religiosity, defined in terms of belief116. The individuation of this shift can 
also be said to be inclusive of exclusive identification with, and assertion of, that belief. In 
other words, due to the rise of identity politics in terms of the choice of religious association 
(or its lack), and the decline of community dictates in terms of religious belonging, people are 
free to choose their religion, and more significantly, how they practice their religion, how they
identify themselves with it by asserting that belief as the essential core of their personal 
identities. Believing without belonging can also refer to individuals or groups that are opposed 
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to traditional communal religious orthodoxy117 and whose notions of belonging may extend 
outside of the ethno-cultural community. An example in the Muslim context is global jihadis, 
who can be described as religious extremists118, who are peripheralised by the vast majority of 
Muslims, and who self-peripheralise or ‘self-other’ in the context of local or national 
communities. In other words, differing religious factions may share core beliefs, but have their 
own extended criteria of belonging, practice and belief.  
The notion of ‘believing without belonging’ can also be inverted to ‘belonging without 
necessarily believing’, in a community setting119. This may be indicated by the continued 
significance of religion in diaspora communities in Europe. As mentioned earlier, cultural and 
socioeconomic heritage have been considered significant for the continuation of religiosity in 
Europe. However, it is not mentioned in Halman and Draulans'120 article whether individuals 
from other religious traditions, besides Christianity, were surveyed. One of the questions asked 
is specifically related to Church attendance rather than referring to religious institutions in 
general121. As there is a significant presence of Muslims who have settled in Europe, this lack of 
inclusion of other religious institutions appears problematic. (Perhaps the word Church has 
been taken as a generic term for religious institution? The authors do not make this clear.) 
However, whilst this personalisation and individualisation of religion is relevant to the 
Western context which is traditionally Christian, it can be argued that the ways in which these 
interpretations of religion are played out, are different according to the different religious 
traditions being referred to. Whilst this individuation is a notable shift, there are other factors 
to consider. These include generational differences and different emphases on individualistic 
expressions according to the religious tradition. Furthermore, in the context of a religiously 
plural and multi-ethnic societal context, the acceptability of the individuated response to 
religion by the immediate religious community is also important. Modern Western society in 
general is based around the individual rather than the collective community, and through 
postmodern society there has been a notable shift towards individuated identity construction 
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in general terms122 and with regard to religion. Immigrant or diaspora communities may be 
‘othered’ from this as they may have more of a collective community focus in general and 
consider the collective community as a whole to be more important than any one individual. 
Thus, an individuated religious response in relation to the diaspora Muslim context may very 
well have different implications for the immediate religious community and wider implications 
for the reified ummah123. These differing cultural norms may, in turn, inform the type of 
responses that individuals with a Muslim background, for example, may seek whilst 
constructing their identity in relation to religion in general, and Islam in particular. However, 
it can be argued that through Western postmodern society, ‘the cult of the individual’ has been 
positioned in opposition to the community. According to Giddens, self-identity is thought to 
simultaneously shape, and be shaped by society. The self is considered to be an active, receptive 
entity through which “individuals contribute to and directly promote social influences that are 
global in their consequences and implications”124. The identity project signifies the notion of 
the self, not as ‘a finished product’, but as a work in progress in a continual state of flux and 
development. Further, the self is considered a ‘reflexive project’ that is characterised by a search 
for meaning in a world with multiple truths and a plethora of choices125. Thus, with regard to 
the second- and third-generation Muslim diaspora in the West, it is fitting that the type of 
Muslim identity that is sought is one that is individuated and personalised.  
The renewal and revivalism of religion has occurred amongst all ‘world religions’ and political 
processes have increasingly become linked with religious ideologies. These renewal and 
revivalist movements can be linked with the processes of globalisation that has made the world 
appear borderless and accessible. The communications revolution has allowed religious and 
cultural processes (that may be global in scope) to be internalised and made local, and 
simultaneously local concerns can be made into global interests through what has been termed 
‘glocalisation’126. Global travel and communications facilitate this process with regard to 
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religious communities and the result may be a production of “…diasporic, fragmented and 
localized communities”127. This media-facilitated social change has caused a paradox to occur 
through which there is an “…integration of dispersed religious communities”128 through media-
space, and also “…a challenge to traditional religious teaching, training and recruitment”129. 
Thus, geographically-traditional strongholds of religious orthodoxy are re-oriented and localised 
in other physical domains130. These social changes have implications for the accessibility of a 
multitude of religious ideologies and through religio-techno-space, individuals are able to 
choose the ideology that serves their (political) interests131.  
It is within the context of the postmodern/ society that religion or ‘the spiritual’ has been seen 
as more acceptable in society. This may be indicated by ‘religious consumerism’ that has come 
through the ‘postmodern turn’ in Western society. In an article in The Humanist in 1996, 
Victor132 proposed two contradictory social changes taking place in religion133. These were, an 
increase in societal secularisation, and an increase also in “supernaturalism in personal 
belief”134. The latter refers to a belief in something that cannot be scientifically explained. The 
rise in supernatural belief in contemporary society can be seen as ‘the postmodern turn’, 
through which religion has been allowed back into society through the politics of identity. The 
postmodern turn implies emphases on relativity, diversity and plurality. Religious identification 
in general terms in the West has been relocated from religion by descent to religion by choice. 
Individuals can express choice in the religion (if any) they identify with, and also, more 
significantly, how they personalise their own religious experiences (in terms of religious 
performance, practice, belief, expression, sectarian associations, transnational associations, 
community participation and personal observance amongst other such issues). The postmodern 
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turn is also reflective of Giddens’ notion of the reflexive self135. The individual has become 
increasingly self-reflexive and identity (and the association this may have with religion) may be 
viewed as a process. Religion may also be sought as reactionary to what Beck has termed ‘risk 
society’136.    
There has also been a rise in more orthodox and traditionalist religious factions, perhaps as a 
reaction to secular society and the hope to return to a ‘mythical’ past (as adapted in the 
present). However, there has also been an increase in more individualist, conservative 
fundamentalist and neo-fundamentalist religious groups. Alternative sources of information 
and knowledge challenge the concept of a singular (religious) authority and a society that 
experiences rapid social change may appear to be one that lacks a singular thread of meaning to 
hold people together. Following this, to achieve a sense of belonging and to ensure that life has 
meaning, it is not difficult to understand how religion may serve as a unifying factor137.
As a modern society is often thought to be synonymous with, and even characterised by, 
secularism, the return of religion may be viewed as a threat to secularisation and to the 
foundations that make a society modern. Examples of religious groups that reject or react 
against the secularisation of modernity138 are orthodox or traditionalist religious groups that 
may aim for an alternative modernity that reflects security and certainty in what may be 
considered an uncertain world. In these instances, religiosity is not considered to be a choice, 
but a regulated way of life that aims at finding a “supreme authority … to end all other 
authorities”139. This worldview may lead religious sub-cultures to isolate and remove themselves 
from society, and may also lead to religious extremism that may challenge the mainstream 
Western perception of the secularisation of the contemporary world. 
Religious extremists may be defined not only as those who are militant but also those who 
engage in violent religious discourse and textual violence, utilised mainly through mediated 
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technologies. Technology has become an important catalyst with regard to the access to and 
spread of religious literature that may incite militancy or separatism, and in this way can be 
regarded as textual violence. This may also refer to religious extremists within religious, such as 
in Muslim societies. Although from the outside, the society may appear to be religious in a 
static way, factors such as rapid social change, globalisation, foreign trade, consumerism, and 
the dissemination of information by the mass media may contribute not only to a changing 
society but also specifically to the erosion of traditional religious values140. ‘Extreme’ religion 
can be considered in terms of sectarian groupings and in a sense considered ‘other’ against the 
wider society. Thus these ‘extremists’ can be described as those who seek an alternative way of 
epistemologically, ontologically and phenomenologically existing, believing and acting 
('performing') in the world with reference first and foremost to  their perceptions of a singular 
religion and religious authority141 which, in the context of this thesis, is Islam. However, it 
should be noted that ‘extremist’ is of course an external qualification of one of the ways 
religiosity is enacted. Extremism can be considered a shifting criterion, located from the 
outside (in this case, external to Islam) and from within (that is, a rejection of these ideological 
claims by the majority of Muslims). 
These societal changes (such as the shift from religion as practice, to religiosity as personal 
identity) have not only taken place in the post-Christian West. Roy142 notes a global shift in 
terms of the relationship between Islam and the identity of its followers. However, there has 
also simultaneously been a return to the institution143 as location of truth, through which 
Mosques and Imams or Mullahs may be perceived as possessing the truth about religion. The 
location of ‘the real’144 has become to an extent institutionalised during what may be perceived 
as turbulent times. Such a description of the contemporary age may be justified because of the 
lack of a stringent societal code of social and religious morality which has been brought about 
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by the postmodern emphases on subjectivity and multiplicity of truths, authorities and 
meanings. Certainty and authority may be sought in an uncertain and fluid world. This change 
is similar to the growth of mega-Churches within Christianity, through which the institution or 
religious community is chosen by affiliation and is perceived as taking on the responsibility of 
guiding individuals in terms of their postmodern interpretation of religion. 
As religious extremists act primarily against their own religious communities first and foremost, 
straying from Mosques and religious communities, they may be seen as taking matters into 
their own hands when disillusioned with their place in the larger society. This relates to 
Nancy’s notion of the ‘inoperative community’145. An individual acts out as an individual, and 
not as someone affiliated to a community, due to the lack of community or as an indication of 
a breakdown within the community. Nancy describes the community as reflective of “no 
singular being without another singular being”146. This relates to the importance for the 
community of the community and the struggle that this implies between conceptions of who is 
paramount, the individual or the community? This disillusionment of religious ‘extremists’ is 
primarily within the younger generations of Muslim migrants who may feel their spiritual 
needs are not being met. Mirza147 relates this fragmentation and alienation to the rise of 
identity politics148 where questions such as ‘who am I’ and ‘who are we’ are constantly being 
asked. Therefore, religious leaders take on an increasingly important role in guiding individuals 
in fulfilling their putative religious duties. Mediated technologies also take on an increasingly 
significant role in transmitting these messages globally. An example of this is the mediated 
broadcasts of Osama bin Laden calling for a global jihad against ‘infidels’. 
According to Bosetti and Eder149, post-secularism is characterised by the return of religion to 
the public sphere. Religion was thought not to have disappeared completely from society 
during secularisation, but to have become invisible due to diminishing Church participation, 
and in this sense, to have been separated from the public sphere of society. The emergence of 
religious traditions other than Christianity in the public sphere in the West is significant for 
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the definition of a post-secular society, for, as noted previously, secularism in the West has 
historically been concerned primarily with Christianity. This shift is also reflective of the multi-
ethnic character of European and Western societies in contemporary times as there are large 
numbers of individuals who are part of ethno-national and religious diaspora communities. 
Thus, the post-secular shift in these societies is a significant characteristic of religiously plural 
societies.   
There has been much European discourse on secularism and European identity150 as more 
European nations are initiated into the European Union. The membership of Turkey into the 
European Union is an example of this. Although Turkey (as discussed earlier) is officially a 
secular country (although religion and religious expression is still controlled or suppressed by 
the State151), the fact that the country has a Muslim majority appears to be problematic for the 
European Union’s definition of a European identity.   
Examples of the significance of religion to the public sphere in society are numerous. One such 
example is the Muhammad cartoon controversy. Others include the headscarf and burqa
debates in Europe and also the debates surrounding the use of any religious symbolism as 
adornment. A recent New Zealand example is the debate over women-only swimming pools. 
Other issues involving the ‘visible’ return of religion are issues involving Muslim schools, and 
the Pope’s speech in September 2006 when he quoted a 14th-century Byzantine emperor's 
(derogatory) opinion about the Muslim prophet Muhammad. These issues will be taken up 
more fully in Chapter 4. 
Post-secularism does not only imply the return of religion to the public sphere, but also the 
return of religious identities in the public arena. In what has been described as postmodern 
society, religion has become a choice of association and identity. The visible emergence of ‘neo-
Muslim’ identities in the Western context are no exception in this respect. Rather than being a 
linear continuation of religious orthodoxy, the politicisation of Islam in Europe has become a 
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choice and recourse to identity for some of the younger generation of Muslims in Europe152. In 
this sense, religious fundamentalism differs from this neo-fundamentalism, because for 
fundamentalists, religion is not seen as a choice, whereas some second- and third-generation 
immigrants have consciously rejected both the expression of religion and the societal
integration of their parents’ generation and have claimed their religious difference in terms of 
self-definition, self-affirmation, social distinction and cultural confrontation against the 
Western societies that they are part of153. Following this, these new-forming revivalist religious 
identities may be described as being a form of ‘self-othering’. 
This new phenomenon is distinctive as it cannot be characterised and reduced to a ‘clash of
civilisations’ or a clash of religious traditions. It can instead be described as a clash of cultural 
and hybrid identities, and a clash of worldviews, of what it means to be Muslims in, but not of, 
Europe154, or being in and not of the West. Thus, there is nothing inherently incompatible 
about Islam and the West or Islam in the West. Such essentialisation is not constructive in 
attempting to comprehend the issues surrounding the recourse or turn to a neo-Muslim 
identity or even a turn to a religious extremism. The fact that religion is being ‘utilised’ by 
diaspora Muslim youth indicates that there are second- and third-generation Muslims155 who 
do not consider it incompatible to profess a religious identity and to remain part of society, for 
example Tariq Ramadan is a strong proponent of what it means to be a European Muslim156.
This discourse pertaining to the religious expression amongst Western Muslim youth indicates 
the need to attempt to understand this turn, not in terms external to the West, but located 
from within. Significant issues are those relating to the experience of Muslims as being treated 
as outsiders in the West (that of ‘other’), their experiences as multi-ethnic migrants and issues 
pertaining to migration, such as dislocation and the internalisation of these matters by diaspora 
Muslims. Thus, what is most significant is not the religious difference, but the social standing, 
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and how these groups of people are represented, treated and present in society and what it is 
about their understanding of Islam in particular, or religion in general, that pulls them towards 
it. Issues pertaining to the hybridity of identities are also relevant, especially in the context of 
postmodern relativity, plurality and diversity. Thus, it is apparent that it is not an inherently 
located Islamic violence that is ‘at fault’ but instead, the primary focus of research should be the 
‘why’ factor. What is it about particular ideologies that attracts particular individuals, what is 
their status in societal terms in relation to their familial context, local context, educational 
context, socio-economic context and national context? How do they see themselves in the 
world and what do they consider their personal prospects to be with the ‘cultural capital’157 that 
they hold?  
In this sense, new religious identities may be viewed as a critique of the ideals of contemporary 
Western (and also non-Western) society. It can be posited that this new identity- formation 
based on religion, rather than on ethnic heritage, is a claim towards what has been traditionally 
considered ‘other’ to modern society. Religion, and more specifically ‘other’, are religious 
traditions that do not have a European cultural and institutional heritage, namely Islam. Thus, 
by claiming or re-claiming a collective Muslim identity as the basis of their identity 
construction, this identity can be considered a form of individuals themselves ‘self-othering’.    
Will Herberg158 discussed the turn (or return) to a religious identity amongst third-generation 
immigrants in the United States in his 1955 book Protestant Catholic Jew. Whilst he discusses a 
return to religiosity amongst the third-generation of immigrants, what we are seeing now, 
especially in Europe, is again a return to religiosity amongst immigrants, this time Muslim, and 
also amongst second- as well as third-generation immigrants.
To discuss what religion means in a postmodern world, it is necessary to distinguish between 
individual belief or community beliefs. In dealing with the issue of the formation of a neo-
revivalist and collective Muslim identity that may be said to have wider implications for a 
  
157 This term refers to Bordieu’s notion of capital as a habitus that relates to the embodiment of symbols and ideas 
that enable the strategic utilisation of resources. According to Bourdieu there is a close relationship between 
economic and social capital.  Marshall, G. and Scott, J. (eds.). ‘Cultural capital’. Oxford Dictionary of Sociology. 
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 2005. pp. 129-30. I use the term cultural capital here to refer the 
individual’s place in the social structure of society and more significantly, what the individual perceives his/her 
prospects to be in society.  
158 Herberg’s thesis will be discussed more fully in relation to diaspora Muslims in Chapter three.
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homegrown religious extremism, I am concerned with the possibility of choice in individual 
belief and practice, and also the individual extremist as self-othering to not just the society or 
country that s/he is part of, but also to the local religious community. The attraction of jihadi
or ‘Islamist’159 networks appears to be the puritanical attitude not just against the West, but 
also against anyone who does not share the same beliefs, and this even includes other Muslims. 
The attitude of these networks appears to be one of monopoly over religious truth, 
interpretation, belief and practice. Mirza160 suggests that the reason behind the Muslim younger 
generations' attraction to extremism is because of the disillusionment with their religious 
community’s stance on religion, in that they view it as overly culture-ridden without the due 
emphasis on the personal duty of a believer. Hence the younger generations of Muslims are 
attracted to these organisations which question the local religious community’s claim to 
authenticity. Thus, this reflects the shift to the individualisation of religious identity as 
paramount within the context of the global jihad. 
Whilst it is apparent that religion has been in a sense ‘allowed back in’ by postmodernity, many 
may not feel as though that is enough. Religion in the West is still characterised by a Christian 
heritage, but more so now by a plurality of religious truth claims, and in this way, there is no 
monopoly on salvation. This view is disturbing to those religiously-oriented individuals or 
communities who may feel as though their way is the ultimate truth and is the only authentic 
way to be and act in any national and global context.  
The following chapter will provide an overview of a classification of ‘moderate’ Muslims, and 
the diversity of ways through which Muslims consider themselves Muslims. It will also expand 
on issues concerning religious extremism and the merging neo-fundamentalism in the West in 
the context of the global jihad. 
  
159 The terms global Jihadi and neofundamentalism will be used to refer to what has been termed ‘Islamist’ identity
160 Mirza, M. ‘Getting to the root of ‘homegrown terrorism’’. Spiked. 30 August, 2006. http://www.spiked-
online.com/index.php?/site/article/1572/ 
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Chapter 2. An introductory classification of ‘moderate Muslims’, the perceived 
roles of Muslims’ in society and a spectrum of the global jihad
This chapter provides an introductory classification of moderate Muslims and a spectrum of 
the diverse ways in which Muslims can act as Muslims in society, considering revivalist Islam in 
the context of the global jihad and neofundamentalism. The purpose of this chapter is to 
provide a context of the classification of Muslims in the global arena.
In the past decade, there has been a noted emergence of a ‘neo-revivalist’ Muslim identity 
amongst Muslim youth in the Western context. Their relationship with Islam is shifting and 
changing in relation to first generation immigrants, for whom Islam can be said to be grounded 
within their ethno-cultural heritage161. This neo-revivalist Muslim identity is discussed within 
the context of the ‘global jihad’ or the ‘landscapes of the jihad’, as termed by Devi162. According 
to Devi, “…the jihad makes Islam into an agent as well as a product of globalisation by 
liberating it from its specific context.”163 Thus there has been a shift from a particularistic 
understanding and practice of religion that may be based on ethno-cultural norms to a 
perceived universalistic conception of Islam that is supranational. Islam however, is not just 
perceived as a universalistic religion, the universality of Islam is central to its claims. What has 
changed is the globalised Islamic identity that is now taken as normative over and above any 
cultural and national identities through a “culture-blind approach”164. This universalistic 
notion of Islam relates to Roy’s165 notion of the deterritorialisation of Islam, that is, Islam 
taken from the local to the global context166. He uses the term globalised Islam to refer “…to 
the way in which the relationship of Muslims to Islam is reshaped by globalisation, 
westernisation and the impact of living as a minority”167. The deterritorialisation that Roy 
refers to is not so much related to the spread of Islam as it is of Muslim people through 
  
161 Islam is particularistic and dependent on their experiences of it in their ‘home culture’ or ‘home countries’.
162 Devi, F. Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity. London: Hurst & Company. 2005.  
163 Devji, Ibid. p. xii. 
164 Roy, O. Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004. p. 330. 
165 Roy, O. Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004.
166 However, as earlier mentioned, due to the notion of the Ummah in Islam, it would be more accurate to suggest 
the shift that is taking place is not the deterritorialiasation of Islam (as Islam has always been extra-territorial), but 
instead, the realisation of this ideal due to the significant number of Muslims living transnationally. 
167 Roy, O. Ibid. p. ix.
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globalisation and immigration168. It can be argued that the notions of ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslim’ are 
different claims of identity and authenticity. I consider Islam in terms of the Qur’anic principle 
of the shahada169 and Muslims as the actors who utilise their own specific hermeneutics to 
understand and apply Islam170 in their lives. Living as minorities, the ways in which diaspora 
Muslims conceive of themselves and their children as Muslims necessitates reflexive thinking 
with regard to their experience of religion and how to ‘keep their religion alive’ in their new 
location. 
With regard to the minority status of Muslims, it is important to bear in mind that being a 
minority, in ethno-religious and even in some cases, in socio-economic terms to the dominant 
majority society, the minority, in order to be taken seriously, have to ‘prove themselves’ or 
assert their identity to counter being ‘othered’171. This may be carried out by striving for 
educational and professional success with regard to societal contribution, or through the 
assertion of one’s ethno-cultural, and more significantly for this thesis, religious identity. This 
assertion of identity may be enacted in both individual and collective arenas, and 
reappropriated in terms of both the individual and collective. In this way, according to the 
societal landscape, the normative expression of Islam by Muslims can change as the relationship 
between the religion, and the religious expression of the religion, is a dynamic process. In 
diaspora terms, there are two significant appropriations. The first is, “[t]he construction of a 
subjective, self-reflexive memory”172, that is a common narrative, which enables the continuity 
of membership over time, and the ability for this membership to be expanded and rooted in 
local contexts. The second appropriation is that the collective identity transcends ethnic and 
cultural origins173. In relation to Islam it is the extraterritoriality of the religion that allows, 
symbolically, the universal to be merged with the particular. Thus, for second- and third-
  
168 Ibid, p. 18.
169 The shahada asserts that there no other God but God and Muhammad is his messenger (Prophet). See Al-
Jubouri, I. ‘Fundamentals, Islamists and the West’. Philosophy Now. July-August, 2006.
170 It is for this reason I consider the ‘neo-revivalist’ Muslim identity rather than the ‘neo-revivalist’ Islamic identity. 
However, this ‘neo-revivalism’ locates itself within perceptions of the collective Muslim Ummah.
171 ‘Othering’ refers to being considered in opposition to the dominant mainstream society, with regard to religion 
and perhaps also the dominant culture. This may be carried out through binary dichotomies of self/other 
us/them, that stress inherent, and immutable, differences and beliefs. However, at the same time, minorities may 
‘self-other’ to the dominant society, by also perceiving themselves as distinctive in the same religio-cultural terms.   
172 Saint-Blancat, C. ‘Islam in Diaspora: Between Reterritorialization and Extraterritoriality’. International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research. Vol. 26, No. 1. March 2002. P. 140. 
173 Ibid.
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generation diaspora Muslims, a hybrid religious culture that is simultaneously individualistic174
and collective175 is enabled to be formed. 
Islam as a religion is ‘a way of life’ and religion is not simply confined to personal belief or 
weekly practice. The religion stems to all areas of social life, including morality, politics and 
behaviour, and in this way is a public religion. However, Islam is also a private religion in that 
each Muslim’s salvation is his/her own and no intermediary is needed between the individual 
and God. This relates to the place of authority in Islam, for which there is no singular 
authority and uniform voice of Islam. There is one basic principle however, that all Muslims 
adhere to. This is the shahada, the assertion that there is no God but God and that 
Muhammad is His messenger. This fundamental principle may be performed through the Five 
Pillars of Islam176. The omniscience, omnipotence and oneness of God and the shahada is 
something all believing Muslims have in common. According to Al-Jubouri, those termed 
‘Islamists’, or for the purposes of this thesis, extremists, neo-fundamentalists or jihadis, have 
four extra ‘rules’ that they adhere to. These are first: “To recognise there are monotheists who 
are not Muslims”177, second, “To recognise that there are polytheists, both Muslim and non-
Muslim”178, third, “To fight them all, without making a distinction between one group and 
another”179 and finally “The polytheists of today are worse than those encountered in the early 
days of Islam180”181 This synthesis is a worthwhile starting point in order to comprehend what 
makes the extremists’ view of Islam different to the majority view, and ‘extreme’. In this way, 
what can be seen is the remaking of tradition.   
It is important to consider, when dealing with any dogma or ideology, religious or otherwise 
that hermeneutics are necessarily based on one’s experience of the world or life history with 
regard to one’s psycho-social experience in the environment. If, for example, an individual has 
  
174 And personalised, due to the postmodern context that allows for the individual interpretation and 
personalization of religion as text. What follows is a turn to individual hermeneutics and the remaking of 
tradition. See Devi, F. Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity. London: Hurst & Company. 2005; 
Roy, O. Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004.  
175 In the sense that individuals are able to identify with and locate themselves within the supranational Islamic 
context of the Ummah.
176 The shahada, the five daily prayers, zakat or alms, the fast during Ramadan, Hajj.
177 Al-Jubouri, I. ‘Fundamentals, Islamists and the West’. Philosophy Now. July-August, 2006. p. 12.  
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
180 This includes those who supplicate saints for the singular God.
181 Ibid.
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not personalised the experiences he/she may have had of religious ‘racialisation’182 and 
xenophobia, then it is unlikely that the individual will be attracted towards an ‘extremist’ 
interpretation of the religion. If however, an individual has personalised xenophobia and 
perceives his/her status in society to be in an arena of ‘structural disempowerment’, 
‘oppression’ and ‘victimisation’, then it seems more likely that the individual will be attracted 
to extremist ideologies that empower the individual through notions of religious superiority. 
Through personalised claims of victimology and victimisation the individual may be far more 
likely to find meaning in such a network that empowers the individual and provides him/her 
with a collective duty and purpose that is perceived as morally correct and superior in enacting 
justice on God’s behalf.    
The term ‘Islamism’ has been circulating widely amongst theorists and in the news media to 
refer to the ‘new’ identity formations that are taking place amongst Muslims in the West and 
non-West. This term has been used as a blanket-term to refer to ‘new’ religious identity 
formations that appear to be problematic for the West. This is inclusive of militant and non-
militant ideologies and is therefore a contested term, and I would assert, problematic. 
‘Radicalism’ and ‘extremism’ refer to the propensity to violent ideologies of global jihadis. The 
term ‘global jihadis’183 is used to identify radical and extremist transnational movements with a 
propensity towards violence, such as Al Qa’eda. It is put forward that it is inaccurate to refer to 
‘fundamentalism’ in this context, but instead, the term ‘neofundamentalism’184 is more 
accurate, as rather than a return to the past, neofundamentalists seek to redefine the 
fundamentals of religion in the context of contemporary society.      
Throughout the course of this thesis, reference is made to the ‘global jihad’ that has become 
popularised in the global media and politics and has increasingly become a subject for analysis 
by such theorists as Faisal Devji and Olivier Roy185. As a post-analysis to the bombings that took 
place in the London underground in July 2005, Ziauddin Sardar186 has articulated ‘Islamic’ 
  
182 See 3.1 for a discussion on the ‘racialisation’ of Muslims. 
183 Devi, F. Ibid.
184 Roy, O. Globalized Islam: The search for a New Ummah. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004.
185 See for example, Devi, F. Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity. London: Hurst & Company. 
2005; and Roy, O. Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004.
186 Sardar, Z. ‘The Struggle for Islam’s Soul’. New Statesman. 18th July, 2005. 
http://www.newstatesman.com/200507180004
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terrorism as being “an internal Muslim struggle within Islam” despite statements being given by 
community representatives stating that the violent acts have nothing to do with Islam. 
I use the term ‘neo-revivalism’ which refers to the ‘new’ religious identity that attracts some 
second- and third-generation children of Muslim migrants to the West. It is a personalised 
form of religiosity located within perceived notions of an Islamic collective or ummah, which is 
necessarily within the wider context of Devji’s notion of the global jihad187. This identity is 
made ‘real’ through the public identity performance188, and whilst this public assertion of 
identity may be considered to be a political act, this does not necessitate extremism or 
militancy.  
2.1 ‘Moderate’ Muslims and a spectrum of the perceived roles of religion in society 
Although the primary focus of this thesis is to investigate how the turn to a neo-revivalist 
Muslim identity can be considered a form of ‘self-othering’ in the landscape of the global jihad, 
it must be noted that the vast majority of Muslims are ordinary citizens whose daily practice of 
religion is not confrontational to others or to society itself. Through this first decade of the 
twenty-first century, due to the very public wave of global terrorism that has had connections 
with Muslims, policy makers and world leaders have been appealing to the moderate Muslims 
to denounce radical claims made by other Muslims or Muslim groups to pressure these ‘rogue’ 
elements within the Muslim context. Whilst perhaps the aim of this is for Islam and the beliefs 
of Muslims to change and become less radical from within, the concept is not entirely 
realistic189. It may be that the moderate majority do not wish to speak out against militant or 
jihadi ideology as they don’t consider it to be their duty to be apologists for the religious beliefs 
and religious expression of a minority. It could also be that moderate Muslims do not want to 
be targeted themselves by those who hold extreme ideas about what an authentic Muslim is 
and how one should behave as they are aware that these extremists would target them as well 
for not being ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’ enough. This could be interpreted as moderate Muslims’ 
support of those who see Islam as violent. One conception of ‘moderate’ Muslims, put forth by 
  
187 See Devji, F. Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity. Hurst & Company: London. 2005.
188 Such as through ‘ethnic’ dress being considered as the ‘authentic’ ways in which to publicly enact one’s 
religious identity.  
189 Especially if change is sought and imposed from outside rather than organically from within the Muslim 
community. See Ramadan, T. To be a European Muslim. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation. 1999; Ramadan, T. 
Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 2004.
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Turner, is that of a ‘Westphalian Islam’190, which he notes is the type of Islam favoured by 
Western politicians due to the problematic state of Islam in Western society191. Turner argues 
that “[t]he West can accept Islam, provided it conforms to the Westphalian liberal model”192, is 
privatised and “acculturated”193. 
In their article, ‘In Search of Moderate Muslims’194, Muravchik and Szrom begin with the 
premise that it is moderate Muslim communities and organisations that the United States and 
its allies should be focussing on in the ‘War on Terror’. The policy aim appears “to call forth 
the Muslim majority against the acts and ideology of the terrorists”195. Muravchik and Szrom 
investigate Daniel Pipes’ claim that the problem lies in radical Islam and that the solution is 
moderate Islam.  However, the now-universal notion of the ‘silent majority’196 should be raised 
in this context, as the Muslim majority may not wish to become politically involved.  
In trying to ascertain what a moderate Muslim is, Muravchik and Szrom state that because 
moderate implies a lesser quantity of something, does a moderate Muslim mean someone who 
isn’t too devout? They concede that if this is the implication, “then the prospects for success will 
be both poor and beyond our control”197. If the definition of a moderate Muslim implies that 
Muslims should become less devout, there may be a stronger pull towards Islam if those of faith 
consider the tenets and piety of their religious duties and observations to be under attack. In 
other words, if moderate Muslims are told that they can’t be that religious, most likely they will 
consider that their faith is being attacked and inadvertently become stronger proponents 
against this particular intolerance.  
To counter this interpretation of what it means to be moderate (as opposed to being an 
extremist), Muravchik and Szrom assert that the primary focus should be on “the acceptance or 
  
190 See Chapter 1.1 for a brief explanation on the Treaty of Westphalia that led to the separation of Church and 
State in Europe.  
191 Turner, B. S. ‘Islam, Religious Revival and the Sovereign State’. The Muslim World. Vol. 97, No. 3. July 2007. p. 
409.
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid.
194 Muravchik, J. and Szrom, C. ‘In Search of Moderate Muslims’. Commentary. 2008. pp 26-34.
195 Ibid.
196 The first time this notion was used was by US President Richard Nixon in his address to the nation on the war 
on Vietnam on 3rd November 1969. See www.watergate.info/nixon/silent-majority-speech-1969.shtml
197 Ibid.
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rejection of pluralism”198, as this encourages tolerance. In Muravchik and Szrom’s view 
however, the “fierce”199 fundamentals of Islam “insists that the world in its entirety must come 
to acknowledge Allah and the teachings of his unique messenger."200 They also assert that there 
are contrary passages in the Qur’an to the ‘state of war’ or jihad that is implied and that the aim 
of a global conversion is similar amongst Christians and Jews. However, without delving too 
deeply into theological issues within Islam, it is not a balanced assertion to assume that this 
“fierce”201 ideal of conversion is a fundamental teaching and message that every Muslim abides 
by or agrees with. This however, leads to their point about tolerance and pluralism being 
achieved through moderate Muslims.   
Bokhari, who once professed to an ‘Islamist’ ideology which he has now denounced202, has 
identified four groups of moderate Muslims203. The first are citizens in Muslim countries who 
are religious but not in the political sense. They are considered to be a silent majority for whom 
faith is significant in their daily lives. They generally do not participate in or support violence 
in the name of religion.
Second, are moderate regimes such as Jordan and Egypt204 who align themselves with the West 
on some levels. However, moderate regimes are likely to deny political freedoms to their 
citizens. So, although these regimes may be moderate, it is not clear in which direction the 
general population of the country align themselves. Moderate regimes may appear to be 
politically moderate but it does not necessarily follow that there is no underground dissent 
amongst the citizenship. 
  
198 Ibid.
199 Ibid.
200 Ibid.
201 Ibid.
202 Although Kamran Bokhari signed a document (with many other notable scholars of Islam) on the 9th of 
September 2002, rejecting terrorism and Islamism following the attacks on the 11th of September, 2001 (see 
http://www.islam-democracy.org/terrorism_statement.asp) his position as a Senior Analyst of Strategic forecasting 
for a private U.S. intelligence firm (see http://www.post-islamist.info/) has been questioned by other scholars of 
Islam such as Daniel Pipes http://209.85.173.104/search?q=cache:aJ2DFMl2-
kcJ:www.danielpipes.org/article/1650+statement+by+kamran+bokhari+denouncing+islamism&hl=en&ct=clnk&c
d=4 . Bokhari’s reasons for severing ties with al-Muhajiroun (which has been linked to Al Qa’eda) are unclear.  
203 Muravchik, J. and Szrom, C. ‘In Search of Moderate Muslims’. Commentary. 2008. p. 27.
204 Which may be compared to Iran which is a theocracy and can be conceived of as being anti-Western. 
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Third, are secular liberals who are sympathetic to the cultural and political stance and values of 
the West. They however are minorities within their own countries. The Middle East region has 
a history of secular and even anti-religious post-colonial ideologies205. However, by not giving 
priority to religion through separating religious and political ideologies with the aim of 
modernisation, it does seem as though there has been a post-colonial backlash. Ataturk’s 
Turkey is an example of this. Modernisation was sought by radically secularising the country to 
the detriment of peoples’ religious freedoms. If a country moves in a direction that the majority 
of the population are not prepared for, it seems inevitable that there will come a time when a 
balance will have to be struck between religious freedoms and secularism. 
Finally, in Bokhari’s analysis are moderate Islamists who have ‘reformed’ from violence and 
extreme religio-political ideologies. The claim of these moderates is to strive for political 
recognition that is not exclusive or dogmatic. Their aim appears to be the formation of a 
religio-political party such as democratic Christian parties in the West.   
Most change can be made with the secular liberals and moderate ‘Islamists’, according to 
Muravchik and Szrom and there are six basic questions that have been formed by Muravchik 
and Szrom to be taken into account when considering any ‘moderate’ Muslim group206. The 
first is whether it both espouses democracy and practices democracy within its own structures. 
In considering this question, democracy should be defined. Is a Western democracy implied, or 
is the Islamic conception of the consensus of the ulama acceptable? Their second question is 
whether the group eschews violence in pursuit of its goals? Violence can be considered as 
having a universalistic understanding, so this question would not be problematic. Muravchick 
and Szrom’s third question is whether the group condemns terrorism. Again, the term needs to 
be defined as the definition of ‘terrorism’ is relative. For example, Hamas in Palestine was 
elected, but the ways in which the group carries out its goals can be considered problematic. 
Their fourth question is, does it advocate equal rights for minorities? The notion of equal 
rights can be considered as universal, but may be dependent on legalistic conceptions207. Fifth 
  
205 Such as, Baathism, pan-Arab Nasserism and Arab socialism.
206 Muravchik, J. and Szrom, C. 2008. ‘In Search of Moderate Muslims’. Commentary. pp. 33-34.
207 A parallel to with regard to minority rights can be seen in Germany where from the 1960s (when a sizeable 
number of ‘guest workers’ entered Germany), to the end of 1999, children born to foreign nationals in Germany 
were not automatically entitled to German citizenship. Only since the 1st January 2000 have children born to 
foreign nationals been granted citizenship rights, although this is still conditional and the preceding generations 
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is whether the group advocates equal rights for women. Again the legal system should be 
considered, such as whether the country has Shari’ah law, and if so, what legalistic school it 
positions itself with. For example, in the Jafari school of law, which is Shi’a, the inheritance law 
is more favourable to women than the Sunni sects. The final question proposed by Muravchik 
and Szrom is, does the group accept a pluralism of interpretations within Islam? This is 
dependent on the Islamic school of thought. Most strands can be considered to be exclusive, 
whilst the Hanafi school, which is the school of jurisprudence most widely recognised in 
Pakistan, is more inclusive208. 
In order to discuss the place of religion amongst Muslims worldwide, I will use Abdullah 
Saeed’s preliminary classification as a starting point209. There are difficulties in attempting to 
assess the different groups and sects within a religion, especially one as diverse as Islam in 
which there is no singular authority on the religion. Normally, classifications of Muslims are 
based on several areas such as: religio-political differences (often referring to religious authority 
and lineage after Prophet Muhammad’s death), legal differences regarding fiqh and Shari’ah law, 
theological and spiritual differences and the emphases on rationalism, traditionalism and 
modernism210. There have been more recent classifications such as: ‘Islamists’, radicals, 
militants, extremists and moderates. Based on the areas referred to above, Saeed has classified 
eight different trends concerning Muslims in the contemporary world. The first of these are the 
legal traditionalists whose primary concern is with maintaining and implementing the  laws of 
the classical legal schools or madhhab. They reject reform and are traditionalists who follow 
their legal school in an uncritical manner (taqlid). Saeed’s second classification is of Theological 
Puritans, their focus, as the name suggests, is primarily on theological issues, for example, 
“correct belief”211 and their aim is the purification of society from customs and practices they 
consider to be un-Islamic. They are literalists who dislike what they consider to be Saint-
worship by Sufis and consider these practices to be against the teachings of Islam that requires 
no intermediary between God and people. Although they disagree about how jihad should be 
    
are still not citizens. See 
www.london.diplo.de/Vertretung/london/en/06/other_legal_matters/Reform_Germanys_citezenship_seite.html  
208 It can be asserted that it is Wahhabi Islam, as practiced in Saudi Arabia that is the most intolerant to plurality 
within Islam, due to the literalist textual interpretations. 
209 Saeed, A. ‘Trends in Contemporary Islam: A Preliminary Attempt at a Classification’. The Muslim World. Vol. 
97, No. 3. July 2007. p. 395.
210 Ibid. p. 396.
211 Ibid. pp. 397-8.
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undertaken, they have revived the notion of jihad. According to Saeed, they also seek “some 
form of “separation” between Muslims and non-Muslims” because they consider this 
association “harmful to the Muslim’s beliefs, behaviour and outlook."212 They are also referred 
to as Salafis and follow the teachings of Abd al-Wahhab213.     
A third trend that Saeed looks at is the most significant to this thesis, that of Militant 
Extremists. The issues involved with this classification are those of national liberation struggles 
and anti-Western sentiment following global encounters in the late twentieth and early twenty-
first century. Militant Extremists have “…a particular understanding of jihad whose theater is 
global and [are motivated] by a belief that less resourceful people can defeat a powerful enemy 
using terror as a tool to achieve specific objectives.”214 Osama bin Laden can be placed within 
this trend due to his anti-Western and more specifically anti-American rhetoric and actions. 
Those holding such an anti-Western stance, such as Al Qa’eda, have been deemed 
responsible215 for the events of ‘9/11’ and other violent acts that have taken place in Western 
and Muslim countries through a global network of extremists. The dominant worldview of 
militant extremists appears to primarily be one of injustice stemming from the time of the 
Crusades to colonialism and through “to post-colonial domination of Muslims by the 
“Christian” West”216. Other sites of outrage are the Israel-Palestine conflict and more recently, 
a backlash to the perceived American and Western occupation of both Afghanistan and Iraq.  
According to Saeed, “This view includes a belief that the West is committed to the domination 
and subjugation of Muslims, the ‘stealing’ of Muslim lands and resources and the economic, 
military and political control of Muslims to prevent any challenge to this domination.”217 This 
view is suspicious and critical of the West and perceives the West as opposed to Islam. 
Proponents of this view, such as Al-Qa’eda, would also be opposed to Muslims whom they feel 
to be collaborating with the West against Islam. jihad is a global objective and bin Laden’s 
  
212 Ibid, p. 398.
213 Wahhab founded the pattern of Islam that is common in Saudi Arabia. The Qur’an and Hadith (through 
which the practices and sayings of the Prophet, or Sunnah were written down) are taken as fundamental texts of 
the Wahabis and are interpreted literally. They consider their interpretations as authoritative, and practices such as 
Saint-worship by Sufis or Shi’a visiting the tombs of Imams are considered shirk, meaning idolatry or worshiping 
something that is not God. Wahabism has no space for plurality within Islam. They follow the Hanbali school of 
jurisprudence and Salafis are related to this type of Wahabi Islam.   
214 Saeed, A. Ibid. p. 399.
215 Following ‘9/11’, the United States made the claim that Al Qa’eda was responsible, which they did not deny. 
The ‘terrorists’ involved all had links to Al Qa’eda. 
216 Saeed, A. Ibid.
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agenda is espoused by advocates of the same worldview who state that it is the individual duty 
of all Muslims to fight against the Western oppressors in order to liberate their lands218.
Saeed’s fourth trend is the Political Islamists. The emphasis of this group is on an Islamic 
society with a focus on ‘Islamic’ values in all socio-political terms. There is a theoretical 
rejection of “…modern ideologies of nationalism, secularism and communism.”219
‘Westernization’ is also rejected. Societal reform and change are sought not through violence, 
as with Militant Extremists, but at a grassroots level, through education.  The goal is a 
reactionary one to the effects of Colonialism. They consider Islam to have been marginalised 
during the colonial period220 and the aim is to bring Islam back into the forefront of society by 
challenging religious and state authorities from within. The Muslim Brotherhood221 of Egypt 
and Jamaat-I Islami222 of Pakistan are groups associated with these ideologies223. 
Secular Liberals224 are Saeed’s fifth classification of the trends in contemporary Islam. They are 
in favour of a democratically organised state. The focus of this group with regard to faith, is 
that faith is an individual matter and is confined to a private relationship between the 
individual and God. Faith is viewed in terms of personal belief, no need is seen for an Islamic 
State or any State involvement in religion. Instead, Secular Liberals wish for religion to be 
separated from the control of the state and value freedom of religion for those of all religions. 
They are not in favour of religious symbols225. In this classification, Islam is largely confined to 
the private sphere of society.
The focus of Cultural Nominalists, Saeed’s sixth classification, as the name suggests, is on 
culture, not religion. Cultural Nominalists may describe themselves as “culturally Muslim”226, 
meaning that being a Muslim does not necessarily imply religious practice (or even necessarily
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belief).  They are Muslim through descent. According to Saeed, Cultural Nominalists represent 
“…a very large number of Muslims today.”227
Classical Modernists are reformists who focus on legal and theological issues. They are strong 
proponents of ijtihad228 (a concept internal to Islam that focuses on analogical reasoning). The 
aim of Classical Modernists is to continue in the line of the eighteenth and nineteenth century 
reformist movement within Islam. The goal is to remain “faithful to the basics of Islam”229, 
whilst reforming certain aspects to adapt to changing society and modernity. The emphasis is 
on rationalism, reason and reappraisal whilst keeping with the traditions of revelation. 
Accordingly, it is thought that “social change must be reflected in Islamic law”230. Classical 
Modernists are opposed to certain Sufi practices and religious syncretism as they consider them 
to be “deviations”231. Rather, change can be made through scientific knowledge and by 
reforming the Islamic education system.  
The final classification that Saeed describes are the Progressive Ijtihadis. They are closely 
related to the Classical Modernists, however their primary focus is on reforming Islamic law to 
relate to contemporary society. The aim is to focus on “core Islamic values of justice (‘adl)”232
and “goodness and beauty (ihsan)”233 . The goal is to focus on these core values inherent to 
Islam and engage with other core values relevant to Human Rights discourse (such as religious 
pluralism, social justice and gender equality) in order to strive towards “a universal notion of 
justice”234. Progressive Ijtihadis accommodate pluralism and align themselves with the 
compassionate and rationalist traditions of early Islam. They seek to turn away from literalist 
interpretations of Islam.  Notable Progressive Ijtihadis are Muslim feminists such as Fatema 
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Mernissi235 and those that seek full participation of Muslims in the West such as Tariq 
Ramadan236.   
2.2 Religious extremism, neofundamentalism and the global jihad
The secularism thesis was an idea put forward by sociologists who proposed that as society 
became increasingly modernised and rooted in science there would no longer be a need for 
religion to provide meaning and certainty. Whilst this arose out of the Western Enlightenment 
context, secular ideologies were not exclusive to this part of the world as colonial and post-
colonial histories have shown237. In fact, according to Vakil, there was a shift in ideological 
thought stemming from disenchantment with the secular pan-Arab defeat in 1967. Pan-Arab 
nationalism was challenged by Israel, and “...a journey...has taken hold in the minds of many 
young Arab men..a call to cleanse...[and] to fight..evil”238. The imported nationalist ideology 
was replaced by a home-grown vision for a pure Islamic state by some in the region. The goal 
was to de-stabilise traditional autocrats and thus, according to Gerges239, “The key to 
understanding the jihadist journey is politics, not religion”240. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 
gave hope to many in achieving the ideal of an Islamic State and changing the current social 
and political order, although of course the revolution that took place in Iran was rooted in 
Shi’a rather than Sunni Islam. The realisation of an Islamic State however proved to be an 
arduous task and the focus shifted to Mujahaddin fighters in Afghanistan following the Soviet 
invasion in 1978. It is during this time that the notions of anti-American rhetoric took root 
and the United States was deemed hypocritical in funding and employing the Mujahadeen for 
their purposes in the Cold War, whilst also supporting Israel and not forging out a plan for 
peace with Israel-Palestine241. Also the United States’ support of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war 
between 1980 and 1988 was further considered an act of hypocrisy. Militancy also expanded in 
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reaction to the targeting of ‘Islamists’242 in the 1990s. Between 1999 and 2005 there was a 
division amongst jihadis and many chose not to follow the path of bin Laden, as it was deemed 
counterproductive and instead chose a non-violent approach to the ideal of an Islamic state. 
The attacks on ‘9/11’ however grouped all involved in the ‘Islamist’ movement243 into “..a 
global battle with the United States”244. Thus, considering the historical context, the “war 
between..[Al Qa’eda and the United States]..broke out in the early 1990s, not on September 
11, 2001”245. The events of ‘9/11’ acted as a catalyst not only for a confrontation between the 
United States, the United States-led Coalition forces and Al Qa’eda, but also for the future of 
political Islam. As Vakil asserts, after ‘9/11’, what ensued “within the umma was a civil war for 
the soul of the community”246. In this way, Afghanistan and Iraq have become linked to each 
other, and linked also to the Israel-Palestine conflict in the ongoing struggle against the West. 
The differences of opposing Muslims groups have become concealed through uniting against a 
common enemy. Iraq has become a physical site for Al Qa’eda to locate itself in and has 
provided a venue247 that is given global attention through the media. Vakil states that “Political 
change is often sparked by extremism”248 and whilst some jihadis do seek political change 
through militancy, there are those who do seek an Islamic state but do not agree with the 
direction of violence, but instead choose moderation. Whilst this may not appear to be the 
case, according to Gerges, once political gains are made (such as through Turkey’s Islamic 
Justice and Development party Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas in Palestine), these 
signs of political progress signify the potential for “...warriors of God...to reassess their old 
ways...[revealing] a new course, one committed not to violent revolution but to political 
persuasion and dawa or religious calling.”249
Through this historical context, the emergent roots of a political Muslim ideology begin to take 
form. Whilst political Islam is historically rooted in Muslim countries, it can be argued that the 
potential attractiveness of these ideologies to second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims in 
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the West lies not in an inherent incompatibility between Islam and the West, but instead lies 
in a failure to balance multiple identities satisfactorily to both the Western context (that is, the 
general perception of Islam in the West), and to diaspora Muslim youth in the context of their 
localised experiences of Islam (this being their immediate experience of Islam transmitted 
through the practices of their parents and the wider localised Muslim community).           
This thesis is mainly focussed within the context of the West as it looks at changing religiosity 
amongst second- and third-generation Muslims in the West. So whilst it would be worthwhile 
to include the historical shifts in Muslim countries relating to fiqh and Sharia law and 
secularism, a thorough analysis of these issues is not within the scope of this thesis. However, 
this brief historical background is relevant to understanding political motivations of global 
jihadis existing as a global network of individuals in both the non-West and West.
The post-secular turn has also been discussed in Chapter one with regard to the 
individualisation of religion and whilst Church participation is in decline in Europe250, this is 
not to say that people are no longer religious, it is their relationship to religion that has 
changed, and how people express their religious identity that has shifted. 
However, what has been of note, especially with regard to Europe, is the tradition, cultural and 
religious (Christian) heritage that forms some form of national identity251. Wharton252 asserts 
that not only has Islam and Islamic identity become problematic to European society due to its 
continuation in the public sphere, but Christianity and in particular Europe’s Christian 
heritage and collective identity is also problematic to the contemporary landscape. These issues 
however have so far been by-passed by the visibility of problematic Islam through media 
coverage of Islamic radicalism and terrorism. However, the Christian heritage will become 
more significant, especially through European Union expansion, as Eastern Europe has 
traditionally been more religious and Western Europe more secular. 
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A further significant issue in Europe concerning Islam is that of Turkey being accepted into the 
European Union (EU). There has been much discussion surrounding this issue, of whether a 
country that has a Muslim majority is ‘European enough’ to be part of the EU. Wharton's 
discussion relating to crises of identity in Europe and European Islam puts forth the notion 
that social and cultural dislocation of Muslims in Europe is set within the context “…of an 
increasingly vague and ill-defined European socio-cultural identity”253. This relates also to 
Asad’s notion of the importance of a “civilisational essence”254 that underlies a European 
collective identity. As Europe becomes more integrated, multi-ethnic and diverse in terms of 
national, ethnic and religious heritage of individuals, a new form of collective identity has to be 
formed. Discussing the new Constitution for Europe255, Amin relates that the commonalities 
being formed are those of the ‘old Europe’ such as, through: “…heritage and tradition…a 
perennial idea of European belonging based around myths of origin such as humanism, respect 
for Reason and (Christian) charity and mutuality.”256 These notions do not necessarily reflect 
the ‘new’ Europe that is multi-ethnic, inclusive of hybrid and transnational diaspora identities 
and cosmopolitan in scope. 
According to Asad, in order to understand the place of Islam in Europe, it is important to first 
consider the conceptualisation of Europe by Europeans. Asad argues that, if ideologies of 
Europe and Islam appear incompatible, “...this has less to do with the “absolutist Faith” of 
Muslims living in a secular environment and more with European notions of “culture” and 
“civilization and “the secular state,” “majority,” and “minority.””257 Thus, to include ‘the other’ 
or ‘them’, it seems apparent that what has to be looked at first is who is ‘the self’, and what is 
meant by ‘us’258. This is an important issue for all Western countries with multi-ethnic migrant 
populations. An inclusive national and collective identity that is cosmopolitan in scope has to 
be formed in order to integrate ‘others’ into this national collective rather than be displaced by 
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it. Thus, a clarification of collective identity is paramount for the inclusion of individual 
identities and it is important to consider whether this can achieved from the top-down, or 
whether a grassroots initiative would be more sustainable. There is a tension of collective and 
individual identity formations as the locus of identity in historical259 terms in the West focuses 
more on the individual than the collective. This leads to the ‘othering’ of those with a more 
continuing collective identity focus and formation and thus the collective ‘other’ may appear 
radical, simply through the  notion of a religiously located multicollective identity that portrays 
a different locus of authority. Accordingly there may be a ghettoisation on all sides and not 
only are Muslim minorities peripheralised according to their physical location, in the sense that 
they may feel security in a common heritage by living in close proximity to other minorities260, 
but this ghettoisation may also work inversely where ethnic Europeans may also take comfort 
in living close to the majority like themselves rather than with ‘others’. A cosmopolitan world-
view that recognises hybrid and syncretic identities that move away from simply essentialising
‘others’ in religious terms would be valuable through which “...everyone may live as a minority 
among minorities”261.  
A deradicalisation programme is recently being established in the UK to attempt to de-
radicalise those who may be susceptible to or have already joined the jihad262. This process 
includes encouraging individuals to feel more valued and confronting particular myths and 
stereotypes that may have led to their radicalisation. A profile has been established of 
vulnerable individuals. This includes individuals “who have experienced trauma through 
migration or asylum; those who have gone through a personal crisis such as divorce, family 
estrangement or time spent in prison; and those frustrated by having a job way below their 
perceived skills or education”263. Criminal activity and the perception of foreign policy 
objectives, discrimination and counterterrorism measures can also be contributing factors 
according to counterterrorism experts264. It is interesting to note that understanding of religion 
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is encouraged in instances where theology is utilised to espouse and justify extremist rhetoric. 
The government has official support of the Radical Middle Way website265 which is a forum 
through which Muslim clerics266 are able to answer questions from the public and many issues 
are dealt with such as, ‘mercy and compassion, citizenship, social justice’267 along with what it 
means to be a Muslim in the twenty first century. This is reflective of a self-critique by Muslims 
and in this case of forging a ‘new’268 British Muslims identity. It is significant to note that the 
website has the term ‘radical’ in its title, perhaps to attract those that are becoming radicalised 
or are attracted to those type of ideologies.  
As ‘Islamic’ doctrines have been used to justify the actions of the global militant acts, it seems 
reasonable to assert that the religious context of these militants be taken into account. Sardar 
proposes that although these acts are reprehensible to the vast majority of Muslims who 
emphasise the message of peace within the religious tradition, other aspects of Islamic history 
and tradition must also be taken into account in trying to understand and explain the actions 
of these few militants, as neo-Kharjites269. Although this analysis is valid to contextualise the 
basis of ‘fundamentalist’ forms of Islam, the ‘global jihad’ and revivalist Islam can be said to 
have emerged out of a broader global context. 
Global networks such as Al Qa’eda may have as their basis historical, national and political 
struggles but the genealogy of the global jihad does not necessitate commonalities in 
“geography, language or religious and political tradition”270 . Social theorists such as Olivier 
Roy271, Faisal Devji272, John Gray273 and Bassam Tibi274 instead put forward that the 
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hermeneutics of Islam in the context of the global jihad is that of neofundamentalism275. The 
current wave of extremist ideology involves a necessary involvement with the forces of 
globalisation such as through utilisation technology. In this way they are modernists rather 
than traditionalists. Whilst religion is utilised, the major goal appears to be a political one 
against Western modernity and hegemony and ironically, cultural modernity is dismissed 
whilst instrumental modernization is embraced276 through the Internet and the use of mobile 
phones. Thus, contemporary extremism is not simply an ideology rooted in the past lacking 
engagement with the modern world. Instead, neofundamentalists utilise technology, are global 
travellers and through this are able to engage beyond national particularities and struggles to a 
broader metaphysical struggle277. Globalisation and the global arena is incredibly important in 
this respect and networks such as Al Qa’eda have adapted their strategies to involve themselves 
in secular Western society, such as through their training encouraging drinking alcohol, 
womanising and shaving their beards and thus engaging in “Western decadence”278. Devji279
asserts that it is important to consider the global effects and unintended global consequences 
of ‘9/11’ as this has brought Islam to the forefront of global political concerns made this type 
of Islam a global phenomenon. For the purposes of this thesis, the implications of this global 
phenomenon (of this type of militant Al Qa’eda global jihad) will be considered on the identity 
projects of second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims in the West. 
The term ‘religiosity’ is used deliberately to denote the process of construction involved in 
individualised religious identity. Roy280 stresses the significance of the deterritorialisation of 
Islam to the new revivalist Muslim movements. It may be more accurate to suggest that rather 
than deterritorialisation, it is globalisation that is a catalyst for revivalist Muslim movements. 
This is because, through the notion of the ummah, or supranational Muslim community, Islam 
has necessarily always been conceived of by Muslims themselves as being extraterritorial. 
Globalisation of Islam, due to a significant number of Muslims living outside Muslim 
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countries, is embodied in what may be referred to as the Muslim diaspora. This diaspora is 
reflected in and reflective of the ummah and transcends culture and ethnicity. 
The move to a more individualised religious identity is coupled with a move towards a global 
community-oriented religious identity as well. Although this may seem to be a contradiction in 
terms, religiosity is stressed in relation to new conceptions of the global Muslim ummah or the 
transnational Islamic community. Thus there is a move towards an individualised religious 
identity in relation to its place in the global whole. Thus 'othering' and 'self-othering' take place 
first and foremost against and within the immediate family, the immediate ethno-national 
religious community second and third to wider mainstream society. Thus embracing a religious 
identity is as much a part of diaspora Muslim youth critiquing the portrayal and practice of 
their religion by other Muslims as it is a part of critiquing the place of religion in general or 
Islam in particular in the secular West and of course in the contemporary geo-political context 
as well. Embracing a religious identity is about discovering, asserting and claiming a sense of 
belonging, security and community within an increasingly fragmented and dislocated world. 
This situation especially relates to youth and in particular minority youth who, it can be 
argued, are caught between two cultures and belong fully to neither281. Thus, this privileging of 
a religious identity cannot be defined as fundamentalism as that implies the desire to return to 
a mythical past. It does however, have aspects of this fundamentalism in the construction of a 
purified and authentic Islam. However, the influences of globalisation and the fact that the 
context is specifically from within the contemporary West suggest that this trend can be 
defined as a form a neo-fundamentalism282 born not out of a return to tradition283, but created 
out of what it means to be modern284. 
In the following chapter the situation of diaspora Muslims will be considered and the global 
jihadi context will be utilised to consider the notion of ‘self’ and ‘other’ and how second- and 
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third-generation diaspora Muslims may position themselves in the contemporary geo-political 
context. At issue is how this relates to the salience of Islam and the recasting of what it means 
to be a Muslim in the West. 
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Chapter 3. Diaspora Muslims in the West: The visible recourse to religious 
identity and the transcendence of culture amongst second- and third-generation 
Muslims in the West as a form of self-othering. 
This chapter examines individual and group affiliations of diaspora Muslims in the West. The 
reformulation of religious expression, in providing a sense of belonging and increasingly 
transcending other identity affiliations (such as ethnic heritage and culture), especially amongst 
second– and third-generation diaspora Muslims, will also be discussed. Feelings of alienation, 
anomie, belonging and the liminality or notion of being ‘in between’ the home of their first-
generation parents and the society they were born into, will also be considered in the context 
of the essentialisation or ‘racialization’ of Muslims and Islam. The views of Tariq Ramadan, a 
notable scholar of Islam, will also be looked at regarding what it means to be European 
Muslim. 
3.1 Othering, ‘self-othering’, the essentialisation of Muslim identity and ‘Islamophobia’
I will engage with the binary dichotomy of ‘self’ and ‘other’285 with reference to the West and 
Islam and vice versa. The notion ‘self-other’ will be related to the reconstruction by an 
individual or group of how the self286 is perceived in accordance with societal constructions. If 
Muslims are viewed as the ‘other’ in mainstream Western society, then it may follow that some 
Muslims may react to this essentialisation and ‘self-other’ themselves by creating an identity 
distinctive to mainstream Western culture. They may do so by asserting their identity-space287
through a Muslim neo-revivalism and also ‘self-other’ themselves to their own immediate 
experiences of Islam (that of their parents’ generation or Islam practiced by first-generation 
migrants) in order to locate the self288 ‘out there’ in the wider context of the global jihad. Roy289
classifies the identity reconstruction of diaspora Muslims and presents tensions between five 
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layers of identity. The first layer is, the relocation of a “well-bonded solidarity group”290 based 
on ethno-national location, and the second, collective identity based on ethno-national 
conceptions. The third layer is a “neo-ethnic” Muslim definition exemplified through Muslim 
heritage and genealogy, and the fourth is Muslim identity defined exclusively on religious terms 
(rather than having reference to ethno-cultural or linguistic heritage). The final tension, 
according to Roy, exists in relation to acculturation or socialisation to the new Western 
location which accounts for the creation of a ‘new’ subculture. I argue that this new subculture 
indicates the development of the neo-revivalist Muslim identity claimed by some second- and 
third-generation diaspora Muslims. Whilst first-generation immigrants often experience both 
economic and social hardships in their attempts to find their footing within a new social and 
cultural context, it is the subsequent generations (in their liminal state) that may experience 
more cultural confusion between the home of their parents (both the physical house or home, 
and also the national idea of home) and the country they were born in. For whilst the new 
generations may consider the country they were born in as ‘home’, the real question of their 
identity comes about when the country they accept as home does not accept them.
To understand the situation fully in the West with regard to Muslims, the heterogeneity of 
Muslim communities within European nations, the United States, Canada and Australia and 
New Zealand should be emphasised, as should the particularities of the ‘host’291 nations and 
the historical background vis-a-vis Muslims292. National context, multicultural policies, notions 
of assimilation and integration are all significant. The ways in which religion is conceptualised 
within these societies is extremely significant. The approaches to interfaith issues and religious 
plurality are also of great importance. When dealing with religion and religious identity, it 
would be too narrow a focus to solely examine the theology of the particular religion without 
examining the roles of culture, regional and national affiliations. This is because these 
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identities and associations are inextricably linked. Religion is a lived experience and expressed 
in cultural terms. In contrast, neo-revivalist Islam seeks, not only a separation of culture from 
religion, but moves further by attempting a transcendence of culture, in order to (re)create a 
‘pure’ and ‘authentic’ supranational Islam. This itself may be described as a ‘modern’293 act and 
reflects the adaptive ability of radical Islam to contemporary times of supranational 
globalisation. Second- and third-generation children of Muslim migrants are coming of age in a 
time where technology allows the constant and continual spread of information and enables 
people to communicate instantaneously across time and place294. This dislocation of time and 
place creates a new space through which global jihadis are able to contribute ideologies and 
amend them to keep current with geopolitical changes and in accordance with responses 
received. A significant area to be considered is the relationship between ‘host’ countries and 
migrants. It may be argued that some second- and third-generation migrants occupy what may 
described as a liminal and hybridised religio-cultural landscape through which they experience 
the salience of Islam both internally and externally.
The notion of the ‘Diaspora’ has been traditionally applied to the Jewish experience of 
historical displacement295 but has more recently been used to refer to the experience of migrant 
groups living outside of their traditional homelands296. In the course of this thesis, I will be 
referring not to an ethnic-based, but a religion-based diaspora, that of Muslims and the Muslim 
experience outside of Muslim countries. As Soysal argues, “Diaspora is the location 
where…background finds meaning”297. In this sense, the ideas that people have of their 
‘homeland’ concerning lived, remembered and ‘imagined’ experiences of culture and religion 
are significant and continual. Although I use the term diaspora to refer to Muslims living 
outside of Muslim countries, I do not intend this term to suggest homogeneity because 
Muslims are ethnically, nationally and culturally diverse. It can be argued that because religions 
are dynamic and adaptive in practice across time, place and circumstance, particular 
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components of religious expression vary according to local and current context although the 
fundamentals may remain the same.  
According to Soysal, “Diasporas form when populations disperse from their homeland to 
foreign lands, engage in movements between the country of origin and destination and carry 
out bi-directional transactions- economic, political and cultural.”298 This assumes that the 
primary attachments that immigrants have are to their homelands and cultures.  The primacy 
of this attachment is of course a contentious point as attachments vary and attachments one 
may feel to the country of origin and the host country are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
The Muslim diaspora in the West refers to Muslims who live in countries that are 
predominantly secular or have Christian roots. Although the term diaspora has been used to 
refer to migrants in general, it is a term that has inspired debate299. Soysal300 has discussed the 
usefulness of the term ‘diaspora’, and concluded that due to rights of citizens and human rights 
discourse, diaspora may not actually be the most accurate description as many migrants living 
in Europe (and other developed or industrialised countries) do have access to certain 
citizenship rights that enable them to deal with issues of culture, identity and community 
orientation. By utilising the concept of the diaspora, the issues that arise are those of 
belonging, the continual relevance of the homeland, and the notion of home as an almost-
idealised and reified concept. However, the context that I am discussing relates to an inter-
generational diaspora, so that over a generation, it is the children of the first-generation of 
migrants who have picked up this notion and idea of home301 not necessarily as the geographical, 
physical space, but as the geopolitical, socio-religious ‘home’ through which “...personal and 
social meaning [is] grounded”302. 
Following the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York on the 11th of September, 2001 
(‘9/11’), there has been much media and geopolitical discourse on Muslims (and Islam) and 
their (and its) relationship to the West. This discourse has enabled Islam to be relocated from 
  
298 Ibid. p 3.
299 See Soysal. Ibid. 
300 Ibid.
301 As a space through which one may feel grounded, and a space of belonging and security.
302 Papastergiadis, N. Dialogues in the Diasporas: Essays and Conversations on Cultural Identity. London; New York: 
Rivers Oram Press. 1998.
62
its traditional locations in the Muslim world to become part of the global consciousness. 
“Landscapes of the jihad”303 have become part of popular culture and Islam is no longer defined 
by tradition or physical space304. Islam is now ‘in’ and ‘of’ the West. In response, there has been 
much anxiety of an ‘Islamic threat’ to the West following the aftermath of ‘9/11’ and the 
changing demographic in Western countries which includes Muslims305, Muslim schools, 
mosques, traditional clothing, headscarves and beards is now seen as problematic and has been 
dichotomised within the framework of traditionalists and modernists306. This all means Islam 
has become salient and Manichean dualisms have surfaced between the West and Islam on 
both ‘sides’. 
One major issue relating to Muslims in Western Europe is the fact that unlike Christians and 
Jews, “Muslims have not had several centuries to work out the implications of their multiple 
allegiances in Western Europe.”307 Considering this from the point of view of mainstream 
society, the multiple allegiances of Muslims have also not yet been accepted. For it is assumed 
that choices are binary in nature rather than cosmopolitan in scope in terms of multiple 
identities and affiliations within mainstream society. A further issue relating to the significance 
of religion to Muslims in Western Europe is that this religiosity may be regarded with 
suspicion, as religion itself may be considered antithetical to the secular West. Following one’s 
religious conscience and following the law in this respect should not be considered mutually 
exclusive, and religious belief and practice should be taken seriously in society308.  
With regard to theoretical formulations, diaspora Muslims in the West can be considered in 
terms of the sociological categories of alienation and anomie. Alienation, as put forward by 
Marx, originally referred to economic alienation due to the inequalities of capitalist society. 
However, the term has broader connotations and can also refer to culture and society. Those 
(individuals, communities or subcultures) who may be positioned as minorities in society due 
to historical convention, may feel alienated, marginalised and seen as ‘other’ due to their 
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minority status within society. Muslims in the West, especially following ‘9/11’, may consider 
themselves especially targeted as ‘visible’ minorities309 due to their faith and ethnicity. This is 
exemplified by racial profiling and suspicion of their intentions towards their adopted 
homelands in the West. 
However, this situation is not new, having historical context. Most notably for Samuel 
Huntington, “The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, 
a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are 
obsessed with the inferiority of their power.”310 Huntington continues that for Islam, the 
problem is the West whose people believe in the universality and superiority of their power311. 
Although written in 1993, Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis has re-emerged post-
‘9/11’ as a subject of enquiry. He states that there is an inherent incompatibility between the 
West and Islam due to inherently opposed values and ideologies. This civilizational ‘clash’ has 
been continuing for the last fourteen hundred years through which Islam and the West (which 
he views as synonymous with Christianity) have each been “…the other’s Other”312. In this way, 
Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis purports an inherent incompatibility between the 
West and Islam due to the nature of the religion of Islam itself and of the culture the religion 
defines. 
The clash of civilizations or clash of cultures reflects a one-dimensional reductionism of a 
divide between the East and West and indicates a prevalence of Grand Narratives313. In the 
current Western context with regard to second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims and to 
second and third migrants more generally, it would be more accurate and useful to describe the 
‘clash’ or differences in more ways than simply traditionalism (of the ‘home’ country) and 
modernism (prevalent in the ‘host’ country)314. In this way, rather than second- and third-
generations being analysed as “caught between two worlds”315, it would be more worthwhile to 
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engage in the multiple affiliations and sites of belonging that individuals may engage with, such 
as the communal basis of the present country, past country and continual religion and religious 
identity in these contexts and within the generational differences. To analyse these issues 
clearly, it is important to gain insight and engage with research that involves cultural 
differences. Binary oppositions such as the tradition/modern dichotomy referring to first-
generations and subsequent generations and ‘home’ and ‘host’ cultures “reifies the notion of 
culture”316 and deems it to be immutable. An alternative is that identity and culture, as in 
Ngo’s view317 are dynamic modalities of positioning. Whilst it is worthwhile to examine 
intergenerational differences between conceptions of ‘home’, belonging, cultural and religious 
continuity, it is important to be aware that these are generalisations, and of course all modes of 
being and acting in the social world are fluid according to time, place and circumstance. 
Essentialisation and Muslims
Following the Second World War, there was an influx of economically motivated immigration 
to the West, and to Europe especially. Whilst many South Asian Muslims moved to Britain, 
other countries in the West received Muslims from other ethnic origins such as North Africans 
in France and Turks in Germany. Initially these migrants were considered to be ‘guest workers’ 
but following family reunification in the 1970s, these economic migrants became a permanent 
part of the social landscape. These first-generation migrants had and have ongoing 
transnational ties, and according to Silverstein, there have been “...fears over the 
transnationality of European Muslims...and its implication for the future of national loyalty 
and participatory citizenship”318. This relates to anxieties over double belonging and dual 
loyalties. So although there was a demand for labour in the post-WWII period this need for 
labour later became coupled with a growing anxiety regarding the social cohesion of the 
migrants with mainstream society and the national unity of nation-states319.  
What is increasingly forgotten is that Muslims as a religious group are not monolithic but are 
diverse in their linguistic, ethnic, national and cultural histories and backgrounds. The 
different ethnic origins makes for very contextually-different situations for first-generation 
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migrants and subsequent generations. Through the salience of Islam, there has been a 
‘racialization’ of Muslim identity and because of this, by labelling South Asians, North Africans 
and Turks as Muslims, “immigration problems...[have been labelled as] Islamic”320 and specific 
immigration issues have been overlooked. Taking Britain as an example of a multicultural 
country dealing with issues of migrants, Max Farrar321 notes that although the term 
multiculturalism has been used in Britain, it has not been explicitly defined other than via the 
epithet “‘Celebration of diversity’”322. Discussion of multiculturalism in Britain in the 1970s 
and 1980s appeared to be a response to the Asian Youth Movements (AYMs) which were often 
ethnically and religiously diverse (including Hindus, Sikhs and Jains) and were often socialist in 
focus. According to Farrar, the decline of these movements in the 1980s may help to account 
for the rise of Salafi-ism323 (or a type of radical Islam) as an expression of Muslim identity. This 
displays the shift in focus from ethnic and cultural identity to a more religiously-oriented 
identity that is reflective through Islamic movements and religious groups. As individuals may 
be essentialised on the basis of Muslim identity, this creates and reinforces ‘othering’ and ‘self-
othering’, and because of one’s heritage one may be viewed as ‘just like them’- the ‘them’ 
referred to of course, is dependent on the current and dominant discourse. 
As noted, the notion of the Muslim ‘Other’ has been considered by Huntington in his Clash of 
Civilizations thesis324. The ‘Other’ is racialised and marked by essentialist differences that are 
irreconcilable for Western society. This reflects a reductionist and essentialist understanding of 
culture, civilization and religion. It is not constructive to approach these socially-defined 
traditions and practices in this way as this not only reifies these practices and deems them 
immutable and static but also discounts the significant impact of historical, social and 
geopolitical context on people and cultures.   
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The dichotomous view of Islam and the West has been considered in relation to geopolitical 
shifts and shifts to the ‘Realpolitik’325. After the Cold War ended, there has been a 
transformation in the perceived enemies of the West from Communism to militant religious 
ideologies326. The West had been defined in relation to the East, the West being “defined as 
liberal capitalism and the East as communism”327. In this way, the self-definition of the West is 
“...relational...and has meaning only in contrast or opposition to an East”328, or an ‘other’.  This 
relational dichotomisation is currently “...pitted against an East now embodied by Islam”329, 
and dichotomies relating to the new East now include oppositions such as 
secular/fundamentalist and tolerant/reactionary. These binary constructions are bi-directional 
and in this way reinforce each ‘side’s view of the ‘other’. This relates to Said’s paper on The 
Clash of Definitions330 through which he asserts that the creation of binary dichotomies exists on 
both sides of Huntington’s ‘civilizational divide’ through oversimplification and a rhetoric of 
homogeneity amongst East and West and a monolithic treatment of the two331.
After ‘9/11’, the Al-Qa’eda suspects involved have been associated with acting on behalf of 
Islam. In particular, Osama bin Laden is supportive of the view that Islam is at war with the 
West. In a speech video-taped and broadcast on Al-Jazeera satellite television on the 3rd 
November, 2001, bin Laden states: “This war is fundamentally religious. The people of the East 
are Muslims. They sympathized with Muslims against the people of the West, who are the 
crusaders.”332 Referring to the media response following the ‘9/11’ attacks, bin Laden further 
states: “This clamour is unprecedented. It conveyed the opinions of people on these events. 
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People were divided into two parts. The first part supported these strikes against US tyranny, 
while the second denounced them.”333
This dualism is also reflected in U.S. President George W. Bush’s post-’9/11’ speech on the 
20th of September, 2001334 reflected (and perhaps also reinforced) a divisive atmosphere in the 
religio-political world by forcing nations (and in turn, individuals) to make a choice about their 
affiliations, loyalties and where they stand in terms of supporting the United States’ led 
invasions of both Afghanistan in October 2001 and Iraq in March 2003. By stating, “Either 
you are with us, or you are with the terrorists”335, it is clear that a choice is being offered of 
either ally or enemy. This speech had implications not only for the geopolitical world, but also 
for individuals worldwide who made personal choices of affiliations and loyalties based on 
international relational conflicts. 
The resulting underlying dichotomous view that is reflected on the global stage is currently one 
of opposition between the notion of the secular West and the expression of Islam in Western 
and Muslim majority counties. Whilst it may be valid to suggest that there are a minority of 
Muslim groups who profess to be anti-Western336 and are antagonistic to the West, it is not 
enough to say that this shows the incompatibility of Islamic and Western values and ideologies. 
These dualisms and oppositions reflect reductionism and essentialism of the ‘other’ in 
reducing conflict to an ‘us’ and ‘them’ scenario and discounts commonalities between 
universally-shared values. This polarisation can thus be regarded as a simplistic reading of 
historical and political contexts which discounts the contextual complexities underlying such 
binary polarisation. 
Self-othering 
‘Self-othering’ refers to the binary opposition and constructed dualism of an ‘Us’ vs. ‘Them’ 
mentality. This relates to Asad’s notion of Muslims who are ‘in’ but not ‘of’ Europe337, and 
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refers to the limitations on acceptance of the ‘other’ within mainstream society in that they can 
never be fully accepted into the mainstream society. Therefore, self-othering refers to a 
reactionary identity formulated around the binary conceptions of self/other. For if a group or 
individual is treated as ‘other’ by society, then they may ‘self-other’ by making their difference 
even more distinctive. This may be seen through the turn to a neo-revivalist communally-
located Muslim identity by second- and third-generation migrants in the West as religion is 
seen as incompatible to secular society. Furthermore, these groups of diaspora Muslims may 
also ‘self-other’ to the religion of first-generation migrants and instead locate their individuated 
religiosity within the context of the global ummah rather than identify with their parents’ 
expressions of religion, which they may see as too steeped in culture and so not ‘pure’ enough. 
This neo-revivalist Muslim identity is reactionary and may also be more widely located within 
neofundamentalist and global jihadi discourse. Of course, this does not mean that by claiming a 
neo-revivalist religious identity, militancy necessarily follows, just that it may.
This notion of ‘self-othering’ which may also be considered a type of ‘empowered victimisation’ 
does not, by any means, aim or attempt to dislocate responsibility from the individual or group 
by presuming that they have no choice in undertaking a violent course of action. However, the 
value of these concepts do arise in attempting to understand and explain why and how people 
do what they may do. For example, they may undertake militant action against those they 
consider to be ‘the enemy’. In a sense, grievances towards their socio-economic status in society 
are exploited by those with greater (meaning more far-reaching) agendas relating to the 
perceived incompatibilities between the West and Islam. 
The ‘new terrorist’
Khan338 writes of the ‘new’ essentialised terrorist as “…the Muslim militant who uses violence 
to terrorize governments and communities”339. He states the rhetoric of the ‘new’ terrorist, as 
espoused by ‘Highly Influential Terrorist Literature’340, is invented and made believable. In 
this, the new terrorist is described as “…dark and evil, part real and part phantom, part human 
and part animal, part man and part woman, part bearded and part veiled, part strategic and part 
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crazy.”341 Described as violent by nature, the new terrorist is essentialised, demonised, hates the 
West, Israel, democracy and freedom. Unlike conventional terrorists who utilise violence as a 
means to enable personal or collective goals, the new essentialised terrorist “uses violence as an 
end in itself”342 and this violence has “little to do with any outward political or geopolitical 
grievances”343. This “…monster resides in sleeping cells, prays to Allah, lurks in tunnels and 
airports, wears a belt of explosives, and craves traveling in buses, trains, and airplanes.”344 Such 
essentialisation of the Muslim militant has propaganda implications and perpetuate inherent 
us/them dualisms. Furthermore, such militants are unable to be protected from torture 
through domestic or international policies because they are regarded as ‘unlawful combatants’ 
as in the Guantanamo Bay arena. This has implications for treating all human beings equally 
under domestic and international law345. Describing the ‘new’ terrorist as Muslim, who has 
been bestowed an inhuman status, undoubtedly has further implications for Muslim citizens 
living in both the West and around the world. There is a danger of creating and perpetuating 
such violence through ‘racial profiling’, and because of the official suspicion and rhetoric of 
fear of Muslims in the West. Essentialisms are employed to portray Islam as a religion that is 
inherently violent346, intolerant and incompatible with Western cultural norms and values. 
Resentments may build in those who view their duty is to ‘defend’ Islam, and this may then be 
enacted through violence. 
Silverstein, an anthropologist, has reviewed the ‘racial’ genealogy categorisation of immigrants 
in the New Europe347. Multiculturalism and citizenship policies continue to address 
‘Europeanization’ in ‘racial’ terms348 and its continued significance is reflected through debate
amongst states, scholars, the media, and the migrant population. ‘Race’ is defined as “...a 
cultural category of difference that is contextually constructed as essential and natural”349
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embodied through scientific and popular perceptions of genetics. Thus ‘racialization’ refers to 
the definition of any aspect of “social personhood- including class, ethnicity, generation [and] 
kinship affinity”350 that is reduced, essentialised and treated as natural. Through this 
‘racialization’, migrants have perpetually been considered problematic in Europe. However, 
according to the geopolitic, there is a shifting construction of perceptions towards migrants351. 
As Islam and Muslims are prominent in the current geopolitic, it follows that through 
suspicions of Muslims, Muslims have “increasingly been slotted as the ‘significant other’”352 in 
Western society. The ‘racialization’ of the ‘other’ is a shifting category and is dependent on the 
social climate in the West. Silverstein relates “a discursive shift in Western Europe”353 from
viewing the ‘other’ as the biologically-‘racialised’ individual to the culturally-entrenched 
‘racialised’ individual. Culture in this context can perhaps also include religion354.  Historically, 
immigrants to the United States from southern and eastern Europe, Slavs, Hebrews and Celts 
were all ‘racialized’ as “inbetween peoples”355. However, these historical ‘others’ have now been 
“whitewashed”356 and have assimilated into the majority culture. It can be argued that due to 
the physical characteristics of non-Caucasian Muslims, it is not possible for this ‘whitewashing’ 
to take place. It follows that rather than emphasising assimilation, what should be stressed 
instead is integration, that enables not ethnic and cultural replacement to the ‘new’ society, but 
cultural and ethnic compatibility. 
Clinton Bennett357 presents three notions of diaspora Muslims in the West concerning 
Muslims as religious minorities and their association with the wider non-Muslim society. These 
are: assimilationalist or pluralist (adaptive within society) on the left, separatist or siege 
syndrome (the notion of the Muslim identity as separate and distinct from mainstream society 
with the goal being self-determination) in the centre, and confrontational (the aim being 
Western conversion to Islam through politics and law as well as religion) on the right358. These 
categories are undoubtedly extremely generalised and would apply more to community 
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orientations than to individual affiliations. It is significant that Bennett considers the 
assimilationalist model to be adaptive within society, rather than the integrationist approach. 
Assimilation implies a cultural exchange (and perhaps even a ‘cultural replacement’) between 
the ‘old’ cultural roots and the ‘new’ culture of the host nation, whereas integration is a fluid 
concept that enables individuals to retain their cultural background and heritage in a pluralistic 
sense. 
Bennett’s second approach359 for diaspora Muslims within Western society is the middle 
approach that is the separatist or siege syndrome. That this classification is in the middle, 
implies that perhaps he views this as the middle way or way of the majority. If so, this reflects 
his attitude concerning how Muslims consider themselves in the Western societal context. It is 
problematic that rather than considering that Muslims may choose to live in close proximity to 
one another due to commonalities in ethno-socio-cultural (and perhaps even socio-economic) 
terms, he considers this as being something necessarily religious. By viewing this group as 
‘separatists’ or of the view that they are under some type of ‘siege’, this denotes some type of 
resistance or opposition to Western society. The goal of these Muslims is also considered to be 
self-determination. That these Muslims may perceive their identities as Muslims to be different 
to the mainstream religious context does not mean that they cannot co-exist with people from 
other religious backgrounds. However, if the separatist model is valid, where there is a group 
within society with an agenda to separate from the mainstream society, this would be 
problematic. Therefore, it is important to take these concerns of separatism seriously because 
having a separatist agenda to begin with undoubtedly points to problems within the sub-sector 
of society. Nevertheless, as earlier mentioned, separatism, ghettoisation and polar communities 
are a two-way process. It could also be that the majority culture does not wish to live close to 
minorities. 
The confrontational sector of Muslims appears to be the one most likely to tend towards 
‘extremism’, and ‘militancy’. However, the turn to militancy may also stem from both the 
assimilationalist and separatist360 models in the context of the West if we utilise Bennett’s 
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broad classification361. It could be that the more people and communities are forced to 
assimilate, (rather than integrate) and to consider their allegiances and belonging solely to their 
new country of residence, the more they may, at some point, question their own individual 
affiliations concerning such areas as ethnicity, nationhood and even religion. By encouraging 
new immigrants to assimilate rather than integrate, one form of identity is prioritised over 
another. The assimilationalist approach implies that one’s cultural heritage is unimportant362
and because of that, inferior. A value judgement is being made when, ‘to be at home’, or to ‘fit 
in’ with the host culture, a migrant must forego his/her past culture and instead assimilate into 
the new one. This implies a binary undercurrent of old/new, good/bad, traditional/modern, 
us/them. Whilst integration enables one to retain one’s cultural roots, assimilation implies that 
one must become ‘just like us’ or ‘just like them’ to be accepted by society. This is what may 
lead to the notion of inferior and superior cultures, rather than being accepting of the culture 
of one’s heritage as one intrinsic part363 of an individual’s being and make-up. Alternatively, 
integration, is a more constructive approach as it is inclusive in scope. Cultural enrichment  is 
valued, a multiplicity of identities is accepted and in this way, it is cosmopolitan in scope. 
Cultural heritage may be retained and considered to be a valid part of one’s identity formation, 
but does not necessarily solely define what an individual consists of or who an individual is.
The transnational, technologically-driven and globalised age in which we live, has made the 
world seem and be experienced as a smaller place. Physical barriers and the distance between 
countries and cultures have theoretically, and to some extent practically, broken down. Saying 
this however, it is apparent, especially in this first decade of the twenty-first century that issues 
of cultural diversity and national identity are at the forefront of most Western countries’ 
immigration policies. Previous conceptions of multiculturalism that have assumed that 
immigrants would somehow integrate, or better yet, assimilate if left alone, have had to be re-
examined. According to Bayat, there are three main groups of Muslim minorities in Western 
Europe364. These are: secular Muslims, second-generation Muslims365 and first-generation 
Muslim migrants. Secular Muslims are integrated, participate in society and “...try to reach out 
  
361 Bennett, Ibid.
362 To some degree, this may be seen as a valid assertion as one is not ‘culturally bound’ due to one’s heritage.
363 This does not imply that this is the ‘essential’ part, but a significant identity marker.
364 This formulation can be applied to all Western countries. 
365 Which will be discussed in 3.4.
73
to the ‘majority culture’, economy, and social interaction”366. This group experiences 
frustration at not being accepted as ‘fully’ European. Using France as an example, Bayat asserts, 
“they embrace liberal democracy”367 and consider Islam and being a Muslim compatible to 
French society. A ‘European Islam’ is sought through textual interpretation. There is a 
resentment of Muslim extremism and a respect for human rights. This group possesses the 
necessary ‘capital’, in terms of education and socio-economic status, and following this it can 
be argued that it is their socio-economic position and education that enables these viewpoints. 
The second group are first-generation migrants “who try to speak the European language, strive 
to hold regular jobs, and wish to live a normal life”368. In this way they are integrated whilst also
retaining practices of their ‘home’ culture such as “...food, fashion, rituals, or private religious 
practices”369. However, anxiety over economic and cultural processes, according to Bayat, 
pushes them towards “...immediate circles370, the language and religious groups, informal 
economic networks, and communities of friends and status groups built in the neighbourhoods 
or prayer halls.”371 This, feeling “at home on the margin of the mainstream”372 or engaging in a 
“peripheral communalism”373 or ‘ghettoisation’ can be understood as a coping mechanism with 
regard to security, reassurance and feeling ‘at home’ with those with whom they share common 
interests and background.    
Rather than viewing this congregation as a reversion to tradition, or as a resentment or 
rejection of Western modernity, culture and secular society, or something necessarily 
representative of Islam or Muslims in the West, this peripheral communalism can instead be 
seen as “a typical coping strategy that lower-class immigrants often pursue when they encounter 
complex foreign life-worlds”374. This type of coping strategy results in parallel or peripheral 
  
366 See Bayat, A. ‘A Symposium on “Political Islam”: When Muslims and Modernity Meet’. Contemporary Sociology. 
Vol. 36, No. 6. November 2007. p. 508.
367 Ibid.
368 Ibid.
369 Ibid.
370 Such as kinship groups and people with the same ethno-national heritage.
371 Ibid.
372 Ibid.
373 Ibid. p. 509.
374 Ibid. pp. 508-9.
74
communities or reactionary isolationism375 and can be considered common amongst all 
migrants or expatriates in the contemporary world of transnational travel, including those that 
re-locate within their own countries, such as though rural-urban migration376. Re-locating from 
one country to another necessitates a reflection of self through which the self must 
“constantly...negotiate [and define] between home and abroad, native culture and adopted 
culture, or...between a here, a there, and an elsewhere.”377  
3.2 Home and belonging: first-generation migrants
The transnational relocation from one country to another gives rise to reflexive questioning of 
‘who we are’ and ‘where we belong’378. ‘Home’ becomes a symbolic space rather than a physical 
place and by travelling from the country of origin to the new country of permanent residence, 
“home is the sacred place from which everything else is mapped”379. Home is remembered, 
imagined, sustained and made ‘real’ through the enactment of cultural products such as dress, 
customs, traditions, collective memory, food, and religion. This “cultural sustainability”380, is 
continued through narratives of personal identity and notions of collective identity, and thus 
one’s place in the ‘new’ world is allowed to be made stable through notions of ‘who I am’ and 
‘who we are’ in relation to others with the same ethno-national heritage, and also in relation to 
the majority culture and society. Identity “...lies at the intersection of dwelling and travelling 
and is a claim of continuity within discontinuity”381. Narratives of migrants exist within the 
boundaries and wide spectrum of “...hostility and welcome”382. When a minority group is 
treated as hostile to the dominant society, “...it tightens its cultural bonds to present a united 
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front against its oppressor...[and] strength is gained by emphasizing its collective identity”383. 
Sarap also relates that by validating cultural identity, which includes religion, a ready-made 
support-system is available384. This accounts for “peripheral communalism”385, due to social and 
cultural dislocation from the mainstream society, through which religio-cultural identity is 
strengthened when there are perceptions of the diaspora group feeling “under attack”386.
First-generation migrants are considered by Will Herberg387 in his 1955 study of American 
Religious Sociology. Herberg traces the developments of religious communities (Protestants, 
Catholics and Jews) amongst the first immigrants to the United States. Several parallels can be 
seen between his study over fifty years ago and immigrant communities confronting religious 
issues in contemporary Western societies. Herberg proposed that first-generation immigrants 
were understandably preoccupied with economic concerns, and then sought to re-establish “the 
sacred symbols of community existence”388 (i.e. synagogues and churches). He suggests that the 
primary allegiance initially was provincial and regional rather than national, and thus the first 
churches reflected this. Through commonalities of religion, local identities were brought into 
question and new issues of self-identification and self-location had to be confronted389. In this 
present thesis, Herberg’s model has been expanded to both second- and third-generation 
migrants through the contemporary situation of Muslims, rather than just the third-generation 
return to religion. Questions of self-identity and self-location are continually significant, 
although perhaps in completely different locations and by different groups of people with 
different religious backgrounds (such as Muslims in the West).   
Whilst first-generation immigrants may have a notion of home, belonging, culture and religion 
brought with them from their country of origin, their children may not necessarily have the 
same attachments to their parents’ country of origin. For the subsequent generations of 
immigrants, the space that they may feel connected with is one of liminality. They are neither 
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wholly ‘of’ the country that their parents may feel affiliated with, and neither wholly ‘of’ the 
country they were born into. Western Muslims and especially second- and third-generation 
immigrants have in a sense “a double belonging” and “a double cultural capital” that is defined 
by both the knowledge of religion and of secular society390. The liminal space of second- and 
third-generation immigrants may create a degree of confusion and require a level of self-
awareness to feel at home in both cultural worlds. Leading on from this, it is religion that may 
serve as a unifying bridge for some, to link the cultural and national past of their parents to 
their location in the present. However, just as religion may serve to unify, it may also divide. 
Analysis of contemporary religiosity amongst some Muslim youth in Britain and the United 
States (US) shows, what to many may be surprising trends for the younger generations 
becoming more ‘religious’ than their parents391 with regard to their external public expression 
of religiosity. This younger generation is self-reflexive and choose to find out for itself about 
Islam and its compatibility with their locations in the West. This intra-generational conflict in 
one sense is quite unsurprising, but the way through which the conflict is being expressed, that 
is, through religion, is392. This move however, is not so unforeseen, if we refer back to Will 
Herberg’s 1955 thesis, Protestant-Catholic-Jew393. In examining the generational changes 
experienced in religiosity by immigrants to the United States, Herberg found that whilst the 
second-generation of immigrants generally rejected the religion of their parents, it was the 
third- generation that returned to formulating a religious identity. Therefore, this shift towards 
religion by second- and third-generation Muslims, rather than being a shift back to religion394, 
can instead be viewed as a shift towards a neo-revivalist Muslim identity, that may be linked to 
Roy’s conception of neofundamentalism395. For there has been a notable cultural shift of 
second- and third-generation immigrants whereby rather than identifying with national or 
cultural labels, religion has become the primary identity of choice amongst some Muslims 
throughout Europe. Herberg’s model of religiosity can thus be applied to Muslims in the West, 
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but the contemporary experience of diaspora Muslims shows that it is the second-generations 
that are re-formulating their religious identities396.
Whilst the stereotypical image of Islam in the West397 may be one of the subservience of 
women398 and a lack of autonomy in both sexes, second- and third-generation immigrants in 
the West are expressing their individualism through religion. In this sense, it is important to 
note that religion has not simply disappeared, or become merely privatised in our 
contemporary society. The individualised freedoms to have no religion or express religion in 
any way has led, not to a lack or disappearance of religion, but to a change in how religion is 
actively expressed and perceived by both individuals and society.        
Many second-generation young women are consciously wearing the hijab (the headscarf), whilst 
their mothers’ generation may not have done so399. Gole400 points out that this return to a 
religious identity by Muslim youth in Europe is being overtly, actively, and visibly expressed 
through dress. Religious difference and deference for their conceptions of religion is expressed 
by young women through dress, wearing of the hijab or even niqab (the veil) and for men by 
growing beards. This visual return to religion is a notable example of the return of the religious 
to the public sphere, overriding the traditional Western secular split of the private and public 
in terms of religion. The public display and performance of religious identity is a symbolic 
marker of belonging to a visible community. In this way, one’s religious affiliations are instantly 
apparent to other Muslims and non-Muslims. It appears, most notably from the 1990s 
onwards, that choosing to wear the hijab401 appears to be a growing trend amongst young 
  
396 Refer to 3.4 and 3.5 for discussion about religious identification amongst second- and third-generation British 
and American Muslims. 
397 See Qureishi, E. and Sells, M.A. ‘Introduction: Constructing the Muslim Enemy’. In The New Crusades: 
Constructing the Muslim Enemy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2003. pp. 1-47.
398 This relates to portrayals and perceptions of Islam. For example the headscarf may be viewed as a sign of the 
oppression of women. This relates to the invasion of Afghanistan after ‘9/11’ when one of the premises for the 
invasion was to ‘liberate’ women from the Taliban. The blue burkha became symbolic of repression. 
399 Either perhaps due to their interpretation of religious doctrine through culture, or as a way to integrate, or 
assimilate into the new society. 
400 Gole, N. ‘The Islamist identity: Islam, European public space and civility’. Eurozine. 17 August 2006. 
http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-05-03-gole-en.html  
401 According to R.W. Maqsood (A Basic Dictionary of Islam. New Delhi: Goodword Books. 2002. p. 91), hijab is 
translated as barrier, cover or veil and was originally referred to as a curtain put up in the houses of the Prophet 
Muhammad’s wives for privacy. There are two types of hijab, the inner and outer hijab. Both are considered acts of 
modesty. The necessity of wearing the hijab is a site of contestation within the Islamic opinion and the 
78
Muslims who live in non-Muslim countries. These second- and third-generation diaspora 
Muslims are choosing to wear the headscarf as a visual symbol of religious identity402. While 
Western society may view the wearing of hijab as confrontational, individuals and community 
may see it as something that attracts respect and acts as a religious symbol to themselves. This 
brings in the issue of religious performance and a study was carried out by Ali403 on the public 
performance of young Muslim women displaying their “Muslimness”404 by choosing to wear the 
hijab or jilbab405 in the United States. His data consists of email interviews, ethnographic field 
research and participant observation. It should be noted that although this article was 
published in 2005, the data collection was carried out in 1999, almost two years before ‘9/11’. 
Following this, it would be informative to consider more recent data, especially following 
‘9/11’. However, Ali’s discussion is a good point of reference that considers the public 
performance and assertion of the Muslim identities of some young Muslim Americans who 
have chosen to wear the hijab. 
Muslim women who wear the hijab or jilbab are highly visible Muslim actors in the public sector 
of society through their visible difference. Ali406 asserts that there has been a marked increase in 
the number of second-generation Muslim American women in schools and colleges who wear 
the hijab and jilbab. This is specifically a marker of the contemporary social landscape (as their 
parents’ and older siblings’ generations did not), and is reflective of “shifts in the American 
social landscape in the late 1980s and 90s”407 and portrays the salience of Islam in America. 
Wearing the hijab, “has suddenly become tolerable and in some ways “fashionable””408. For the 
purpose of his study, Ali considers religion as an ethnic identity in that it is socially constructed 
and “the boundaries and significance”409 of these identities “…vary over time and space”410. The 
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Muslim identity in this way is “contested, fought over, constructed and reconstructed”411. 
According to the social landscape the boundaries of this group identity will be more visible and 
significant than at other times. As I argue in this thesis through the concept of ‘self-othering’, 
“how others perceive and define one has an effect upon one’s construction of identity”412. 
Following on from this, external definitions by others (such as ‘othering’) has implications on 
internal definitions of self (which could lead to ‘self-othering’). Ali argues that the performance 
of religious expression of the second-generation Muslims in his study is reflective of the 
salience for them, of their Muslim identities and the privileging of this identity-marker over 
their national origins413. In comparison, an earlier survey carried out in the 1980s414 on the 
situation in the United States reflected the abandoning of ‘ethnic’ clothing by Muslims born in 
the United States. In the 1990s however, there has been a visible change with regard to the 
hijab and although the vast majority still do not cover, there are an increasingly visible number 
of women who do.      
Displaying religious affiliations in an active and public manner may be considered a statement 
of belief and identity that is normative and authoritative415. Those who choose to be visibly 
different to the status quo (when they may already be considered to be ‘visible minorities’ with 
regard to skin colour, dress, language and behaviour416), such as Muslim women opting to 
wearing the hijab in Western countries without family support, (often despite the possibility of 
harassment in the context of mainstream society) are either making an active statement of their 
identity, or in other cases are continuing their lived interpretation of religion family traditions, 
for example of covering their hair. As for the public display of religion in general, and with 
regard to this example of the hijab in particular, there is a claim of authenticity in terms of the 
expression of dress and of religious performance. This can be viewed in one way as being 
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directed, both against secular public space and also, perhaps, against other Muslims. It may be 
perceived as a visual and ‘real’ way through which to display and portray that religion, and 
Islam, in particular should be taken seriously. However, the wearing of the hijab should not 
simply be considered as a confrontation to the secular society or as a political statement as 
there may be a genuine desire to dress according to customary norms, that are seen as 
‘authentic’. Thus, the law banning religious symbols in French state schools, that came into 
effect on the 2nd of September 2004417, may be considered an affront to religious custom, 
tradition and authentic expression. This law is reflective of France’s policy of laicite that seeks 
the separation of religion from the state and has affected not only Muslims, but also Sikhs who 
wear the turban. 
The way in which religion is being practiced and expressed in contemporary times has changed. 
Whilst modern life sought to move away from religion as the basis of organised life, 
postmodern or postsecular society has theoretically, on one level, allowed a dislocation of 
inherited cultural and religious affiliations. At the same time, the individuation of 
contemporary life has, on another level, allowed space for religion and spirituality to be re-
interpreted in individualised and de-institutionalised terms418. Religion in the contemporary 
world has become far more personalised, and the religious identity of migrant Muslims in 
Europe is no exception to this. In fact, according to Gole, it is proximity to modern life that 
has triggered the return to religious identity.419 The experiences of migrants include all that is 
‘brought’ with them from the country of origin to the new country of residence. This includes 
markers of identity such as culture, religion and ethnicity. 
Writing in The International Migration Review Zimmermann et al. carried out a study on the 
‘Ethnic Self-Identification of First-Generation Immigrants’420 in Germany. The approach taken 
was two-dimensional in that both pre-immigration and post-immigration characteristics421 and 
gender differences were considered instead of viewing attachments between the home country 
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and receiving countries as mutually exclusive. Ethnic self-identification is viewed by 
Zimmermann et al. as complex, variable and fluid. Connections, ties and attachments to the 
country of origin and receiving country can change over time and are therefore fluid. Whilst 
“…individuals can alter their feelings over time, place and surroundings”422, the external 
imposition of ethnic identification is also significant to the migrants’ ethnic self-identification. 
Some individual characteristics may be conspicuous, such as “one’s skin colour or hair 
texture”423 which can lead to “racial labelling”424 and the status of individuals as ‘visible 
minorities’. Thus, an individual may not consider oneself as ‘other’ until they are externally 
‘othered’. This may have implications on one’s self-definition, with regard to heritage, country 
of origin and ethnic visibility. 
Zimmermann et al.’s research was carried out in Germany where nine percent of the 
population are foreigners, and of that nine percent, one-third are Muslim. The research 
mapped out four paths of post-immigration transition. These are: assimilation, through which 
the country of origin is fully disengaged with, there is full adaption and identification with the 
new country of residence. The second path is integration, through which there are strong 
connections to the origin country and the new country. The third path is marginalisation which 
involves loose connections and a loss of associations to both the country of origin and the new 
country of residence. This path is considered an extreme situation. More extreme is the fourth 
path which is one of separation through which the country of origin is the country that is fully 
identified with and there is a weak link to the new country of residence. 
The results of this study425 showed that for males and females, religiosity and education in the 
country of origin is not important to the integrated status in the new country. Women in 
general were more likely to assimilate. Education in the new country was significant for female 
integration, and older age negatively affected women’s integration. Ethnic identification 
appeared more complex for women, perhaps due to the cultural expectations of home life and 
work life. In this study, Muslims were the exception and were less likely to self-identify as 
integrated than other religions surveyed. It is not clear from the study the reasons behind this, 
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but it can be deduced that this could be due to the current salience of Islam in the West and 
the contested place of migrants in German society, and also due to cultural and social 
expectations of Muslims in their new country of residence. 
Muslim migrants’ experiences in the West
The focus of some Muslim groups in the West, instead of being located inwards in terms of 
integrating the Muslim communities, is often located ‘out there’ to perceived injustices 
occurring in the global arena. Gole notes that the displacement of the traditional Islamic 
authority, the ulama, has led to a new form of interpreting the Islamic texts by individual 
Muslims and political militants426. This can also be referred to as a move towards ijtihad or 
analogical reasoning employed in the interpretation of Sharia to accommodate the logical and 
relevant current situation. As primary interpretation and understanding of Islam in the West 
has been in cultural and political contexts, local, national and social bonds have been 
overshadowed by “imaginary bonds” between Muslims globally who may feel “socially 
uprooted” and may consider themselves treated unjustly by society427. 
Whilst traditionally Muslims around the world may have been deeply divided (and still are) 
into religious factions, the Islam of neofundamentalists and global jihadis428 can in fact unite 
adherents from traditional Muslim contexts and countries by presenting Islam as monolithic as 
much to itself (with regard to rhetoric of what being and acting as a ‘true Muslim’ entails of) as 
non-Muslims may conceive of it. This type of revivalist Islam, exists as a result of the Muslim 
diaspora. Ethnic and cultural diversity enable unity on the level of religion as no shared history 
or cultural context is required other than religion. In this sense, rather than Muslims in the 
West being divided into for instance, Sunni, Shi’a, Ismaili, Sufi, Ahmedi, they can overcome 
these factions, and be theoretically united by the overarching religion of Islam. However, this is 
not so much a unity as a surpassing of these sectarian divisions which are considered at odds 
with ‘true’ Islam. This ‘unity’ may seem problematic in countries with large Muslim 
populations in the non-West, as they have experienced a shared cultural, religious and national 
history. The transnational experience may be considered a borderless or virtual state in which 
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physical proximity is not necessary to bind people together. Thus, due to the notion of the 
‘imaginary homeland’ or ummah, second- and third-generation immigrants would not 
necessarily need to be in a Muslim-dominated environment to feel connected to Muslims in 
different countries of the globe. In this context, it is important to consider the type of Islam429
that is portrayed as normative. This leads to the views of Tariq Ramadan who seeks the 
formation of a European Islam430. That is, an Islam necessarily of Europe, that is culturally 
based in Europe, but organised through the unity of the singular Islam. In this way, Ramadan 
also appeals for a religious transcendence over culture431. 
Due to the Western or diasporic context, religious identity may become the ultimate identity 
that unites the group over class, economic status, educational background, language, province 
and sectarian status all of which are the traditional social affiliations that may serve to divide 
individuals and groups in a national context. In this sense, the domination of a religious 
identity may be referred to as a type of ‘religious Marxism’432. In the modern world, individuals 
have the choice to associate with the roles of victimisation and injustice with Muslims in the 
global context, especially due to communication technologies that enable hyperconnectivity. So 
far in the twenty-first century, in addition to the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict, 
associations can be made with Afghanistan and Iraq, post-‘9/11’. These claims are on behalf of 
the disenfranchised, such as in Iraq but these can be considered to be romanticised notions 
because those in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan deal with issues internally. Diaspora Muslims 
are external to these type of conflicts. The global connectedness of Muslims can also be 
observed with the awareness of Muslims in non-Western countries regarding issues involving 
Muslims in non-Muslim countries as well433. An important example of this was the response of 
Muslims in both the West and non-West to Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses in 1988. As 
Rushdie’s background is Muslim, the response by Muslims was to what was perceived as an 
insult to Islam and the Prophet Muhammad, by ‘one of their own’. Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini 
issued a fatwa against Rushdie in 1989 and Rushdie has been considered an apostate by many 
  
429 See chapter 2 for an overview of perceptions of Islam by Muslims, for example, literalists, traditionalists, 
reformers, modernists. 
430 See Ramadan, T. To be a European Muslim. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation. 1999; Ramadan, T. Western 
Muslims and the Future of Islam. Oxford University Press: Oxford/New York 2004.
431 Ramadan’s ideas will be discussed in greater detail in 3.3.
432 In that religion is the primary identity over all other identity-markers. 
433 See chapter 4 for more on importance of the media as a tool for enabling this type of discourse.
84
Muslims worldwide. Rushdie was recently awarded a knighthood for his contribution to 
literature, which has sparked criticism and protests in Pakistan and Iran434. For those protesting 
and condemning the knighthood, it is perceived as a direct and deliberate insult and attack on 
Islam. Once again, there are calls amongst some Muslims to assassinate Rushdie as a religious 
duty. 
It is important to note, with regard to the issuing of a fatwa, that this is related to the Christian 
context of excommunication. It is a way of the community at large to make clear that dissent is 
not tolerated and that the behaviour and practices expressed by a particular member of the 
wider Muslim community is not ‘sanctioned’ by the ‘moral guardians’ of the religion. What is 
interesting to note is that individuals do not need to profess their Muslim heritage to be 
negatively targeted in this way. By someone simply being born into a Muslim family (practicing 
Muslim or not), a shared faith and respect of that faith is assumed. When dealing with 
religious extremism relating to Muslims, another issue that becomes apparent is that there is no 
singular authority or guardian of the faith within Islam. 
Religion may fill the void of social unity and acceptance when country of origin or ethnicity is 
not sufficient to bond individuals to one another. Individuals may gain social solidarity from 
religion. If they are treated negatively in society and marginalised, it is not difficult to 
understand how they may choose to react and perhaps perpetuate a ‘peripheral 
communalism’435. In this way, it can be understood how individuals who may not fit in to the 
status quo may associate with other individuals who are also different, in order to gain some 
degree of social acceptance. The struggle for societal acceptance into the mainstream436 and the 
assertion of identity in the public sphere is being re-shaped from ethnic to religious terms due 
to the salience of religion, which in this context is Islam. 
  
434http://books.guardian.co.uk/news/articles/0,,2106133,00.html#article_continue, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article1951462.ece
435 See Bayat, A. ‘A Symposium on “Political Islam”: When Muslims and Modernity Meet’. Contemporary Sociology. 
Vol. 36, No. 6. November 2007. pp. 507-11.
436 Perhaps it is this struggle that is problematic, for those who are different or minorities will never be fully 
accepted into the mainstream, and nor should they want to as that would dilute and take away what makes them 
unique. This is why we need a cosmopolitan ethic.
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Whilst the current mass-media-voiced-opinion of a religion such as Islam is one of aggression 
and retribution437, it would be more constructive to assess or discuss the strengths of religion in 
terms of providing a moral code for individuals, rather than solely focusing on a term like jihad
that has been debated by religious scholars since the beginning of Islam itself. By focusing on 
the negative (by mass media, right-wing politicians and individuals), how can proponents of 
xenophobic views expect there to be any positive change? If an individual has respect for 
his/her religion, regardless of his or her own personal religious practices and if the religion or 
its practices, that are part of their personal identity formation, are criticised (with no 
constructive aim), it seems logical that the individual will react defensively. The same can be 
said for immigrants living in Western countries. If they have been harassed purely for how they 
look, or if someone has reacted to them just for being the 'other', then it makes sense that, as 
they are being attacked for factors they have no control over, they may personalise their 
experiences and take control in any way that they could and associate with those with whom 
they feel secure. When individuals or a grouping of individuals feel that they have no control 
over the way they are perceived by society, it is natural to want to have some control over 
societal perception and reaction to them as individuals. 
With regard to xenophobic or negative reactions to individuals because of their ethnicity, it is 
evident that a negative response will produce some degree of negative response, be it public or 
private in terms of actions and reactions. The ability to critique negativities experienced within 
society is necessary and healthy for positive change. However, critique must be relevant and 
non-violent438 and carried out through dialogue. Those who may be negatively attacked may 
choose to empower themselves, sometimes by becoming aggressive, and reaffirming their 
identity in this way. When under ‘attack’, the response may be, “You don’t tell me who or what 
I am, I tell you or show you who I am”. In other words, identity is what the individual perceives 
it to be, and is also informed by this perception, rather than solely being what others perceive it 
to be. In this case, when one already possesses a religious identity, the political and the religious 
intertwine which may result in some form of a Muslim ‘liberation theology’. A new type of self-
empowerment may be realised through religion, and in this context, Islam. Religion, being a 
  
437 See Aly, A. ‘Australian Muslim Responses to the Discourse on Terrorism in the Australian Popular Media’. 
Australian Journal of Social Issues. Vol. 42, Iss. 1. Autumn 2007. pp. 27-42.
438 For a discussion on interfaith dialogue, see Ramadan, T. To be a European Muslim. Leicester: The Islamic 
Foundation. 1999; Ramadan, T. Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. Oxford University Press: Oxford; New 
York. 2004. 
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global network, transcends difference and may act as a catalyst (or comfort) towards a new type 
of self-empowerment. Religion provides tradition and stability and offers a theological 
framework for interpreting why a negative response was given to a particular individual and 
what to offer as a response. In this way, ‘self-othering’ may also be looked at as a type of 
empowered victimisation. Associating with a religion enables the individual to focus on what 
binds them to other adherents, rather than focusing on ethnic divides. This of course refers to 
those who have the same ‘authentic’ view of religion. 
To analyse and try to understand the plight of migrants or exiles that form, in this case, the 
Muslim diaspora, it is useful to employ theories of fundamental social theorists, such as Marx’s 
idea of alienation439 (which is primarily economic) and societal estrangement, and Durkheim’s 
notion of anomie440. According to Durkheim, religion lies in the collective consciousness of 
society itself and in this way religion is a social phenomenon reflective of societal norms441. 
Anomie implies that there is a disjunction between means and goals, albeit in this case, 
economic means and goals. However, if we extend and elaborate these means in society to lead 
not only to economic inclusion, but to result in societal acceptance as well, migrants and exiles 
living in a host country would be the beneficiaries of such a system. Ramadan considers the 
societal acceptance of European and Western Muslims by emphasising universally-shared 
values. 
3.3 Tariq Ramadan and Western Muslims
Tariq Ramadan is a notable figure in discussions on Islam and the West, Islam and Europe 
and more specifically, regarding what it means to be a European Muslim442. The discussion of 
Islam in a pluralistic sense, that is, of multiple ‘Islams’, is one that has become prominent in 
the West and specifically in Europe with regard to the variety of practices and expressions that 
are occurring in differing ethno-national contexts443. Ramadan’s view is that there is only one 
Islam and as such, emphasises the singular and universalistic nature of Islam. “There is one 
  
439 Marx, K. and Engels, F. Economic and philosophic manuscripts of 1844. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing 
House. (First published 1844) 1959.
440 Durkheim, E. Suicide. London; New York: Routledge. (First published 1897) 2002. 
441 Ibid. 
442 See Ramadan, T. To be a European Muslim. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation. 1999.; Ramadan, T. Western 
Muslims and the Future of Islam. Oxford University Press: Oxford; New York. 2004. 
443 For example, a North African based Islam in France, a South Asian Islam in Britain, a Turkish Islam in 
Germany, according to the majority ethno-cultural demographic. 
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Islam, and the fundamental principles that define it are those to which all Muslims adhere, even 
though they may be clothed in Islamic principles, an important margin allowed for evolution, 
transformation and adaptation to various social and cultural environments.”444
In order to describe European Islam, for Ramadan it is necessary to first turn to the 
fundamental principles of Islam. This will make clear “…what, in their religion, is 
unchangeable (thabit) from what is subject to change (mutaghayyir)”445. Ramadan is opposed to 
both the views that Islam and the West are incompatible and to the idea of some Muslims who 
say there are no commonalities between Islam and the West. In this way, he explicitly rejects 
us/them dualisms and othering on both ‘sides’. Ramadan relates: 
“This bipolar vision is widespread and gives some Muslims a sense of power, might and 
legitimacy in Otherness…in practice, the Muslims who maintain these theses only 
isolate themselves, marginalize themselves, and sometimes, by their excessive emotional, 
intellectual, and social isolation, even strengthen the logic of the dominant system 
whose power, by contrast, lies in always appearing open, pluralistic and rational.”446
Bipolar visions of Islam and the West are thus not a one way process, in terms of the West 
considering Islam as an ‘other’. Muslims living in the West may also have certain conceptions 
about the nature of Western society being overly permissive, and morally incompatible with 
religious teachings and with the teachings of Islam with regard to such things as modest dress 
and prohibitions on alcohol. Essentialist and reductionist viewpoints necessarily flow from one 
side to other, and thus it is obvious that if the West has particular conceptions of Islam and 
Muslims, then the opposite will also occur. This creates a situation in which each side is in 
danger of espousing an inherent incompatibility between the two and following that, 
irreconcilable and fundamental differences regarding a peaceful co-existence. Thus reactionary 
identities are given space to form, through which one side creates an identity in opposition to 
the way they are generalised by the other which puts peaceful co-existence at risk. This type of 
thinking leaves no space for the notion of a ‘global citizenship’ or a cosmopolitan worldview 
which attempts to move beyond essentialism by positing (that which Ramadan proposes in 
  
444 Ramadan, T. Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. Oxford University Press: Oxford; New York. 2004. p. 9.
445 Ibid. For Islamic fundamentals see Al-Jabouri, Chapter 2.
446 Ramadan. Ibid. p. 5. My italics.
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relation to Islam) universal shared values and truths in terms of citizenship as well as with 
regard to Human Rights discourse and a legalistic framework447. With regard to European 
Muslims, or diaspora Muslims more generally, the key areas to be emphasised in Ramadan’s 
view448 are integration, an authentic dialogue and mutual respect449. I would also add tolerance 
and understanding of each side’s worldviews in a holistic sense, such as through ethno-religious 
and cultural diversity, and historical context perhaps through an educational framework. 
Dialogue and dialogism450 is necessary in order to critically understand, assess and evaluate 
taken-for-granted notions of ‘who we are’ with regards to both Muslims and the West. 
With regard to religion and culture, Ramadan seeks a separation between the two. He sees 
Islam as necessarily separate from culture due to overarching Islamic principles and states, 
“Islam is not a culture”451. This is a contentious issue and is dependent on how Islam as a 
religion is defined as the religious necessarily emanates from (and continues in or continues 
through) some type of communal cultural context, be it in historical, socio-political or ethno-
national terms. The ways in which a religion is in turn internalised and externalised by the 
individual, community and society is again dependent on cultural values and cultural 
significance. Whilst in theory Islam can be said to have no culture due to the universalistic 
nature and it is claimed that the religion goes beyond time and place, this is a particular faith 
statement, and not a statement based on how religion is practiced. As Islam is a religion that 
emphasises religious practice452 and is considered a ‘way of life’, it seems apparent that ethno-
national culture453 will necessarily hold some bearing regarding such areas as dissent, 
blasphemy, apostasy, the things that are considered haram (forbidden), halal (permitted) and 
makru (neither forbidden not permitted). Theoretically, it may be said that Islam does not need
  
447 See Chapter 4 for a brief reference to the cosmopolitan ethic.
448 “…their [Muslims] universal principals teach them that wherever the law respects their integrity and their 
freedom of conscience and worship, they are at home and must consider the attainments of these societies as their 
own and must involve themselves, with their fellow-citizens, in making it good and better.” Ramadan, T. Western 
Muslims and the Future of Islam. Oxford University Press: Oxford; New York. 2004. p. 5. Thus, it is not simply a 
matter of co-existing, but of participating and contributing to the wider society that they are part of. 
449 Ramadan. Ibid.
450 Originally formulated from the ideas of Mikhail Bakhtin, dialogism refers to self-critique and self-reflection 
being reached through dialogue and challenges the notion of an essentialised self. See Hermans, H.J.M. ‘The 
Dialogical Self: Toward a Theory of Personal and Cultural Positioning’. Culture & Psychology. Vol. 7, No. 3. 
September 2001. pp. 243-81.  
451 Ramadan, T. Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 2004.  p. 
214. 
452 In terms of the Five Pillars of Islam.
453 Especially in terms of the ulama or consensus of scholars.
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culture to endure, if religion is considered a personal matter, if one follows the principles from 
the Qur’an. However, this idealistic viewpoint is difficult to put into practice when dealing 
with a communal setting, as the community454 may act as authoritative, in ways such as, 
interpreting ‘the word of God’ (the Qur’an) and in terms of ‘correct’ practice, dress, diet 
amongst other cultural norms455.  
Therefore, it may be argued that religion is expressed through cultural norms and practices. In 
contrast, Ramadan considers Islam to be separate from culture due to the “central principle of 
tawhid”456, or faith in the unity of God, scriptural sources such as the Qur’an and Hadith and 
the “foundations of faith and practice”457. Islam is viewed by Ramadan to be “clothed”458 in 
cultural practices however. With regard to first-generation Muslim migrants to the West, he 
considers that they “…brought with them not only the memory of the universal principles of 
Islam but also, quite naturally, the way of life they followed in these countries”459. In his view, 
for first-generation migrants, “…to remain faithful to Islam meant…to perpetuate the customs 
of their countries of origin”460. For diaspora Muslims born in the West, Ramadan considers it 
necessary to separate Islam from the cultural practices (or lived experiences) that first-
generation migrants brought with them, and instead to locate their culture not through their 
ethnic heritage, but within the citizenry of the ‘new’ or ‘host’ countries. For second- and third-
generation Western Muslims Ramadan’s argument is valid, whereas on another level, foregoing 
the cultural norms of first-generation migrants insinuates that cultural memory, cultural 
experiences, cultural heritage and lived experiences of religion (that may be enacted through 
culture) are not valuable modes of expression in the West and cannot be reconciled within this 
context. 
  
454 Such as the supranational ummah and the ulama.
455 The term ‘culture’, as utilised in this thesis, refers to all things that are transmitted socially as opposed to 
biologically. Following this, religion can be referred to as lived experiences in social contexts. It can be proposed 
that religions and culture share a symbiotic relationship in that each is dependent on the other for personal 
meaning and social continuity.
456 Ramadan, T. Ibid.  
457 Ibid.
458 Ibid.
459 Ibid. p. 215.
460 Ibid. 
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Although Ramadan’s primary focus is on the principle of integration461 into Western societies, 
which he considers to have been vital through the history of Islam in enabling Muslims and 
Islam to exist in diverse and varied cultural contexts, it appears that ethnic heritage is 
incompatible with these principles. Another concern for Ramadan is to assert universal 
commonalities between Muslim or Islamic values and legalistic and citizenship codes. He 
rightly relates that co-existence and harmony can be achieved by (Muslims) focusing on 
integration and participation in Western societies462. It appears that Ramadan’s reasoning 
behind the disengagement of cultural traditions is to focus on the overarching claims of Islam 
that bind all Muslims together in integrating and participating in the West and to accept all 
that is not forbidden within Islam. The transcendent claim of the purity of Islam over culture 
appears to be one that is gaining popularity amongst some second- and third-generation 
diaspora Muslims in the West.   
3.4 Culture, religion, cultural dislocation and religious relocation amongst second- and 
third-generation diaspora Muslims
The problem with Ramadan’s purist approach separating culture and religion is that a 
symbiotic relationship does exist between culture and religion. Religious identity exists in and 
from a cultural context which accounts for the vast variation of religious traditions, practices, 
performance and ritual of those of the same faith. In contrast, and idealistically, revivalist Islam 
seeks a separation of culture and ethno-regional location from the tenets and fundamentals of 
religion. Global jihadi organisations transcend culture in that membership is neither exclusive 
nor culturally- or ethnically-bound. Religious bonds are allowed to be strengthened through 
association and the freedom to choose to belong463, which can be related to Morris’464 notion of 
assent communities through which belonging is enabled by association. 
  
461 Ibid.
462 Ibid.
463 It can be argued that individuals have a wider freedom of association with dissenting religious community 
groups in the West and in the global context due to less of a fixed religious identity structure and more freedom of 
choice rather than belonging to a sectarian religious group solely through descent. There is also less persecution of 
minority religious groups compared with Muslim countries. For example, Ahmedis are declared to be non-
Muslims by the Government of Pakistan. 
464 Morris, P. ‘Community Beyond Tradition’. In P. Heelas, S. Lash and P. Morris (eds.), Detraditionalization: 
critical reflections on authority and identity. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 1996.  
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As noted, it would not be wholly inaccurate to suggest that it is the cultural dislocation of
second- and third-generation immigrants that allows these groups of diaspora Muslims to be 
susceptible to an ideology of belonging, empowerment and action that can be found within 
global jihadi discourse. The degree of their susceptibility however, can perhaps to said to be 
dependent to a degree on their socio-economic state in society (and also on the educational 
background and background of their parents) and also on the historical situation of national 
policies towards immigrants and the treatment of culture and religion in these contexts. The 
social landscape is thus important.  Another significant factor is their degree of association and 
involvement with the Muslim ‘community’ as a whole. That is to say, a distinction can be made 
between those Muslims who are not associated with ‘the community’465. 
The transitional and liminal nature of the second- and third-generational diaspora Muslims 
leaves these Muslims in a position different and unique to that of their parents’ generation, in 
that religion and culture are two significant areas of social interaction that are instrumental to 
their ‘identity projects’466. Ethno-religious and culturally-located beliefs, practices and norms 
may be a ‘natural’ state for first-generation immigrants who were born in a different physical 
location, but for Muslim youth in the West these social identity markers may be more fluid in 
that they are not a ‘natural’ state within mainstream society, although they may be so in a 
community setting. Often ‘living’ a culture at home is vastly different to the culture of 
mainstream society, so their ways of being have to be re-negotiated with regard to language, 
dress and socially acceptable and unacceptable behavioural norms and values according to the 
context and location they find themselves in. This negotiation of identity in the private and 
public realms is a situational identity467 and the presentation of self to the ethno-religiously 
located community norms and to mainstream society.
The negotiation of identity firstly takes place in any community that Muslim youth are 
associated with468 and secondly within the confines of mainstream or dominant society469. 
  
465 Community orientation is heterogeneous and dependent on ethnic affiliations and perhaps even along 
religious sectarian, regional and linguistic lines. Such that it is not necessary that a Muslim from North Africa 
would consider a Muslim from Pakistan to be part of the same immediate community, but instead consider them 
as part of a wider Muslim community or Ummah. 
466 See Giddens, A. Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Cambridge: Polity Press. 1991.
467 Being an emphasis on particular parts of one’s identity according to situation and context.
468 Such as a wider Muslim community they may live in close proximity to.
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Identity and the identity project in this way is not simply innate and static, but is a process that 
is constantly redefined and renegotiated according to both internal and external variables. 
With regard to immigrants in general and Muslim migrants in particular, the expectations of 
and between the ‘host’ society and migrants need to be clearly explicated, with regard to such 
things as societal integration and contribution.  
Therefore, it can be said that it is the cultural dislocation of second- and third-generation 
immigrants that allows these groups of diaspora Muslims to be susceptible to an ideology of 
belonging, empowerment, action and retribution. The degree of their susceptibility can 
perhaps be said to be dependent on their socio-economic state in society470, educational 
background, the background of their parents and their own individual prospects. If they have 
no hope for the future, then they have nothing to lose. Through this nihilistic framework, they 
may have a propensity towards violence against others and themselves in joining a global jihadi
organisation, especially if this group is framed within the context of martyrdom being a worthy 
and religiously-rewarding and religiously-rewarded471 endeavour. When considering ‘global 
jihadis’, and the external jihad it is important to refer to the historical context of Dar al Harb 
(the House or Realm of War) and Dar al-Islam (the House or Realm of Islam)472. These 
divisional categories of the world were especially significant in the Prophet Muhammad’s time 
as armed jihad was a reaction to those who attacked Islam, or did not want Islam to exist. 
However, these categories are not applicable to the modern world due to the reciprocal 
diplomatic agreements that exist between nations473. Despite this, the idea of separating the 
world into peaceful nations and nations at war, is one that still does exist amongst those with 
antagonistic or extremist ideologies. 
Whilst the notion of the external and global jihad or struggle does have historical context, the 
way in which it is now utilised by global jihadis, is not as a form of defence, but as a ‘reaction’ 
    
469 Generational difference and lack of acceptance from within community. See Kibria, N. ‘The ‘new Islam’ and 
Bangladeshi youth in Britain and the US’. Ethnic and Racial Studies. Vol. 31, No. 2. February 2008. pp. 243-66. 
470 Which emphasises the differences of national context. See Kibria, ibid for differences in attitudes of Muslims 
in Britain and the United States.
471 Such as the promise of Paradise.
472 See Al Sayyid, M. 2004. ‘Mixed Message: The Arab and Muslim Response to ‘Terrorism’’. In Gus Martin (ed.) 
The New Era of Terrorism: Selected Readings. Sage: California, London, New Delhi. 2004. pp. 144-5. 
473 Diplomatic agreements signify that another country is part of Dar al-‘ahd (the House or realm of commitment). 
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to perceived injustices, perpetrated by the West on Muslim countries474. The external and 
global jihad whilst on one level encompasses ideologies of hatred of freedoms475 on another, it 
may be considered a defensive stance, a retribution for perceived injustices against Muslims in 
a Western-dominated world. In this way, by engaging with global jihadi discourse and 
privileging Muslim as the declared identity is a progressive expression of religion rather than 
simply an attempt to recreate an idealised past of the ancestors of Islam. This neo-revivalism is 
neofundamentalist and is specifically and necessarily located in the present late modern age. 
It is important to understand that the external jihad or struggle is stressed by global jihadis over 
the internal jihad. The internal jihad is conceptualised around the notion of an internal spiritual 
struggle. Of course, the ways in which Muslims conceive of these terms is dependent on their 
specific hermeneutics. Sufi Islam stresses the internal spiritual struggle over the external 
physical battle and in this context, an interesting point to consider is why there is a move 
towards the external rather than internal jihad. Why isn’t there a move amongst an extremist 
minority of youth towards a peaceful form of Islam, such as Sufi practices that embrace all 
religions? Sufi Islam also has multiple leaders but perhaps this is too steeped in national and 
cultural traditions rather than the transcendence of them as with revivalist Islam. The move 
towards the global jihadi Islam also suggests that those attracted to it are attracted to the 
violence of it juxtaposed against a more peaceful Sufi Islam, as in Britain that is the Islam of 
the parents’ generation476.  In this way, those engaging in the global jihadi discourse, engage in a 
self-essentialisation, and may view Islam themselves as inherently violent. The move of Muslim 
youth towards the ‘new’ self-essentialised and self-othered Islam, is towards an interpretation of 
Islam related to the global landscapes of the jihad that transcends culture, and must necessarily 
be seen as politically active.  
Violence may be seen in a sense as restorative and necessary to overcome perceived injustices in 
the West and global arenas. This can be viewed as reactionary on an anomistic level477
reflecting societal dissatisfaction, perhaps based on societal expectations. It reflects some sense 
  
474 See Vakil, S. ‘Journey of a Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy’. Middle East Policy. Vol. 13, Issue 3. Fall 2006. pp. 
175-8, Chapter 2.2 for a synthesis of perceived injustices perpetrated by the ‘hypocritical West’. 
475See 
http://209.85.141.104/search?q=cache:g48wIod8JHMJ:www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-
8.html+bush,+they+hate+us+for+our+freedoms&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=nz&client=firefox-a
476 See Shaw, A. ‘Why might young British Muslims support the Taliban?’ Anthropology Today. Vol. 18, No. 1. 
February 2002. pp. 5-8.
477 Where societal expectations do not much societal reality.
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of vision for the future and in this way may be described as progressive. In terms of the 
attraction to violent ideologies, a discontentment is again reflected amongst those who choose 
to participate in this form of extremism in the form of textual violence that incites a ‘them’ and 
‘us’ duality and the propensity towards militant action, for example the language used by the 
four London bombers478. Radicalisation in itself needs to be understood in a broad way in the 
sense that those who become ‘radicalised’ are not themselves devoid of agency. Rather than 
emphasising an us/them duality in values, ideals and ideologies, related through the ‘War on 
Terror’ rhetoric479, it is more significant to try to comprehend ‘their’ perception of events, 
grievances and notions of injustice (even if these are regarded as mere perceptions rather than 
objective actuality or fact). This is not to say that militant or violent action be in any way 
excused or tolerated, just that it can be understood on a deeper level as the only recourse to 
seek justice and to be taken seriously. In this sense, grievances regarding the socio-economic, 
alienated and anomic status of some younger generations of diaspora Muslim youth in the 
West may be exploited by those with greater, meaning more far-reaching, agendas relating to 
the perceived unresolved issues and incompatibilities between the West and Islam. 
Contemporary leadership in Islam
There is an unprecedented textual (re)interpretation and unmediated presence of theological 
doctrine in contemporary times which has been furthered by technological innovations. This 
has led to a shift in leadership and authority figures for young Muslims to look up to480. 
Importantly, there is no universally accepted singular authority within Islam, except God, 
which leads to multiplicities in sectarian leadership. Thus anyone can be and act as an 
authority within Islam as religion is considered a personal matter. However, this ‘democratic 
authoritarianism’ has taken on a wider spread of ‘leaders’ and more significantly, ‘followers’. 
This enables the creation and growth of new sectarian identities relating to the hermeneutics of 
theology, local, national and global politics and most significantly, for the scope of this thesis, of 
  
478 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4206800.stm
479 See 
http://209.85.141.104/search?q=cache:g48wIod8JHMJ:www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-
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how to act in the contemporary late modern world. This accounts for the diversity of Muslim 
or ‘Islamic’481 groups that revivalist Muslims can choose to associate with. Religious leadership 
is no longer confined to Imams and Mullahs, but, “…a celebrity system is rising, and its figures 
include lecturers, rappers, singers, comedians, actors and television personalities of the Islamic 
West.”482 The second- and third-generation of diaspora Muslims therefore belong to the late 
modern generation of ‘pick and choosers’483 with regard to religious and cultural affinity, 
according to their needs484. Rather than describing the space that second- and third-generations 
inhabit as being one of liminal dislocation, it can instead be also described as occupying a 
hybrid culture-identity space, that is, an identity in its own right485. In this sense, this 
dislocation can be considered to be a ‘new’ location of cultural space.    
3.5 Case studies of second-generation diaspora Muslims and religious identity
Recent qualitative studies of second- and third-generation Muslims in the West486 over this last 
decade following ‘9/11’ points to an emergence of literature and the attempt to understand 
social and political issues concerning Muslim youth in the West. The October 2005 edition of 
The Muslim World487 explores the multiple ways Islam is understood and practiced by young 
Muslim Americans. That there is an issue in The Muslim World on these issues reflects the 
attention being given to the identity formation of these Muslim Americans in the post-’9/11’ 
context. This reflects the salience of Islam in the Western world and in the current geopolitic. 
The aftermath of ‘9/11’ has been especially significant for those with Muslim heritage as this 
collective group “have found themselves under greater scrutiny by others and are undertaking 
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more self-scrutiny as well.”488 Following this, it can be suggested that this neo-revivalist Muslim 
identity can be viewed as a reactionary identity to the national and global contexts.
As has been previously mentioned, this characterisation does not of course apply to all Muslim 
youth. However, through externally identifying489 those with a Muslim heritage as primarily 
Muslim (that being a Muslim is the most important identity-marker), this creates a space 
through which young Muslims may seek to relate each of their identities to each other. In this 
context, Muslim Americans may attempt to reconcile how being Muslim impacts on their 
identity as Americans (and also on their ethnic heritage) and how being American impacts of 
their identification as Muslims.
All individuals have multiple aspects to their identities that are reflected through ascribed and 
chosen characteristics. “Identity is based on interactions, perceptions that one is the same or 
not the same as others, and elements of one’s personal and collective identity, including not only 
religion, but gender, ‘race’, ethnicity, class, nationality, and generation.”490 The ways through 
which personal and collective identities are formulated is significant as it appears that, within 
the framework of a neo-revivalist identity, the personal identity of Muslim is considered within 
the collective global context of the supranational ummah and the perceptions of what a Muslim 
collective identity entails. That is, identity may be performed through perceptions of what it 
means to be part of the Muslim diaspora and more significantly, for second- and third-
generation Muslims living in the West, the reflection and consideration of what being a 
Muslim means in the West491. This consideration of their Muslim selves may be reflected upon 
in a way different to those migrants who have lived in Muslim-majority countries. Arguably, in 
Muslim-majority492 countries, religion and being a Muslim can be considered to be a taken-for-
granted identity through the continuation of ethno-cultural and religious practices. Such 
  
488 Leonard, K.I. ‘Introduction: Young American Muslim Identities’. The Muslim World. Vol. 95, No. 4. October 
2005. p. 473.  
489 See Malik, K. ‘Born in Bradford’. Prospect Magazine. Issue 115. October 2005. http://www.prospect-
magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=7070 ; Rehman, J. ‘Islam, “War on Terror” and the Future of Muslim 
Minorities in the United Kingdom: Dilemmas of Multiculturalism in the Aftermath of the London Bombings’. 
Human Rights Quarterly. Vol. 29. 2007. pp. 831-78. 
490 Ibid. My italics and inverted commas.
491 In a personal, familial, community, ethnic, national and global sense.
492 I use the taken-for-granted status of religion in Muslim-majority countries as an example due to the scope of 
this thesis, however, arguably, this taken-for-granted relationship to religion may occur for individuals in all 
countries when their religion is the majority religion.  
97
practices include celebrations of religious festivals such as Eid, fasting during Ramadan and 
being aware of the call to prayer by hearing the azan. It can be argued that living in a country 
where one is the religious majority does not necessarily require self-reflection through which 
one’s religious identity is questioned within the dominant societal landscape. In this situation 
one may participate in religious celebrations, festivals, norms and practices as a part of religio-
cultural continuity. This relates back to Davie’s conception of ‘believing without belonging’493 with 
regard to religion in the West, that can be inverted to, in countries that are religio-centric, 
‘belonging without necessarily believing’. This being so, an individual can engage in the practice of 
religion as it is celebrated through culture, but this does not necessarily indicate a proclamation 
of faith.
Viswanathan494 has argued that in Western democracies, religious difference is considered in 
terms of cultural difference and because of this, establishing one’s religious difference is an on-
going process for migrants and their subsequent generations. It is clear that all minority groups 
that are ‘othered’ with regard to the dominant culture will have to actively engage in a long-
term process of acceptance in order to establish their difference in the mainstream. Leonard 
asserts that there are visible tensions “among national, ethnic, “authentic”, and “new” forms of 
Muslim identity”495. The “new” forms of Muslim identity are “shaped by a strong American 
experiential component”496, and are arguably personalised and individualised through the 
postmodern project of the self and reflect contemporary issues of self-reflexivity497. 
Ethnographic research on Muslims in Britain and the United States498 has shown that 
questions of identity and affiliation which can be broadly considered as identity politics are 
significant amongst Muslim youth. The issue of assumed affiliation due to a person’s cultural 
and religious heritage is also a significant one. However, it is important to note that one’s 
religious affiliations are not the only way through which Muslim youth can ‘self-other’. A re-
negotiation of one’s cultural and religious heritage can take place in numerous ways, such as 
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distancing oneself from the (local/national/global) Muslim community, and developing and 
emphasising other aspects of one’s identity in a hybridised identity project. Second- and third-
generation diaspora Muslims in France are an example of this, who are referred to within 
French society in a manner distinctive to their parents’ generation as ‘beurs’. This growing 
trend of politically mobilized Muslims (who may self-define by expressing a “public Islamic 
religiosity”499) are attracted to an Islam of the spectacle. Music is highly significant for their 
religious expressions and their self-identification500.  
There have also been several qualitative research studies of the self-identification of Muslims in 
the United States and Britain following ‘9/11’501. The development of a Muslim-American 
hyphenated identity is thought to have emerged following the crisis of the attacks on the World 
Trade Centre in 2001. Sirin et al502 consider the Muslim-American identity as socially-
constructed and historically-bound through media representation, government agencies, and 
especially post-’9/11’ through public surveillance, and foreign policy concerns as informing 
negative attitudes towards Muslims. To identify a person as a Muslim is viewed as synonymous  
identifying them as a collective identity transcending ethnicity and based on shared religious 
beliefs and shared experiences. Sirin et al consider the Muslim identity to be arguably a cultural 
identity as it is not dependent on degrees of religiosity503, meaning how religious one is. They 
carried out a survey of 97 participants aged between 18 and 25 and through surveys and 
pictorial representations attempted to investigate how the relationship between self-
identification as Muslim and as American was influenced by discrimination, acculturation and 
religious practices and whether there were gender variations in the identification process504. 
Following ‘9/11’, being a Muslim in the United States505 has become a salient religious 
category and through profiling, the national identity of Muslims has been questioned. Peek’s 
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research has shown that following ‘9/11’, some Muslims who were surveyed engaged in visibly 
embracing their American identities through the public display of American flags outside of 
their houses and avoiding mosques and other locations associated with Islam506.
Peek507 has identified three stages that the Muslims surveyed in her study went through in 
developing their Muslim identity. These are, firstly, the religious (Muslim) identity as ascribed, 
secondly as chosen and finally, as a declared identity. The ascribed identity is taken-for-granted. 
There is little critical reflection of what it means to be a Muslim during early developmental 
stages (i.e. childhood). Religion is one amongst a variety of factors that identify individuals 
during this stage. Other factors include ethnicity and the culture of the parents’ generation. 
Through self-reflection, some participants concluded that “they were more likely to identify 
themselves in this way because of social norms and external pressure in the US to define 
oneself by ‘race’, nationality, or ethnicity rather than religion.”508 Peek conducted research of 
New York college students between September 2001 and October 2003. During the ascribed 
identity stage, most participants reported a lack of self-reflection. However, behavioural 
practices reflect the internalisation of this process through norms and values, for example, 
dressing modestly and attending religion classes at the mosque. The environment that the 
Muslim participants lived in during this stage (such as urban or rural settings, and the number 
of minorities and especially whether other Muslims were living in the same environment) is 
considered significant in the pressure to assimilate to “‘American’ norms and values”509. This 
reflects the significance of whether one is made aware of being a minority or ‘other’. Some 
reported that due to being stigmatised because of their minority status, they often concealed 
their Muslim identity because of the desire to ‘fit in’ to mainstream culture510. These 
management strategies reflecting religious identity formulation are common in the 
development stages of all religious identities where religious identity is ascribed.
    
American Muslims, South Asian Muslims and Arab Muslims. South Asian and Arab Muslims mainly migrated to 
the United States following the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act505.
506 Peek, L. ‘Becoming Muslim: The Development of a Religious Identity’. Sociology of Religion. Vol. 66, No. 3. Fall 
2005. pp. 215-42.
507 Ibid.
508 Ibid. p. 225. My inverted commas as ‘race’ is a contested term. 
509 Ibid. 
510 Ibid. p. 226. 
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The second stage of the Muslim students surveyed was the stage of being Muslim as a chosen
identity, as with age, children develop a “more concreted, cognitive conception of their 
religious identity”511. The participants reflected that as they matured, being a Muslim became 
their chosen identity rather than it being unquestionable and ascribed. Through their social 
development, a re-examination process took place through which religious identities were 
reflected upon. Some of the participants became more religious in high school, but for others, 
the transition took place at university in the context of “reflection and identity transition”512
where life choices became more evident. The college or university experience enabled the 
awareness of larger social networks of Muslims and through peer-group Muslim Student 
Associations (MSAs) it became easier to identify as Muslim due to the large numbers of 
Muslims like themselves who had the same social norms and were in similar situations facing 
the pressure to assimilate.
Of those surveyed, Peek found that peer groups and close friends were highly significant in 
“constructing, reinforcing and affirming”513 the emergent revivalist religious identity. They 
shared similar experiences of religious exploration in learning about Islam through the MSA in 
an organisational and social setting. This reflects the collective examination of beliefs and 
practices and in the construction of a religious identity. The reflection of what it means to be a 
Muslim in the United States was enabled to be examined through a collective narrative and 
consciousness that went beyond the individual. Thus solidarity reflects the significance of 
“social context and narrative space”514. 
Many chose to join MSAs to learn about Islam because “they felt they were not receiving 
enough religious education at home”515. They may have learned about the fundamental 
teachings of Islam from their parents, but found their parents to be “too cultural…as [they] 
mixed cultural norms with religious practices”516. The parents were mainly from Muslim-
majority countries (who immigrated to the United States in the 1960s, ‘70s and ‘80s) where 
they were part of the Muslim majority and in this way there was an infusion of their respective 
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ethnic culture in Islam. Islam was a taken-for-granted, given aspect of identity, and it being the 
majority identity, had no need to be questioned. For the second-generation however, who Peek 
has interviewed, there is a realisation that “they were part of a small, highly visible religious 
minority in the United States”517. This awareness has led to the assertion of Muslim identity. 
“[A]s they matured, it became increasingly important not only to maintain their religious 
identity, but also to develop that aspect of themselves.”518
Thus it appears, that growing up as part of the second-generation of the Muslim diaspora, an 
exploration takes place of what being a Muslim means in a Western country where their 
religion (although highly visible) is a minority. The response is that the maintenance of the 
religious identity is important for these Muslims, but it is also important for them to teach it to 
their children as well. In some cases, the choice in asserting the religious identity was “in order 
to reject ethnic, national, or cultural identities that they viewed as un-Islamic”.519
The MSA520 has provided a new institutional locus through which this generation is able to 
find out about what is perceived as ‘authentic’ Islam. An Islam that transcends cultural and 
ethnic divisions and that is located in the global supranational arena may be taken as 
‘authentic’. MSAs were founded in the United Sates in 1963. Funded initially by Saudi Arabia, 
it can be deduced that this encouraged a Wahabi style Islam to be emphasised521. They were 
created in opposition to alienation perceived by the ‘Americanisation’ of Arab mosques. In this 
way the MSA has become “an alternative umbrella organization with a mandate to promulgate 
‘true Islam’ and to shift the focus away from national or ethnic markers”522. The belief and 
behaviour that is focussed upon is against ethnic versions of Islam and national divisions, but 
the focus instead is on the unity and perhaps even ‘purity’ of Islam. There is disassociation with 
the ethnic background and the focus is upon religious factors which are viewed as the 
overarching aspect of an Islamic identity. However, MSAs have now become more diverse and 
organised around political issues following ‘9/11’523.
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In the twenty-first century, in such contexts, Muslim as a declared identity, is considered in 
response to a crisis, that is, ‘9/11’ and the aftermath of xenophobia towards Muslims, 
expressed by, “discrimination, harassment, racial and religious profiling, and verbal and 
physical assault”.524 The affirmation of religious identity is considered especially important in 
this social landscape and bonds to Islam strengthened through the defence of Islam and the 
“increased need for a spiritual anchor”525. Increased group solidarity appears to be an 
important response to the negative treatment of Islam and Muslims. It is seen as important to 
declare one’s Muslim identity and although these students were under pressure to modify their 
visible display of their Muslim identities (by removing the hijab for women or by men shaving 
their beards), they are unwilling to do so. 
This declaration of faith is seen as important in declaring a positive perception of self and to 
“correct public misconceptions”526 about Islam. As such, Peek’s study is reflective of the 
dynamic, ongoing and active construction of the identity process and the relationship of religion 
to the identity-projects of young Muslim-Americans. In a societal landscape where Islam is 
salient, the formulation of a religion-oriented response by these Muslim-American social actors 
involves a “heightened reflection and self-awareness, individual choices, and the 
acknowledgement of others”527. The formulation of a neo-revivalist Muslim identity in this way 
involves both internal choices and external pressures. Following ‘9/11’, this religious identity 
has become stronger in the social and political arenas, and important for Muslim-Americans to 
their “social and personal selves”528. This declaration of identity can be seen as reactionary, self-
reflexive, and a site of group solidarity.   
The negotiation of a Muslim identity in the West
Negotiating a Muslim identity has also become significant for second- and third-generation 
diaspora Muslims in Britain. As Kibria’s research529 on Bangladeshi Muslim youth in Britain 
and the United States shows, there has been an increase in a revivalist Islam in terms of 
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identity and practice based on “a concern for scripturalism and totalism, a return to basic 
principles and an emphasis on Islamic thought for all aspects of life”530. This second- and third-
generation diaspora Muslim revivalism is also located within the global context of the ummah. 
Kibria relates the generational divide between these young Muslims in both the US and British 
contexts and the declaration of the revivalist identity is an external rebellion against both 
mainstream Western society and their parents’ generation. Within the revivalist identity, Kibria 
does not find hostility towards modernity but rather, what she terms the ‘new Islam’, is “...part 
of a movement of modernity”531, that simultaneously affirms it and also reflects anxiety towards 
modernity, specifically relating to “...moral and spiritual corruption”532. The ‘new Islam’ 
provided a locus, similar to the participants in Peek’s study who spoke of the need for a 
“spiritual anchor”533, from which those engaging with this new revivalist Muslim identity can 
‘protect’ themselves from “moral laxity, commodification and spiritual vacuity in the 
surrounding culture”534 The ‘new’ Muslim identity enabled the individuals to respond to 
alienation and xenophobia in a public way. Through Kibria’s research on the ‘new’ Islam in 
Britain and the United States, differences in national context became apparent. Generational 
conflict between first-generation and subsequent generations was more visible in Britain. Also 
in Britain there were concerns for the young Muslims of “the dangers of downward mobility” 
(in socio-economic terms). In the US, participants expressed “fears of cultural loss and 
assimilation”535 and were concerned about “upward mobility”536. This reflects the different 
socio-economic backgrounds of Bangladeshi Muslims in Britain and in the United States. In 
Britain, the Bangladeshi participants tend to be less socio-economically secure, whereas in the 
United States, Bangladeshis are highly educated and professionally successful. There are similar 
concerns of the British and American Muslim revivalists. In Britain however the neo-revivalist 
Muslims are looking for gains whilst in the US, they are afraid of what they may lose. 
Communication technologies and transnational Muslim movements were significant to both 
US and British Bangladeshi Muslims.      
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Summary
The neo-revivalist identity formation is not static, unchanging or the universal norm. Bayat 
relates that the young extremists are a very small portion of the diaspora Muslim demographic 
but receive the most media attention. This may be reflective of the problematic status given to 
this sector within secular Western society. The neo-revivalism of second- and third-generation 
diaspora Muslims is an expression of Islam separate from their ethnic culture. They often do 
not have an awareness of traditional Islam. “Suspended from their own ethnic values and 
dejected by the host culture which views them with suspicion and derision, they look 
desperately for an outlet to forge identities”537. An “authentic” reference of Islam is sought, one 
that is “trans-local, global, and abstract...stripped of cultural influences”. 
The investigation of a neo-revivalist identity formation is important to highlight the 
implications of the salience of Islam in the West following ‘9/11’. Religious extremism that is 
discussed in the context of the global jihad is not by any means an inevitable result of the neo-
revivalist Muslim identity. The purpose of discussing neo-fundamentalism is to highlight the 
apparent visibility of media-reporting and global fear that relates to Islam and how political 
issues are formulated through religious expression. Religion and religious identities are not 
incompatible with Western norms, laws and values if we view religion and difference through 
the cosmopolitan worldview. This denotes everybody as different if identity is considered as an 
ongoing process of construction, a work in progress, so to speak, that enables different aspects 
of one’s identity to be recognised and realised without being reduced to discovering where the 
ultimate loyalty lies. Of course, this is an ideal situation, but one that can be realised through 
mutual respect, self-reflexive on-going dialogue, not with perceived ‘group or community 
leaders’, but with individuals who live their respective identities538. 
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Chapter 4 will consider mediated representations of Muslims. 4.1 will examine internal 
critiques by Muslims through literary fiction and 4.2 will discuss the portrayal of Muslims in 
the media before this thesis arrives at its conclusion.  
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Chapter 4. Text in globalised context: Muslims, contemporary literary fiction 
and the media
Mediated discourses are significant because firstly, they present perceptions Muslims have of 
themselves through literary fiction and secondly, they reflect the global consciousness 
pertaining to the portrayal of Muslims through techno-mass media. Literature and the media 
are both sites of dialogue, and dialogism that can be read as semantic and semiotic texts. This 
enables analytically critical interplay of discourses between both the producers and the receivers 
of mediated communication.  
4.1. Diaspora Muslims in the West and literary fiction: ‘My Son the Fanatic’, Brick Lane, 
The Reluctant Fundamentalist
By investigating the primacy of a religious identity as a form of ‘self-othering’, integration, 
community and identity issues for intergenerational Western Muslims are explored to 
contextualise the recourse to religious expression. In this context it is fitting to discuss 
contemporary post-immigrant literature written by Western Muslims to gain insight into the 
issues raised and observations made by those who have experienced living as migrants in the 
West. 
Literature is a significant element of an individual and group’s identity project, as an 
expression of their views of and within society. As such it is especially important to consider 
literary fiction written by multi-generational migrants and minorities in the West in order to 
gain an understanding of their reflections on self and the ‘community’. However, it is 
important to critically analyse this literature and not assume that, purely due to ethnic heritage 
or religious ascription, these writers necessarily are the authentic voice of and on the world they 
are writing about. That said, such literature is useful in stimulating debate pertaining to 
minority voices, and is also useful in presenting a different and perhaps a more widely-located 
perspective from the ‘inside’, on issues relating to Muslims in the West. The authors’ 
presentation of characters in these contemporary fictions, and each of the authors themselves, 
can be related to one other as part of a process of dialogical reasoning539, with regard to 
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minority life-worlds. Literary fiction presents and re-presents a plurality of life-worlds and 
heterogeneous voices. In this way, polyphonic (or multi-voiced) novels540 and short stories may 
present independent authorship. This may take place within each characterisation through 
which the characters may narrate their own independent and multiple stories. Also through the 
act of reading, the reader may take shifting positions. The authorship is representative of “I as 
the author”541, and “Me as an observed actor”542. Landscapes of imagination enable a scope 
wider than “the existing conceptions of the self”543 and the position of each character shifts 
according to situational identity in time and space. In this way, authors are able to position 
each character through the authors’ own social mirror which is reflected upon through the 
narrative and between the characters’ interactions. By reading the works of fiction selected for 
analysis in this chapter, the reflections of the authors regarding the context of Western 
Muslims and their views of socio-cultural adjustment issues faced by migrants are highlighted.    
When dealing with the subject of migration, one important question to consider is: when do 
migrants stop being classified as immigrants? The answer to this question is multifaceted, 
dealing with both the self-proclamations of generations of immigrants (that is, how individuals 
and communities of immigrants classify themselves in the present and over time) and the 
mainstream societal response (how individuals and institutions in a mainstream society group 
classify those with a migratory heritage). Also related is the fluidity of self-proclamations and 
self-identity can be fluid (especially over and across generations and over and across 
communities) depending on the interaction of differing social groups and the socio-political, 
economic and foreign policy climate of the country, and indeed the geopolitical climate. These 
factors are a backdrop to more localised issues, such as racism and xenophobia and may 
influence communal attitudes relating to specific local situations just as much as incidents 
directly related to personal life histories. It is therefore important to have an awareness of such 
issues to relate them to the turn to a neo-revivalist religious identity that may have implications 
for religious extremism. These attitudes also need to be contextualised in order to gain insight 
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into the worldviews of individuals choosing to act or perhaps, in their terms, ‘react’ militantly 
in the name of religion or to claim a religious identity.    
It should be noted that in terms of immigration, integration and assimilation, one important 
criteria of acceptance into the mainstream of the ‘host’ society is the visual aspect, that is the 
first image and impression that individuals have of one another. Both image and ‘the visual’ 
are especially important in contemporary society due to the dominance of mediated 
technologies, where things often have to be seen to be entered into the consciousness as 
‘real’544. Visual images can also reinforce stereotypes. For example men of non-indigenous 
European descent with beards may be viewed with suspicion, as may women wearing the hijab. 
It can also be proposed that ethnically- Caucasian Muslims may be accepted by society faster 
than those of minority ethnic origins who may be considered to be more ‘visible minorities’ 
(and continue to be so over and across generations545 due to conspicuous personal 
characteristics such as skin colour). Despite this however, the style of dress may override this 
point. Other factors to be considered regarding societal acceptance are dress, language (whether 
they speak the language of their adopted country), and also education, socio-economic status 
and national context. Religion may also be included in this list of issues to be considered, in 
particular in a Western, pluralist society. Perhaps more important than religious affiliation 
however, is a willingness and readiness to accept other religious and cultural traditions and to 
in a sense co-exist with others rather than engage in an isolationist stance. 
The acceptance of other traditions can also be related to treating individuals as such rather 
than as representatives of the communities to which they may belong (through ascription 
rather than choice). The cosmopolitan ethic is therefore a useful starting point in moving 
beyond local cultural particularities, (whilst simultaneously embracing them through a 
universalised human rights perspective) to participation in a global citizenship with shared 
values, embracing diversity and pluralism as cultural enrichment. Through this ethic, 
individuals are respected as human beings, enabled multiple affiliations, and not reduced to 
any singular affiliation, for it is individuality and difference that is shared. Furthermore, 
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Anthropology. Vol. 34. 2005. pp. 363-84.  
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minorities should also not self-victimise by embracing the unconstructive role of victim in 
society, but should instead, interact and participate in society. The cosmopolitan ethic, 
although an ideal, needs to be applied by all citizens to realise both the hybridity of 
transnational identities and a global citizenship that is respectful of difference, is self-reflexive 
and is dialogical in dealing with issues that may arise. This may be reflected through “the 
emergence of a new “We”...who would undertake together to resolve...all offences against 
human dignity”546.
In contrast, the isolationist stance could lead to “peripheral communalism”547 or “pillar”548
communities, whilst maintaining the self-proclaimed important aspects of cultural heritage that 
are compatible with legal restrictions of the adopted country. With regard to “peripheral 
communalism”, and a challenged socio-economic state in society of, for example, Pakistani, 
Bangladeshi, Turkish and North African migrants to Europe and the US, it is important to 
consider the historical experiences of migration pertaining to national and socio-economic 
context. It is important to deal with issues of immigration and integration into mainstream 
society as issues of immigration, and not as essentialising these heterogeneous and ethnically 
diverse groups, and treating them as Muslim issues. This would be overstating the case. Rather 
than considering that those engaging in separatism, isolationism or “peripheral 
communalism”549 reflect the incompatibility of Islam and secular (Western) society, it should 
be considered that the extent to which these are immigration issues550.  
To demonstrate these issues, three pieces of literature will be examined in this chapter: Brick 
Lane, by Monica Ali, ‘My Son the Fanatic’, a short story by Hanif Kureishi and, The Reluctant 
Fundamentalist by Mohsin Hamid. These works were chosen not only because they are 
  
546 Ramadan, T. ‘Manifesto for a new ‘WE’: An Appeal to the Western Muslims, and their Fellow Citizens’. 7 July 
2006. http://www.tariqramadan.com/article.php3?id_article=743    
For a further discussion on cosmopolitanism, see Featherstone, M. ‘Cosmopolis: An Introduction’. Theory, Culture 
& Society. Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2. 2002. pp. 1-16; Beck, U. ‘The Cosmopolitan Society and its Enemies’. Theory, Culture 
& Society. Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2. 2002. pp. 17-44; Turner, B.S. ‘Cosmopolitan Virtue, Globalization and Patriotism’. 
Theory, Culture & Society. Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2. 2002. pp. 45-63; Appiah, K.A. ‘Cosmopolitanism’: Ethics in a World of 
Strangers. New York; London: W.W. Norton & Company. 2006.
547 See Bayat, A. ‘A Symposium on “Political Islam”: When Muslims and Modernity Meet’. Contemporary Sociology. 
Vol. 36, No. 6. November 2007. p. 509.
548 For a discussion on pillar communities, separatism and isolationism, see Kramer, J. ‘Letter from Europe. The 
Dutch Model: Multiculturalism and Muslim immigrants’. The New Yorker. 3 April, 2006. 
549 Bayat. Ibid. 
550 See Bayat. Ibid. 
110
contemporary and deal with religious identity and Muslims, but because there are other levels 
in the writing that deal with notions of home, belonging, nostalgia, exile and issues revolving 
around being an ‘other’ to mainstream society. Brick Lane and ‘My Son the Fanatic’ are both 
set within the context of Britain, whereas The Reluctant Fundamentalist is narrated in Pakistan 
but the story is set in New York. 
Comparing all three pieces of literature from the outset reflects differences pertaining to ethnic 
heritage, national context and socio-economic status. Brick Lane deals with Bangladeshi-origin 
people in Tower Hamlets, East London; the characters in ‘My Son the Fanatic’ are of Pakistani 
origin in Britain and the central character in The Reluctant Fundamentalist is Pakistani who lived 
in New York. The two pieces of fiction in the British context deal with characters from 
working-class backgrounds, whereas Changez in The Reluctant Fundamentalist originates from an 
upper middle-class family in Lahore, Pakistan, is educated at Princeton (on a scholarship) and 
finds a job at a prestigious corporate firm in New York before ‘9/11’. 
These differences in national context, ethnic heritage and socio-economic status in society 
relate to Kibria’s551 research findings pertaining to issues for the diaspora of up-ward mobility 
amongst Bangladeshi Muslim migrants in the US, such as fears of losing the distinctiveness of 
culture, identity and religion due to the context of the ‘decadence of capitalist society’ and 
socio-economic advantage. Also, due to the desire to ‘fit in’ and become a ‘model migrant’552
emphasis lies on assimilating into mainstream society553. Pertinent issues for those surveyed in 
  
551 Kibria relates that during the post-World War II years, there was a migratory flow of those from the former 
British colonies traveling to Britain which was facilitated by the 1948 Nationality Act. Due to the demand for 
labour, many worked in unskilled jobs, and a lot of the immigrants travelled from rural areas in Bangladesh (and 
Pakistan) to Britain. During the 1970s family unification was enabled and localised communities began to be 
established. There continue to be large Bangladeshi enclaves in old industrial areas such as Tower Hamlets, East 
London and these groups remain relatively socio-economically disadvantaged. Migration to the United States from 
South Asian countries is more recent and it was mainly students and professionals who immigrated to the US 
following the liberalisation of immigration laws after 1965. See Kibria, N. ‘The ‘new Islam’ and Bangladeshi youth 
in Britain and the US’. Ethnic and Racial Studies. Vol. 31, No. 2. February 2008. pp. 247-53. 
552 For a discussion on effective ‘deracialization’ strategies due to upward class mobility, see Silverstein, P.A. 
‘Immigrant Racialization and the New Savage Slot: Race, Migration, and Immigration in the New Europe’. Annual 
Review of Anthropology. Vol. 34. 2005. p. 365. Silverstein, ibid, also relates that South Asian migrants represent 
themselves as ‘model minorities’ in the US to counteract negative minority stereotypes, such as of African 
Americans.   
553 However the other side of this desire to assimilate is the negative impact it may have on the distinctive group 
identity in terms of cultural and religious transmission across generations. In this way, religion acted as a moral 
anchor and provided the basis for an alternative way of being in this societal context. The revivalist Muslim 
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the study of the Bangladeshi Muslim diaspora in Britain related to the fears of down-ward 
mobility and structural socio-economic disadvantage.
Brick Lane554 by Monica Ali and Hanif Kureishi’s, ‘My Son the Fanatic’555 are both set within 
this social landscape of Britain. Both British authors are children of Muslim migrants to 
Britain and can therefore be considered second-generation diasporic writers. Whilst both 
authors are second-generation Britons, they are different generations from each other, but their 
works of fiction have similar themes such as issues relating to recent migrants to Britain, 
acceptance into mainstream society and being a Muslim in Britain (‘My Son the Fanatic’ deals 
with this theme more fully than Brick Lane). 
Monica Ali was born in 1967 in Dhaka, Bangladesh and moved to Britain in 1971. Her 
mother is English and father Bengali556. Hanif Kureishi was born in 1954 in Bromley, England 
and is of Pakistani origin557.  Being second-generation authors, this type of literature is
cosmopolitan in scope, reaching within and between cultural worlds. The cosmopolitan aspect 
of their writing can be seen through their reference to more than one cultural context and with 
regard to their multiple cultural affiliations (Kureishi’s being Pakistan and Britain and Ali’s 
being Bangladesh and Britain). 
Mohsin Hamid, author of The Reluctant Fundamentalist was born in 1971 in Lahore, Pakistan. 
He moved to New York at the age of eighteen to attend Princeton and later Harvard Law 
School. He worked in the corporate world in New York before returning to Pakistan as a 
journalist. His writing is cosmopolitan is scope by locating itself in more than one physical 
space. The location of place for Hamid is fluid as he converses between cultural worlds. This 
encourages a hybrid social and cultural experience. The multiple affiliations that are present in 
this cosmopolitan worldview can enhance perspective of cultural practices and traditions 
through what Turner has termed “ironic distance”558. In Turner’s view, a certain reflexive 
    
identity was seen as an alternative coping strategy for ‘at-risk’ youth who may become involved in crime and to 
gain a positive sense of self in society when confronted with xenophobia. See Kibria. Ibid. pp. 243-66.
554 Ali, M. Brick Lane. London: Doubleday. 2003.
555 Kureishi, H. ‘My Son the Fanatic’, In Love in a Blue Time. London and Boston: Faber and Faber. 1997.
556 http://www.contemporarywriters.com/authors/?p=auth03B5N513312634963
557 http://www.contemporarywriters.com/authors/?p=auth57
558Turner, B.S. Cosmopolitan Virtue, Globalization and Patriotism. Theory, Culture & Society . Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2. 
pp. 45-63. 2002.  p. 55.
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distance from one’s own culture and homeland is required to be able to respect other’s cultures 
and to view one’s own culture objectively. This cosmopolitan worldview is not limited to those 
who have multiple cultural affiliations, but is also a by-product of global cultural exchange and 
social changes associated with globalisation.  
The three pieces of contemporary writing have been selected, as each deals with the hardships 
that migrants and foreigners face with regard to difference, financial security, social and 
cultural integration (notions of being accepted by peers from the same ethnic community and 
by the wider mainstream society, dealing with racist attitudes) and of course with regard to 
religious difference. Therefore these popular fictions are pertinent to issues being dealt with in 
the West pertaining to multiculturalism, especially in the post-‘9/11’ context. They reflect the 
prominence of social issues relating to societal belonging, the hybridisation of religion, and 
issues of integration and assimilation. ‘My Son the Fanatic’ is an important short story as it was 
published four years before ‘9/11’, after which issues of multiculturalism and religion became 
prominent. Yet, although it was published in 1997, the depiction of a young Muslim 
(re)claiming his Muslim identity indicates that these issues are not entirely a post-‘9/11’ 
‘problem’. Brick Lane was published after ‘9/11’, in 2003, but before ‘7/7’. The Reluctant 
Fundamentalist was completed in the summer of 2001, but was published in 2007, after many 
re-drafts559. The story was originally formulated around the theme of a Pakistani man living in 
New York and returning to Pakistan, but no doubt took on a different form following ‘9/11’.  
This type of literature is, as Boehmer puts it: “…necessarily transplanted, displaced, multilingual, 
and simultaneously, conversant with the cultural codes of the West…”560. Although Kureishi 
and Ali are British, the literature may be viewed as within, but in a sense not fully of Britain as 
there are points of reference that relate to other cultural codes as well. This relates to Talal 
Asad’s point about Muslims who have settled in Europe, and are perceived as “in, but not of 
Europe”561 as they may not be accepted as ‘fully’ European because they lack the cultural and 
historical “civilizational essence”562 or collective identity. This attitude may of course also be a 
  
559 http://harcourtbooks.com/Reluctant_Fundamentalist/interview.asp
560 Boehmer, E. Colonial and Postcolonial Literature: Migrant Metaphors. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
2005. p. 230.
561 Asad, T. Formations of the secular: Christianity, Islam, modernity. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 2003. 
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self-perpetuating one by European Muslims, as they may also reject the historical and cultural 
heritage of Europe as their own, and are able to choose to identify with being either ‘more’ 
Muslim or ‘more’ European. But such an attitude is an essentialist one rather than a 
cosmopolitan viewpoint where one can have multiple cultural affiliations without the 
reductionist ‘either’/‘or’ attitude. Therefore viewing this type of literature as ‘not fully British’ 
points to the lack of adjustment to the multicultural character of contemporary Europe for 
both authors are British (Kureishi was born and raised in Britain and Ali is half English and 
has lived there most of her life), and this type of literature is an example and a reflection of the 
multiculturalism of contemporary Britain. What needs to be recognised is that Kureishi and 
Ali’s writing is cosmopolitan in scope as it is simultaneously conversant with cultural codes of 
both the West563 and the East. The cultural and religious heritage of these two authors is 
emphasised. The subject matter that each deals with is, in a sense, wider in scope than 
mainstream literature as they both deal with cross-cultural themes. This in turn points to a 
cosmopolitan ethic within sectors of the Muslim population, who rather than separate being 
Muslim from being British, embrace their multiple affiliations and frames of reference.
This, however is a contentious issue as it is not necessary that only migrants can write and 
inform migrant literature, as non-migrant writers can also develop and engage with cultural 
hybridity and geographical movement.564 Walkowitz’s analysis suggests that the classification of 
migrant literature should be dependent “…more on a book’s future than on a writer’s past”565. 
However, Walkowitz does concede that the writer does inform and influence the writing and 
the ways in which the book is received566. Thus, life-histories cannot be separated from the 
present and issues of authenticity, subjectivity, objectivity and exclusivity arise in the context of 
the post-colonial and transnational novel that deals with the movement of migrants between 
cultures and physical spaces. Also significant in migrant or transnational writing are issues of 
“belonging, community, and civic engagements”567, and it is evident that issues of belonging to 
more than one cultural space are realised through all three authors’ writings.  
  
563 Boehmer, E. Ibid. p. 230.
564 Walkowitz, R.L. 2006. ‘The Location of Literature: The Transnational Book and the Migrant Writer’. 
Contemporary Literature. XLVII, 4. 
565 Ibid. p. 534. 
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‘My Son the Fanatic’
The short story, ‘My Son the Fanatic’, is told from the perspective of a father (Pervez) who has 
emigrated to Britain from Pakistan, and is concerned about the well-being of his son (Ali) who 
has become more distant and secretive. He notices initially that a lot of the changes in his son’s 
behaviour are also positive ones however, such as a tidier room and the fact that his son has 
been giving away most of his possessions, even recently-acquired ones. Pervez drives a taxi, and 
has worked hard during his twenty years in Britain to ensure that his son is well taken care of 
and well-educated (his son is studying to be an accountant); he is concerned about Ali’s success 
and future happiness. Through Ali, Pervez’s “Dreams of doing well in England would have 
come true”568. The story opens with Pervez being slightly wary of his son’s silences and sharp 
tongue and his attitude that there are “more important things to be done”569. Pervez is 
reluctant to discuss his worries regarding his son with his other Punjabi taxi driver friends as he 
fears their judgement of the situation. He eventually does discuss the matter and comes to the 
conclusion with his friends that perhaps his son is taking drugs and selling his possessions to 
pay for them. Pervez also discusses his son’s behaviour with one of his regular clients, Bettina, a 
prostitute who has become Pervez’s confidante ever since he helped her out during a violent 
encounter with a client. She advises him on things to look out for in terms of Ali’s behaviour 
and physical appearance. The only physical changes that Pervez notices regarding his son are 
that he has given up cricket, swimming and football (that he used to enjoy and do well at), but 
still seems relatively healthy, has clear eyes, but has become sullen, watchful and has begun to 
grow a beard.   
Pervez discovers that his fears of criminal activity for his son are unfounded, and instead 
discovers that his son has started to pray five times a day. Pervez has avoided all religions since 
he came to Britain as his upbringing in Lahore entailed being taught the Qur’an by a Maulvi 
who tied a string to his hair to wake him up every time he fell asleep. Pervez discusses his 
discovery with his friends, who, unusually choose not to comment although they have similar 
attitudes to religion as Pervez and joke about religious leaders. Their silence suggests that they 
still respect religion and so cannot disapprove of someone who has chosen to become religious. 
  
568 Kureishi, H. ‘My Son the Fanatic’. In Love in a Blue Time. London and Boston: Faber and Faber. 1997. p. 120.  
569 Ibid. p. 119. 
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Pervez decides to talk with his son about his son’s life. Ali is initially reluctant, but eventually 
concedes to go out to a restaurant with his father. At the restaurant, Pervez orders his usual 
whiskey and water at which his son winces and questions his father about drinking alcohol. 
Pervez explains to Ali that he works hard, and that he is entitled to some form of relaxation. 
Ali seems disgusted by his father, which angers Pervez as “he wouldn’t stand for his own son 
telling him the difference between right and wrong”570. Ali says that his father had “…broken 
countless rules of the Koran.”571 An example that Ali gives is that his father also eats pork and 
makes his wife cook pork, saying to her: “You’re not in the village now, this is England. We 
have to fit in!”572. This attitude of Pervez perhaps indicates his desire to not only integrate into 
British society, but also to assimilate, or to use assimilation, and ‘being like everyone else’ as a 
reason to do as he chooses and to expect his wife to also do the same. Ali says to Pervez, “The 
problem is this…You are too implicated in Western civilization.”573. Pervez replies: “But we live 
here”574. Ali says: “The Western materialists hate us…how can you love something which hates 
you?”575 This conversation between father and son displays not only the differing generational 
attitudes between a father and son, but also the attitudes and reactions of those who are 
minorities in Britain in the wider society. For Pervez, none of the things Ali is talking about are 
concerns for him, as for him, that is just how Britain is, but for Ali, who has most likely 
encountered some type of racial abuse, religion is the way to counteract the society he does not 
feel part of. Ali states that, “The West”576 is “…a sink of hypocrites, adulterers, homosexuals, 
drug takers and prostitutes”577. He says he is following Islam’s laws and will even gladly join a 
jihad for the reward of paradise if the persecution does not stop. When asked by his father what 
influenced him to think in this way, Ali stated that it was living in Britain. Pervez says that he 
loves England, “They let you do almost anything here”578. That, for Ali, is the problem. There 
is no control of people’s behaviour. Ali finally tells Pervez that he is going to stop his education 
as “Western education cultivates an anti-religious attitude”, as in the accounting world, it is 
common “…to meet women, drink alcohol and practice usury”579. The fact that his son is 
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stopping his education is what angers Pervez the most. Pervez concedes to praying with his son 
and even begins to grow a beard (which his son does not notice). He discusses his attitudes and 
philosophy of life with his son, but his son sees enjoyment as “…a bottomless pit”580.
The story ends with Pervez driving his taxi with Bettina, his confidante next to him. They pass 
Ali on the street and give him a lift. Pervez becomes aware of Bettina’s dress, and starts to 
become nervous. Ali proceeds to insult Bettina while she is telling him how much his father 
loves him. Pervez tells Ali to get out, but Bettina ends up jumping from the moving car. Once 
they are home, Ali goes to pray. Pervez is so angry that he goes home and has a few drinks, and 
ends up kicking Ali while he is praying, and continues to hit him on the face until he is 
bleeding as “He knew that the boy was unreachable”581. Ali does not fight back or even try to 
defend himself. All he says to his father is: “So who’s the fanatic now?”582
The subtext of the short story deals with freedom with and without context, and the 
consequences from one generation to the next concerning choices made with regard to physical 
location and upbringing. It seems that for Ali, the spiritual home has replaced the notion of 
the physical home as a place for security, support and belonging. For Pervez, he enjoys life in 
Britain for what it is, but Ali has different expectations about what his life should be. Ali’s 
attitude towards the West, as a den for everything morally bad taking place, is an attitude that 
idealises other locations, as what he talks about also takes place in his father’s home of 
Pakistan. The story shows the father in a helpless situation, as what he is objecting to is 
religion, or rather, a particular expression of piety that is responded to as increasingly 
normative. Despite Pervez not being a religious man, he still has respect for religion. It is the 
central irony of the story that Pervez ends up assaulting his praying son while he is drunk. The 
father’s response reinforces the son’s claim of dislocation and piety. Pervez’s intolerance to 
Ali’s religiosity may reinforce Ali’s ability to take the ‘high road’ and view his expression of 
religion as superior. It is interesting to note that Ali’s expression of religiosity is in a sense 
mutually exclusive to (mainstream) society. Activities that have seemingly little to do with 
religion, such as playing sport, are renounced. Not only has Ali taken to praying, but has also 
become ‘visibly’ religious by growing a beard, which is an outward and public expression of his 
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newfound religious identity. This act indicates that for Ali, the revivalist Muslim identity is not 
merely an internal change, but with it comes a necessary outward performance of faith.      
Brick Lane
Brick Lane has been described as a work of realist fiction583 that has a postcolonial story and 
deals with issues of immigration and multiculturalism. Ideas of double belonging, integration, 
assimilation, culture in terms of language, dress and issues of authenticity are all dealt with. 
This can be considered reflective of “Britain’s new hybrid society”584. Issues of migration dealt 
with in Brick Lane can be considered in terms of immigrant subjectivity, that is, through both 
narration in the novel and the central character, Nazneen. The (paradoxical) roles that 
individuals play within particular cultural and social contexts are exemplified through 
Nazneen’s relationships with Chanu, her husband, and Karim, her lover. These relationships 
signify “...the double bind that female migrants face, treated as alien by their host nation and as 
commodities by the men in their own communities.”585 Nazneen is bound to the realm of 
domesticity and is considered on the peripheries of mainstream society that she comes to enter 
into in Tower Hamlets. Nazneen is both the object and subject of the discourse. She is 
objectified in relation to her marriage arranged by her father in Bangladesh and is the subject 
of the narrative not only in personal terms, but also acts as a character reflective and “...policed 
by the pedagogic narration of her origin”586.           
   
Brick Lane revolves around the fate and personal agency of Nazneen as experienced through her 
relationships with her Chanu, her husband, and later through her young Bangladeshi-British 
lover in England, Karim. 
Nazneen was born in a village in East Pakistan in 1967. It was a difficult birth following which 
her parents had to make the choice of whether to take the baby to the hospital, a great distance 
away, or to leave her survival up to Fate. Nazneen was reminded of this story as she got older, 
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especially the wisdom of her mother’s choice to leave her life up to Fate. She learned at a young 
age that “What could not be changed must be borne and since nothing could be changed, 
everything had to be borne.”587 This notion of accepting all that cannot be changed is reflective 
of fatalism that may be related to religion. 
Although Brick Lane begins as a fatalist narrative, the reader is aware by the narration at the 
start that through the novel, Nazneen’s identity will be re-formed, from an identity based on a 
lack of autonomy, as control over her life is not in her hands, to an autonomous identity, 
“...when for the first time she could not wait for the future to be revealed but had to make it 
for herself, she was startled by her own agency”588.    
Nazneen is married off at the age of eighteen to Chanu, a Bangladeshi man who lives in Tower 
Hamlets, a block of low-cost housing flats, in East London. Following her move from 
Bangladesh to Britain, Nazneen is faced with issues involving what her husband Chanu 
describes as “the immigrants’ dilemma”589, involving issues of assimilation, rather than 
integration, counteracting xenophobia and re-negotiating identity in a new place. 
The immigrants’ dilemma is discussed with Mrs Azad (wife of Chanu’s friend, Dr Azad), an 
assimilated Bangladeshi who regards assimilation, especially amongst her daughter’s generation 
as inevitable. Chanu states that “To be an immigrant is to live out a tragedy.”590 He continues 
that the tragedy of the immigrant is the clash of values, alienation, racism and “...the struggle to 
assimilate and the need to preserve one’s identity and heritage...children who don’t know what 
their identity is [and] the struggle to preserve one’s sanity while striving to achieve the best for 
one’s family.”591 Mrs Azad’s response is that assimilation is inevitable. She drinks alcohol and 
Chanu has a drink with her. About this, he pontificates, “...it’s part of the culture here...Back 
home, if you drink you risk being an outcast. In London, if you don’t drink you risk the same 
thing”592. For both Chanu and Mrs Azad, culture is treated as monolithic and unchanging. 
While Mrs Azad talks about the benefits of assimilation, she chides those that do not 
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assimilate, such as Nazneen. Rather than considering integration, by continuing cultural 
markers that one may find value in, Mrs Azad relates fixed positions, such as “...when I’m in 
Bangladesh I put on a sari and cover my head all that. But here I go out to work. I work with 
white girls and I’m just one of them”593. Clearly, Mrs Azad is not ‘one of them’ due to her ethnic 
heritage, and by relaying that she covers her hair in Bangladesh and goes to work in England, 
these points of view are considered to be mutually exclusive, which reflects her fixed position in 
relation to culture. 
As well as discussing the ‘immigrant’s dilemma’, Chanu also talks of the“...Going Home 
Syndrome” amongst other Bangladeshis. He describes them as “...basically 
peasants...[who]...miss the land...They don’t ever really leave home...[they are]...just recreating 
the villages here.”594 Ironically, it is who Chanu also moves back to Bangladesh (without 
Nazneen and their daughters) at the end of the novel due to the problems that he faces of 
attempting to assimilate into British society.
Chanu struggles with idealised notions of both Bangladesh, through his continual recitation of 
the Bengali poet Tagore’s poetry, (which he teaches to his disinterested daughters in order for 
them to know their roots) and his life in Britain, where he struggles to find his place within 
society. Although Chanu and Nazneen live in Tower Hamlets which has a large Bangladeshi 
community, Chanu constantly considers how different he is to the others, with regard to his 
education and prospects. He resigns from a good job that he holds in the Council as he was 
passed over for a promotion, and eventually becomes a taxi driver. 
The issues of immigration and assimilation are dealt with and are reflected through his 
relationship to Nazneen, whom he does not want to learn English (as he says she does not need 
to learn it), although he considers himself to be open-minded and educated. Intergenerational 
struggles are exemplified through his relationship with his daughters, to whom he constantly 
talks about Bangladesh, about ‘fitting in’ and about not being accepted by society. This 
contradiction and confusion is again reflected through clothing, when some days Chanu tells 
his daughters they must wear trousers under their school uniform (as a sign of modesty), and at 
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other times he questions them for doing so and berates them for not fitting in. What is 
reflected through these contradictions are Chanu’s own cultural confusion relating to his place 
in relation to mainstream British society, the Bangladeshi community they live amongst and his 
ideas of Bangladesh as home. For him, Bangladesh takes on a mythical status, a type of 
reimagined homeland, but for Nazneen, she is aware of the hardships experienced in 
Bangladesh exemplified through her sister’s letters from Bangladesh.    
Nazneen begins an affair with Karim, a younger man who brings clothes to her to be repaired. 
For Nazneen Karim represents a world outside of her experiences of individual and collective 
identity595. He is at home in England; this is displayed through his Western dress and speaking 
English. Nazneen and Karim idealise each other as authentic inhabitants of their respective 
worlds. Karim sees Nazneen as “the real thing”596, representing to Karim, “[a]n idea of home. 
An idea of himself that he found in her.” For Nazneen, Karim was patched together. Karim 
wants to marry Nazneen, but she refuses, saying, “I wasn’t me and you weren’t you. From the 
very beginning to the very end, we didn’t see things. What we did – we made each other up.”597
 
Religion is dealt with implicitly by most of the characters in the novel. Chanu is not religious 
and does not pray. For Nazneen however, Islam and the Qur’an are familiar, they symbolise 
and represent security. She takes comfort in the Arabic words (although she does not 
understand them) and finds solace in prayer in providing structure to her days. At the 
beginning of the novel, when Nazneen is nervous in having a friend of Chanu’s over to the 
house for dinner, she selects a page at random from the Qur’an and reads a verse: “The words 
calmed her stomach and she was pleased. Even Dr Azad was nothing as to God...She was 
composed...Nothing could bother her. Only God, if he chose to.”598
For Karim, the assertion of a religious identity incites the re-claiming of a sense of self. Karim’s 
sense of religion is hybridised. He receives salat or prayer alerts via his mobile phone. Karim 
also finds ‘authentic’ (and collective) identity through his relationship to political religion. In 
response to literature and graffiti around the flats with anti-Bengali rhetoric, he creates the 
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596 Ali, M. Ibid. p. 454.
597 Ibid. pp. 454-5.
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‘Bengal Tigers’, a religious community group “...open to all Muslims”599. Much of the first 
meeting (which Nazneen also attends as an observer) is taken up by discussion of what to name 
the group. Leaflets are distributed about violence in Chechnya and Palestine. There is a 
continual ‘war of leaflets’ between those that are against the multiculturalism of Britain (such 
as ‘white’ supremacist groups) and those who are pro-Islam. This angers Chanu who sometimes 
takes the side of the Bengal Tigers, and at other time strongly disapproves of them. After three 
months of the continual leaflet drop off at the flats, Chanu is angered by a leaflet in praise of a 
martyr. He says: “Are they mad? Poking these mad letters through white people’s doors. Do 
they want to set flame to the whole place? Do they want us all to die shaheed600?”601 However, 
later in the novel, Karim begins to perform his religious identity through a change of dress. 
While after ‘9/11’, some Bangladeshi parents told their daughters to remove their headscarves, 
Karim removed his gold necklace, jeans and t-shirt and instead wore “punjabi-pyjama and a 
skullcap”602. As in ‘My Son the Fanatic’, the young man also performs his identity through the 
utilisation of dress. As well as dressing in ‘authentic’ Bangladeshi clothing to accentuate his 
difference, it is just as important to consider the type of clothing that he is replacing and what 
these signify for him. The jeans and t-shirt reflect conformity to mainstream society, and the 
gold necklace a sign of material excess. Against such overt ‘conformity’; the turn to the neo-
revivalist religious identity in this way necessitates public expression, public display and public 
performance of religious identity.     
The Reluctant Fundamentalist 
The Reluctant Fundamentalist603 is another important work of fiction for this study as it deals 
with a Muslim in the context of the United States, engaging with issues pertaining to living as a 
foreigner. The premise of the novel is of a Pakistani Muslim man who despite having a secure 
professional career, decides to leave his job in New York and return to Pakistan. The issues that 
come up in this work are primarily social (dealing with his place in New York society before 
and after ‘9/11’) and economic (in relation to professional success), in comparison to the 
British writing, and especially ‘My Son the Fanatic’, religion is only secondary.
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601 Ali. Ibid. p. 275.
602 Ibid. p. 376.
603 Hamid, M. The Reluctant Fundamentalist. London; New York: Hamish Hamilton. 2007.
122
This work of contemporary literature deals with issues relating to the Muslim diaspora in the 
United States. The novel is set between New York and Lahore, Pakistan and deals with issues 
of identity faced by the central character Changez, who was born in Pakistan and educated in 
the United States. A reflective look at Changez’s experiences in the United States before and 
after ‘9/11’, the book is retold in a narrative monologue style to an American stranger at a 
restaurant in Lahore. The emphasis, rather than being alienation, is disenchantment primarily 
relating to the type of person that Changez is becoming due to his economic successes. 
Although he came from an upper middle-class background, Changez goes to Princeton on a 
scholarship. At his interview with a corporate firm following his graduation, his future boss 
recognises Changez’s ambition to succeed. The personal (internal pressures) and political 
(external pressures) are intertwined to present Changez’s story of living in New York. Due to 
the cosmopolitan nature of the city, Changez asserts “I was, in four and a half years, never an 
American; I was immediately a New Yorker.”604 Changez was at home in the city. Much of the 
narrative revolves around his infatuation with Erica, who can be seen as a representative of elite 
Manhattan society that Changez came to socialise with. Yet even prior to ‘9/11’, when 
Changez’s country of origin was brought up, he experienced some negative and condescending 
reactions pertaining to fundamentalism in Pakistan. 
Changez travelled to Manila on a business trip, and it was there that his behaviour began to 
change. His impression of Manila, as a successful developing country, “with a glittering 
skyline”605 elicited a comparison to Lahore or Karachi in Pakistan. Changez narrates, “...it was 
one thing to accept that New York was more wealthy than Lahore, but quite another to 
swallow the fact that Manila was as well.”606 This comment is reflective of the beginnings of an 
inferiority complex and, due to the respect the Filipinos gave his American colleagues, 
Changez, “...attempted to act and speak, as much as my dignity would permit, more like an 
American”607. This attempt at assimilating into American culture was an attempt to become ‘just 
like them’ in order to be treated as such. As well as feelings of inferiority, his values are also 
clouded by ‘capitalist superiority’ and to be respected for his professional position.
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Changez “learned to tell executives [his] father’s age, ‘I need it now’”608. Whilst he felt ashamed 
for changing his behaviour so dramatically, he continued to do so, but didn’t let this show 
publicly. Whilst still in the Philippines, travelling with an American colleague in a limousine, 
the Filipino driver looked at him with a hostile stare. Changez later tried to rationalise this, but 
nevertheless it upset him and he concluded that he and the driver “...shared a sort of ‘Third 
World’ sensibility”609, regarding perhaps jealousy of his success. During the same trip, with the 
American colleague, Changez had the thought that the American was so “foreign”610, and that 
Changez was “play-acting”. He therefore felt closer to the Filipino driver than his own 
colleague. This reflected his feeling uncomfortable with his successful position in society. 
The events of ‘9/11’ took place whilst he was in Manila, and after seeing the Twin Towers 
collapsing, Changez “smiled”611. Instead of thinking of the victims, Changez smiled at the idea 
of the symbolic collapse of America, although he had become successful in America. What 
reinforced this change of attitude was that, at the airport leaving Manila, Changez was taken 
into a separate room by security to be searched. He “flew to New York uncomfortable in [his] own 
face:..was aware of being under suspicion...[and] felt guilty”612. Arriving in New York, Changez 
was again detained. On his return, America was in mourning. He ignored rumours he heard 
about Muslims being attacked, and tried to carry on life as normal, preventing himself from 
connecting “...the crumbling of the world around [him] and the impending destruction of [his] 
personal American dream”613. 
Worried about Pakistan and his family, Changez travelled to Lahore to visit his family, and 
while he was there grew a beard. Before travelling back to the United States, he did not shave it 
off “...perhaps, a form of protest...a symbol of...identity”614 or as a reminder of the home he left 
behind in Lahore. After he went back to work in New York, he received negative reactions to 
his beard, but still did not shave it, which reflects his growing defiance to being regarded with 
suspicion in the post-‘9/11’ society. The growing of his beard, (which Changez still has at the 
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end of the novel) may be perceived as either, an act of defiance or a symbol of religious 
expression (or indeed both). Religion is implicit in the novel despite its title, which may be a 
deliberate reflection of social conditions being more important than a religious ‘pull’ in the 
development of a revivalist religious identity. 
Whilst on another business trip, this time to Chile, rather than focusing on work, Changez was 
preoccupied with politics and being in a new environment. At the risk of being fired, (which he 
later was) he left Chile two weeks before schedule and returned to New York. Following this 
Changez returned to Pakistan but remained emotionally tied to Erica in New York. He took a 
position as a university lecturer and instigated demonstrations for Pakistan’s autonomy in 
international affairs, that came to be seen as anti-American615. He received warnings for violent 
encounters that broke out, and at the end of the novel attempts to live a normal life despite
“being plagued by paranoia”616. The novel ends with mutual suspicion as Changez says to the 
American tourist “...you should not imagine that we Pakistanis are all potential terrorists, just 
as we should not imagine that you Americans are all undercover assassins.”617 Changez leaves 
the un-named American tourist at his hotel, and after extending his hand for a handshake, sees 
metal shining as the American reaches into his pocket. Changez assumes it is a business card 
holder618, and the ending is left open, so that the reader, after being presented with the post-
‘9/11’ context of suspicion and distrust between Americans and the Pakistani, can choose the 
ending accordingly.
The protagonist and narrator of the story, Changez, soliloquises to the American tourist to 
whom he relates his story to in Lahore. The ending of the novel is left open, but it is clear that 
they “mirror...[each other’s] mutual suspicion”. The narrator, from Pakistan, acts as a 
representative of the Muslim world, and the un-named tourist is representative of America. 
Hamid’s writing is reflective of both the US and Pakistani contexts and relates the 
contradictory positions felt by a foreigner relating to issues of up-ward mobility and 
professional success in America and living the “personal American dream”619. The novel 
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emphasises that there are multiple perspectives in any one narrative and in this way seeks to 
portray our shared humanity and empathy620.
The form of the novel invites the reader to act as a judge. It is simultaneously sympathetic to 
both the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds, and as Hamid asserts in an interview: “I hope that 
readers will feel my affection and see that my intent is not to gloss over the very real pain of 
September 11 but rather to reconnect parts of my world, and myself, that have grown increasingly 
divided”621. 
Connections and reconnections are both enhanced through media-space. Techo-medias have 
enabled hyperconnectivity and polyphonic communication; globalisation and the media are 
thus significant for facilitating dialogue. 
4.2 Globalisation and the media 
Mass media, increasing globalisation and the hybridisation of culture (and arguably the 
hybridisation of religion622 as well) are features of post- or late modernity. As mentioned in 
chapter 1, due to secular Western thought, religion is no longer a singular authority relating to 
the organisation of everyday life. The postmodern turn enabled the spiritual to re-enter society 
due to the multiple ‘truths’ that people may associate with. These multiple truths, with a move 
towards “hybridity, eclecticism and pluralism”623, may have been perceived by individuals as a 
loss of meaning in the contemporary world. The recent post-secular turn reflects the realisation 
of this continued significance of religion in contemporary society, and religious ideologies may 
be utilised by individuals to counter the perceived loss of meaning.   
The rapidity, intensity and scope of mass-technological medias have impacted many areas of 
social life, including religion in ways such as how religion can be perceived, spread, localised 
and globalised. Neofundamentalism, the global jihad and the neo-revivalist Muslim identity can 
be seen in one way as examples of the reflexive self that critiques contemporary society. In a 
  
620 harcourtbooks.com/Reluctant_Fundamentalist/interview.asp  
621 Ibid. 
622 This hybridisation is reflected in the growth of sectarian religious groups. 
623 Bennett, C. 2005. Muslims and Modernity: An Introduction to the issues and debates. London; New York: 
Continuum. 2005. p. 28. 
126
world of multiple truths and authorities, a singular overarching authority624 may be sought in 
opposition to, and through rejection of, the dominant worldview of postmodernity, that 
arguably favours no singularity625. Discontent with the social order has been reflected in the 
turn to a collective consciousness of religion. Mass media and globalisation have widened the 
scope of the public influence of religion in a world where global ideologies can be localised and 
localised ideologies can be spread globally.
In the contemporary globalised world, religions are able to transcend the nation-state through 
technological processes and the place of nation changes from universal to particular when put 
in a global context. In this way it is the global context that becomes paramount; interactions on 
the global stage override local issues as the site of metaphysical struggles for religious 
supremacy. The world is interconnected as never before and it can no longer be said that there 
is a separation between the West and non-West (or Muslim-majority countries and non-Muslim 
majority countries) as techno-mediation transcends these divisions. The formation of 
individual and collective identities are influenced by this global collectedness, as the nation-
state no longer holds centrality or primary legitimacy, such that “[n]ational identity now 
becomes one ‘difference’ among others”626, rather than being the difference among others. 
Individuals and social groups can be and are connected beyond time and space through 
ideologies, such as religion, that bind them together. In this way, religion has become a social 
force which enables it to be legitimised in its own right (rather than being viewed in opposition 
to some other social force). Therefore, religion has the capacity to lead the new ‘collective 
consciousness’. Religious discourse is facilitated by communication technologies which enables 
religious literature to be spread freely, and ‘new’ self-proclaimed religious authorities may form 
in this arena627. Religion and the voices of individual religious authorities are transmitted 
through the mass media, such that, “European-born, self-taught intellectuals and telepreachers 
confirm the loss of monopoly by the religious authorities linked to mosques, and fuel the 
diversity of a religious offer...appropriate to the individualization of belief”628. 
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Muslims and mediated technologies
Technology and more specifically, the internet has become an important tool in the re-
imagining of the Muslim ummah and in one sense acts as a catalyst for the realisation of 
supranational connectedness. This collective consciousness, defined in terms of religious 
commonality, has been allowed to manifest extraterritorially and in many ways is expressed and 
understood in hyper-real terms. Individuals are able to be instantly connected with a 
multiplicity of ideologies and ‘new’ forms of authority that are able to claim their authority, not 
through ‘real’ physical presence but through claims of ‘authentic’ geographical location629. This 
may relate in various ways to an individual’s emotional needs of belonging as part of a 
community, to acceptance (that may be unconditional in terms of being Muslim through 
descent or of course through conversion), and also in terms of action, of how to be and act in 
the contemporary (secularised630) late modern world whilst still claiming a religious, and more 
specifically, a Muslim identity. 
In the technologically-connected world of today, community is no longer restricted to physical 
presence. Whilst the physical community will always provide a backdrop for members and non-
members to work with or against each other, participation and allegiances are no longer 
restrictive and controlled. Cyber-communities are an example of this. Globalisation is not a 
single process, “but a complex mix of processes”631 that may often appear to contradict one 
another. The utilisation of techno-global forces, such as the internet, by religious groups that 
are perceived as traditional could be viewed as ironic but in fact demonstrates that sectarian 
religious groups that utilise technology are necessarily a product of contemporary times632. 
Therefore cyber communities may act as a catalyst for the realisation of the ummah through 
online khutbas or sermons, and what Bunt633 has termed ‘E-jihad, ‘Online Fatwas’ and ‘Cyber 
Islamic Environments’. Such techno-mediation enables globalised and personalised expressions 
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of religion that respond to the notion of the global ummah. In this sense, the e-jihad has 
enabled a virtual religare. 
The virtual location of mediated technologies enables a space for new individualised religious 
authoritative figures to be located within, and be made virtually (omni)present in their 
transcendence of time, place and cultural space. Through websites, individuals may act as 
authorities, who themselves, “...may not be recognised within national geopolitical borders, 
and at times can even be ostracised”634 within Muslim countries as their views may be deemed 
contrary to the official religious position of the State. The majority of these websites that reflect 
diverse religious authority have been written in English, but following ‘9/11’, there has been a 
“profusion of Arabic and other language content”635 websites. In this way, the internet enables 
individual and minority views of religion to be made globally public and acts as a “safe zone”636
for this interaction. An interactive dialogue can now take place “between Muslims living in 
minority and majority settings, which in some cases augment or supersede”637 transnational 
and traditional ways of networking. However, as the internet is not easily available to all 
individuals in Muslim nations, there is a “digital divide” as the voices that represent Muslim 
countries are of those who have access to the internet, most likely those who are educated, 
elite, or those who can afford it638. Due to issues of censorship or security, the online 
environment makes possible the expression, dialogue and personalisation of (radical) ideas that 
may not be able to be voiced in other environments.     
In the Muslim experience, cyber-communities are not the only alternative form of transnational 
community, as the notion of the transnational ummah has existed since the emergence of Islam, 
globally connecting Muslims together on faith terms. However, it may be argued that as 
technology and the world of visual imagery has become prominent, the transnational ummah
has become hyper-real. Televised images of war-torn Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq have 
enabled a sense of visual connectedness amongst many Muslims and confrontations that may 
not be everyday occurrences are enabled to be conceived of as the norm and as everyday 
occurrences. These visual images elicit an emotional response, such that those who may be 
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conceived of as being financially better off by living in the West, may feel some pull of 
responsibility (because of their privileged Western positions) and feel the need to act in some 
way. 
The global made local and the local made global 
Globalisation is defined as “action across distance”639. It is a result of the transformation of space 
and time which has led to the “intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant 
localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away 
and vice versa”640. When considering notions of ‘othering’ and ‘self-othering’, it is important to 
take into account media representations of minority issues in a given society. The primary goal 
of media is information and news but, viewed on a deeper level, it can be perceived as a site of 
contestation641, continually in a state of flux between forming, informing and re-forming 
perceptions relating to ethno-national, socio-religious and global consciousnesses. Such 
technologies, “…construct images, text and sounds that mediate relations within specific 
communities, but also mediate connections among fellow members of diasporas and 
communication between different cultural groups and individuals in local, national and 
transnational spaces.”642 This reflects the salience of the mass media in enabling connectivity by 
reinforcing subjective paradigms and viewpoints whilst simultaneously presenting relativistic 
heterogeneous truth claims by attaching different levels of meaning to the same event. 
It is significant to note that due to the global and mediated spread of information, there is no 
conceptual divide in this sense between East and West (such that what occurs on a local level 
can instantly make global news). Inversely, in the globalised age, world issues are also enabled 
to become localised, and in this way made ‘glocal’643.  There is a global audience of local events 
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in the re-making of the global into a local issue, and in this way, the media may be 
‘glocalised’644. 
Muslims and the media
The plethora of ‘glocalised’ mediated texts645 enables a plurality of truth claims to be prioritised 
in subjective terms646. Through globalisation, the media has become increasingly mobilised and 
transnational, it transcends time, national and cultural space, and geographical location. Thus, 
“[t]ransnational media become outlets and means for transporting and translating ideologies 
and cultural repertoires beyond bounded physical places”647. The visual image has become a site 
of perceived authenticity and is re-located to the realm of the hyper-real.  
Considering the relationship between the media and Muslim communities in France, Colin 
notes that “unlike the situation in English-speaking countries and Spain, there is a notable 
absence of media in France dealing with Muslim issues”648. Colin notes that the reason may be 
two fold. Firstly, “…very few Muslims intellectuals migrated to France”649, and secondly, earlier 
generations of Muslims in France “…were more likely to see themselves as foreign workers than 
belonging to a category called ‘Muslims’.”650 A variety of Muslim community magazines and 
newspapers did emerge in the late 1990s, but it is interesting to note that these community 
publications did not appear until the third generation. These publications did not last however 
(despite the sizeable population in France of six million Muslims), one reason being a lack of 
investment from commercial advertisers due to the content that dealt with Muslim issues651 . 
According to Colin, the mainstream French media does not specifically deal with “social and 
cultural realities”652 relating to Muslims in France, but when Islam is reported, it is in the 
context of issues of security, such as terrorism. By disregarding a sizeable proportion of the 
population (10 percent of which are Muslim), this points to the perception and attitude of 
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Muslims being situated ‘out there’ rather than as a part of French and European society653. 
Thus, whilst the dominant mass media may not have ‘space’ for French-speaking Muslims, 
other independent mediated technologies have enabled ‘new’ sites for information flow. 
SaphirNew.com is one such internet site aimed at French-speaking Muslims. It is a news 
medium existing outside of the mainstream and deals with Muslim community information 
and issues.
Mediatisation: Muslims  
On the 30th of September 2005, Flemming Rose published cartoons in the Danish newspaper 
Jyllands-Posten depicting the Prophet Muhammad in a negative light. This became known as the 
‘cartoon controversy’. The protests and boycott of Danish goods in Muslim countries made it 
clear that the satirical depiction of the revered Prophet was unacceptable to a sizeable 
proportion of the world. The publisher defended his rights to publish the cartoons and stated 
that he was aiming to put Muslims on an equal footing by satirising their religion654, and in this 
way was being inclusive. Rose states: “You are not strangers, you are here to stay, and we accept 
you as an integrated part of our life. And we will satirize you, too”655. Clearly within the West 
however, Muslims are a minority, so following this, they are not on an equal footing. This is 
not to say that minorities should be given special treatment, just that to avoid conflict and 
offense, it would be useful to have some degree of universal standards in depicting specific 
things that people hold sacred. By the West insisting on freedom of speech and expression that 
is not relativistic, it itself is acting from an intolerant ideology that disrespects the viewpoint of 
others that do not agree with their freedoms. This notion that ‘our values are more important 
than theirs’ can lead to the perception of  hegemonic global news networks acting this out 
through ‘liberal freedoms’. The question to be asked is: Who are these freedoms benefiting?  
The Muhammad cartoon controversy in 2005 is another such example of the globalised effects 
of local issues. Initially published by Jyllands-Posten, as a critique of Muslims, the publishing of 
the Danish Cartoons (and republishing of these cartoons in some European countries as a 
show of solidarity and defence of the rights to free speech) of these cartons elicited a (violent) 
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response by a very visible mass of protesters in countries such as Pakistan who considered the 
cartoons to be intentionally insulting. The timing of these cartoons should especially be 
considered in the post-‘9/11’ world. The first reactionary demonstration came from the West 
Bank on 30 January 2006 where Danish flags were burned656. The Danish cartoons were 
reprinted in Denmark in February 2008. The response to this came in June 2008 when a car 
bomb exploded outside of the Danish embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan657. 
With regard to the response of violence, it should be remembered that those who respond 
violently are a small minority of much larger populations. Without context these protesters 
may appear to be a critical mass, due to the visual impact of their responses and also due to the 
media attention that they receive658, but in relation to the population as a whole, they are a 
minority. The protests are reflective of the utilisation of the media (intentionally and 
unintentionally)  as a tool for presenting alternative and reactionary viewpoints, but, with this 
mediation comes positioning, the presentation of events, and the re-presentation in accordance 
with time, place and circumstance of publication. 
Pope Benedict’s speech in September 2006 is a further example of the essentialisation of Islam 
and the West or Islam and Christianity. Rather than engaging through dialogue with the issues 
of violence and religion that were brought forth in Benedict’s speech, it was the reaction that 
was focussed on, both in the West and non-West. Many Muslims that protested against the 
Danish Cartoons and also the Pope’s speech may not necessarily have had first-hand knowledge 
of these publications659 as primary sources but may have been informed by others angered by 
these negative depictions and portrayal of Islam. However, the (violent) reactions such as the 
car bomb outside the Danish embassy in Pakistan, may reinforce the perception of Islam as 
inherently violent, rather than the emphasis being on the violent expression of a small 
minority. These notions of self and other between Muslim counties and Western countries is 
essentialised on both sides and in this way are self-perpetuating.
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The utilisation of the media as a tool in the ‘global jihad’
The globalised world in which we live enables instantaneous communication across and 
between time and space. Mediated technologies660 are utilised by global jihadis which shows this 
neofundamentalist and neo-revivalist Muslim identity (that aims at locating within the Islamic 
collective) is necessarily a product of the contemporary globalised world. The ideals reflect a 
progressive (in terms of wanting change) and alternative modernity, not secular but religious 
and Islamic. Rather than an attempt to re-create some mythical past, they desire a utopian 
present, one in which Islam is respected, taken seriously and seen as viable (and visible) in the 
twenty-first century. 
Western theorists Baudrillard661, Zizek662 and Devji663 all consider the jihadis’ use of media and 
technology through the primacy of the ‘spectacle’, that is, by orchestrating an event such as 
‘9/11’ through which audience participation is enabled by the media. The audience is a 
significant part of the spectacle, through the “collective witnessing” of events such as 
martyrdom, and according to Devji, “this martyrdom achieves meaning only by being witnessed in 
the mass media”664 and as such, the jihad has “...as much to do with the nature of mass media as 
it does with anything Islamic”665. In this way the media spectacle is an end in itself. It enables 
the continuity of the spectacle beyond the death of any individual. Visual images have a 
significant impact on global audiences and (used on all ‘sides’ of the ideological divide) it is 
these pictorial images that come to present, re-present, make present and make ‘real’ religio-
political ideologies, shown through spectacles such as ‘9/11’. Dramatic visual attention and 
global publicity is sought by jihadis to gain exposure for their cause through the media and 
following this, an audience is important in changing acts of violence into performance666.
  
660 Communication medias, such as audio cassettes, radio, television, video, DVDs, mobile and satellite phones 
and the Internet.     
661 Baudrillard, T. The Spirit of Terrorism and other Essays. London; New York: Verso. 2002.
662 Zizek, S. Welcome to the Desert of the Real!: Five Essays on September 11 and related dates. London; New York: Verso. 
2002.
663 Devji, F.  Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity. London: Hurst & Company. 2005.
664 Ibid. p. 94. My italics. 
665 Ibid. p. 99.
666 Kellner, D. From 9/11 To Terror War: The Dangers of The Bush Legacy. Lanham; Boulder; New York; Oxford: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2003. p. 53; McTernan, O. Violence in God’s Name: Religion in an Age of 
Conflict. New York; London: Orbis Books. 2003. p. 34.
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Considering ‘9/11’, Zizek states that there was an entrance into reality of a “fantasmatic screen 
apparition”667. Baudrillard considers that these attacks reflected a kind of de-ja vu. Due to the 
genres of films (such as disaster movies) and vicarious or real violence in popular culture, there 
was an expectation that some type of dramatic and violent event would take place; “[t]he West, 
in the position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), has become 
suicidal, and declared war on itself.”668 Due to the contemporary preoccupation with the visual, 
lines have been blurred between fantasy and reality. The events of ‘9/11’ have reorganised 
these vague boundaries and de-sensitisation to violence has been re-organised by its re-
awakening in popular culture.       
Islam is made ‘real’ by the global jihadis through a ‘spectacle’ such as ‘suicide bombing’. This 
spectacle reflects the response of ‘terrorists’ to the “demand for reality”669. The techno-
mediation of “virtual space”670 has allowed the jihad visual prominence671 whereby the jihad is 
universalised through the mass media and is made uniform and coherent. Devji states: “[a]s a 
series of global effects the jihad is more a product of the media than it is of any local tradition 
or situation and school or lineage or Muslim authority”672. This is reflected in one way through 
external mediatisation as the “...landscapes of the jihad receive more airtime than any other 
object identified with Islam”, and thus through mediation and mediatisation, Islam is made 
universal through the jihad and the relationship between the two becomes blurred so they may 
incorrectly be deemed synonymous with each other673. The depiction of ruins, caves and 
battlefields have become ‘new’ visual and visible sites of global Islam that have displaced 
shrines and holy cities674. Through the broadcasting of these images by satellite television 
networks, the jihad and Islam are reduced to a “state of immediacy”. There are no 
particularities, or life histories of those engaging in ‘battle’, just Islam portrayed as the 
overarching thread. 
  
667 Zizek, S. Welcome to the Desert of the Real!: Five Essays on September 11 and related dates. London; New York: Verso. 
2002. p. 16.
668 Baudrillard, T. The Spirit of Terrorism and other Essays. London; New York: Verso. 2002. p. 7.
669 Ibid. p. 76.
670 Ibid. p. 92.
671 Devji, F.  Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity. London: Hurst & Company. 2005. p. 93.
672 Devji. Ibid.  p. 87.
673 Ibid. pp. 93-4.
674 Ibid. p. 92.
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Manichean dualisms such as us/them, good/evil, ally/enemy circulate widely in the mass 
media. Although there is a seemingly infinite number of multi-mediated official (and 
unofficial) news organisations, they must be critically assessed as each has its own agenda (be it 
Al Arabiya or Fox News) and its own method of gate-keeping. The reflexive self should seek out 
discourse that is not essentialised or commodified or dealt with as an object. Instead a more 
subject-centred discourse should be sought out which displays events in all their humanity. 
This will enable us to critically differentiate reality from opinion.    
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Conclusion
This thesis began with the working title: ‘The recourse to religious extremism as a form of ‘self-
othering’. As the research was undertaken, it became clear that the initial title was too limited  
and limiting and whilst there had been ‘homegrown terrorism’ in Britain (7/7) where the 
‘terrorists’ were born and bred in Britain, this was not enough to say that this had become a 
‘phenomenon’. What did become clear through the research was that following ‘9/11’ some 
second- and third- generation diaspora Muslims were (re)claiming their Muslim identities and, 
through their hermeneutics locating themselves within the context of the wider ‘Islamic’ 
Ummah. This now, for them became the locus for an ‘authentic’ and ‘real’ normative Islam, 
because the religious practice of their parents was seen as too steeped in culture, and not 
spiritual enough. What these young Muslims came to see as authentic was personal religiosity 
necessarily enacted in the public realm of society. This emphasis on the personalisation of 
religion is read through Giddens’ notion of the late modern project of the reflexive self675. Such
religiosity was identified as reactionary to Western society (and the current geopolitic) by 
developing Hook’s ‘new failure of nerve’676 to a contemporary failure of nerve. As the 
individual and society share a symbiotic relationship where one impacts upon the other, this 
contemporary failure of nerve is necessarily a product of time, place and circumstance, and in 
this way, is a reaction ‘of’ and from the West. As they are located within the West, neo-
revivalism can be seen as a self-critique by Western Muslims to and of their (real or perceived) 
positions in society. Neo-revivalists self-other not only to their perceptions of how Western 
society responds to them, but also self-other to the culturally-clothed religion of the generation 
of their parents. 
In considering diaspora Muslims as migrants, Herberg’s study, Protestant Catholic Jew677, was re-
developed by analysing the turn ‘back’ to religion by third-generation migrants, and applying it 
to the turn ‘towards’ a new religiosity located in and reinforced by the reified notion of the 
supranational ummah. The ummah, rather than being created by the ‘deterritorialisation’ of 
  
675 Giddens, A. Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
1991.
676 Hook, S. ‘The New Failure of Nerve’. The Partisan Review. Vol. X, No. 1. January-February 1943. pp. 2-23. 
677 Herberg, W. Protestant-Catholic-Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology. Garden City, New York: 
Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1955.
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Islam, as Roy proposed678, has been enabled to become realised (as the Ummah by definition has 
always been extraterritorial) through mass migration and globalisation. This hyperconnectivity 
of Muslims has been facilitated by techno-mediation and new self-proclaimed authorities (due 
to the lack of a singular supreme authority in Islam, besides God) now have a virtual and 
interactive global audience. Following this, religion in general, and Islam in particular, due to 
the dialectic between the global and local, is now very much globalised, re-localised and made 
‘glocal’679. 
The essentialisation of Islam and Muslims, as seen through Huntington’s ‘Clash of 
Civilizations’680 thesis is ineffectual and counterproductive to a peaceful co-existence between 
the West and Islam and has implications for the enactment of the Islamic identity by Muslims. 
Essentialisation takes a reductionist approach, by identifying a specific example or encounter 
and generalising this as the norm. Neo-revivalists respond to such essentialisation and 
‘racialization’681 of Islam and Muslims, and through their particular hermeneutics, react to this by 
performing their religious identities in a political fashion. This politicisation of religion may 
have implications for religious extremism, especially in the current geopolitical climate of the 
‘landscapes of the jihad’682 (and through reactionary governmental policies to this) but this is 
not necessarily the case. 
Islam has also continued to be very much a part of the Western social landscape due to cultural 
expression in religious practice of first-generation migrants. Religion is enacted through culture 
and whilst Ramadan683 seeks a separation between the two (which is also the approach taken to 
religion by neo-revivalists) this discounts the ‘lived’ social elements of religion by a focus solely 
on religion as the personalised expression of religiosity. In short, Ramadan seeks Western 
Muslims to divide aspects of their selves by being religiously Muslim and culturally Western. 
  
678 Roy, O. Globalized Islam: The search for a New Ummah. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004.
679 Robertson, R. Globalization: social theory and global culture. London: Sage. 1992.
680 Huntington, S.P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. N.Y.: Simon & Schuster. 
1996. 
681 See Silverstein, P.A. ‘Immigrant Racialization and the New Savage Slot: Race, Migration, and Immigration in 
the New Europe’. Annual Review of Anthropology. Vol. 34. 2005. pp. 363-84. 
682 Devji, F.  Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity. London: Hurst & Company. 2005.
683 Ramadan, T. Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 2004.
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This leads to issues of assimilation and integration and may have implications in the 
qualification of ethno-cultural identity formations leading away from relativism and towards 
inferior and superior ethno-cultural practices. However, Ramadan’s notion of active 
participation and integration of Muslims in Western society is an extremely valid and 
significant point leading to a reciprocal relationship between Muslims and Western secular 
society. Through the pressure to assimilate, neo-revivalists perform their reactionary identities 
in the public societal arena. This is not problematic in and of itself, and only becomes 
problematic when textual or other forms of violence are engaged with. Through the pressure to 
assimilate, a separation is sought of ethno-national and religio-cultural identities from the 
public to the private arenas of society. This may lead to a cultural confusion over the ‘essential’ 
aspects in each cultural setting which has implications for affiliations and loyalties of the 
individual and the collective with regard to acting in different ways in different social and 
cultural venues. 
The solution is to engage with a ‘cosmopolitan ethic684 of integration’ that overcomes 
essentialisations. In this arena, the public performance of religiosity is not problematic, as 
rather than a politicised identity marker, religious performance, such as through ethnic dress is 
seen as a cultural identity marker. The integrationist approach to immigration is inclusive of 
difference, and through the cosmopolitan ethic, individuals are treated as such. Diversity is 
embraced and viewed as cultural enrichment. Shared universal values are focussed upon rather 
than that which divides, and the goal instead is the realisation of our shared humanity that 
moves beyond binaries and polar opposites. Hybridity is normative, and issues involving 
immigration are dealt with as such, rather than being reduced to the realms of religious and 
cultural incompatibility. Dialogue and dialogism that is self-reflexive is engaged in, in a manner 
respectful of difference and plurality in order to overcome misconceptions that, more often 
than not, are perpetuated through ignorance rather than intention685. This shared humanity is 
realised by all in society, minorities as well as the majority culture, and rather than “engaging in 
  
684 Ramadan, T. ‘Manifesto for a new ‘WE’: An Appeal to the Western Muslims, and their Fellow Citizens’. 7 July 
2006. http://www.tariqramadan.com/article.php3?id_article=743    
Featherstone, M. ‘Cosmopolis: An Introduction’. Theory, Culture & Society. Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2. 2002. pp. 1-16; 
Beck, U. ‘The Cosmopolitan Society and its Enemies’. Theory, Culture & Society. Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2. 2002. pp. 17-
44; Turner, B.S. ‘Cosmopolitan Virtue, Globalization and Patriotism’. Theory, Culture & Society. Vol. 19, Nos. 1-
2. 2002. pp. 45-63; Appiah, K.A. ‘Cosmopolitanism’: Ethics in a World of Strangers. New York; London: W.W. 
Norton & Company. 2006. 
685 This can be carried out in the educational and media arenas. 
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crude taxonomy”686 through each essentialising the ‘other’, Muslims and non-Muslims are 
considered, not by what they are, but by who they are: necessarily complex human beings.  
As such, against essentialims, we must remember the diversity of Muslims, who do not engage 
in neo-revivalism or religious extremism but who do embrace their multiple affiliations rather 
than seek to self-essentialise, self-divide and self-other. 
  
686 Aly, W. People Like Us: How arrogance is dividing Islam and the West. Sydney: Picador. 2007. p. 243.
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